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CHAPTER III

THE DE\t-ELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF OUl"'ER SPACE
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RULES

A brief reference to the way in which legal "principles" and
"rules" will be used will contribute greatly to an understanding of
the problems involved in the development of the law of outer space.
International law, it has been said, is a body of principles and
rules binding upon states, international organizations, and individuals. A more traditional characterization of international law is
that it is a body of princi pies and rules generally accepted by civilized states as governing their interrelationships. A common element
of these vastly different approaches is that international law encompasses principies and rules. 1
The major difference between a principle and a rule is that the
former is intentionally broad in its coverage and fundamental in its
orientation. Rules are narrower, more specific, and are put forward
in terms of penalties in the event of noncompliance. Principles, like
rules, are intended to be interpreted. Nonetheless, principles tend to
be associated with eternal verities, whereas rules are more readily
affected by the pressures of the social complex and are, therefore, less
stable and less impressive in their historic acceptability.
The distinctions made by Pound are persuasive, and are accepted
here. He holds that a "principle is an authoritative starting point for
legal reasoning." '2 The principles are the product of developed experience. It is experience 'vhich society has determined to be significant and rests upon reasoned differences. As illustrations of legal
principles he refers to "where one intentionally does something
'vhich on its face is an injury to another he must respond for the
resulting injury unless he can justify it." Or, "One person is not to
be unjustly enriched at the expense of another." 3
Rules, on the other hand, are precepts which attach "a definite
detailed legal consequence to a definite detailed state of facts." 4 II1
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lustrations are cited from primitive codes, as in the Code of Haininurabi, "If a free 1nan strike a free n1an he shall pay ten shekels of
silver," or, in the Ron1an Twelve Tables "If a father sell the son
three times, let the son be free from the father." 5 Since it is not possible to imagine all possible fact combinations and assign legal consequences to conformity or failure to conform, the concept of the principle lends itself to a 1nore satisfactory description of total legal
possibilities.
In international law it is custo1nary to refer to principles of sovereign equality of states, national existence, national independence,
self-defense, international peace and security, etc. It has been con1mon practice to refer to these principles as fundamental rights. 6 The
rules of international law on the other hand relate to more prosaic
subjects, such as guides to treaty interpretation, procedures for obtaining diplon1atic privileges and immunities, factors to take into
account in the event of the nationalization of foreign property, etc.
The distinctions between principles and rules in international law
can be well drawn, and there should be no cause for confusion.
The principles and rules of international law are practiced ....-\.1though they exist in a loosely organized legal order they may be enforced, as well, depending upon the nature of the problem, the mutuality of interests, and the totality of the pressures contained within
the social complex of a given time and place. 7 It has been pointed out
that the rules of international law, no matter how perfectly stated,
cannot enforce themselves. Even so, it is well to recall that it is erroneous to believe "that legal rules are useless if they do not in then1selves guarantee lawful activity." 8 States, in considering the application of legal principles and rules to the use of outer space by space
devices, will be obliged to take into account the fundamental right
and duty relationships envisioned in such concepts.
Ibid.
Fenwick, International Law 213-214 (3d ed. 1948). Paton has described the
role and function of legal principles. "Through the medium of the principle, law
can draw nourishment from the Yiews of the community, for the ratio legis is
wide and, in deducing from it a particular rule, regard may be paid to the
circumstances to which the rule is to be applied." Principles serYe to giYe
cohesion to a particular branch of the law, take into account practical needs
and ethical requirements, and are "elastic enough to afford opportunities for
deYelopment in the rules that are based upon it." Paton, A Temt-Book of Jurisprudence 176 (2nd ed., 1951).
i I Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United
States 14-15 (2nd ed. 1945).
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Attention 'viii now be directed to the international principles and
rules, and to the rights and duties confronting states, and other international persons, in the rapidly emerging law of outer space.

B. THE DECISIONAL PROCESS
It is necessary to inquire initially if the traditional source of inte1::".
national law, custom, has as yet established norms of conduct for the
use of space devices. Attention will be directed to an analysis of
other internationalla w sources in following sections.
I. Cu§tom: Collaborative Activities and the Uniformity of
Expectations

In order to determine whether there now exists a customary international law for certain uses of outer space, it is necessary to focus on
a set of highly interesting facts. It is also necessary to relate this set
of facts to the components of customary law. By comparing the facts
with the legal standards and characteristics of custom,. it will be possible to come to certain significant conclusions.
a. 0 ollaborative Activities
The present large scale use of outer space by space devices resulted
primarily from the exploration of outer space by scientists during
the International Geophysical Year, July 1, 1957, to December 31,
1958.9 The successful employment of space devices during this period
by scientists from 66 states has resulted in continued cooperative
efforts in the areas of rockets and satellites. It has also contributed
1naterially to the development of additional cooperative procedures
for the same and different kinds of space devices for the period since
January 1, 1959.
The relationship of such practices and experiences is so important
to the development of an international law of outer space that the
highlights of these efforts need be briefly recounted.
The IGY was designed as a coordinated, scientific effort whereby
1nan would be permitted to comprehend more fully his multidimensional physical environment. Through the IGY n1any thousands of
scientists, the world over, acquired a new understanding of the earth
beneath, the air and 'vater about, and the universe around hi1n. Despite the fact that the IGY took place during the period of serious
political unrest and contention, cooperation among scientists, 'vithout regard to nationality, was readily achieved. The appraisal of Dr.
9 See generally Chapman, IGY: Year of D-iscover y (1959) ; lVIarsh a ck, The
lVorld in Space (1958) ; Sullivan, Assault on the Unknown: 'l'he Int ernational
Geophysical Year (1961) ; Wilson, I.G.Y., The Year of the New' ]loons (1961).
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Hugh Odishaw, Executive Secretary, United States National Colnmittee, IGY, is a challenging one. He stated "the IGY is the single
most significant peaceful activity of n1ankind since the renaissance
and the Copernican reYolution." 10 The IGY was an important elenlent of the larger scientific revolution " . hich has been described as
the event " . hich has influenced mankind more than any other since
the rise of Christianity. 11 These conclusions, 'vhich appear to be " . ell
merited, cannot but have a great influence upon the future course of
international la,v.
The concept of an International Geophysical Year dates back to a
discussion at the hon1e of Dr. James A. Van Allen on April 5, 1950.
Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner referred to the fact that 1957-1958 'vould be a
period of unusually high sunspot activity, and would fall twenty-five
years after the Second Polar Year. Since several eclipses were scheduled for the same period, it appeared to be an unusually propitious
moment for extended scientific investigations. Berkner, with the approval of the group, presented a program of scientific investigation
to an international scientific body kno,vn as the l\fixed Commission
on the Ionosphere during midsummer 1950. The latter referred it to
the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). The original
notion of a polar study was modified as the result of the interest
displayed by scientists engaged in meteorological, magnetic, and
electrical research. "When the ICSU General Assembly met in October, 1952, Dr. Sydney Chapman of Queen's College, Oxford, who
had been present at the Van Allen home in 1950, suggested that the
name be changed to International Geophysical Year. This proposal
was adopted. ICSU, in order to further the project, established a
Special Comn1ittee which during the summer of 1953 scheduled a
meeting attended by representatives of the numerous scientific unions 'vhich composed ICSU. 12 At this time a transition between man10

Report on the Int ernat ional Geophysical Year, February 1959, Hearings
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11 Butterfield, The Origins of :AI odern Science viii (1949).
12 Supra, pp. 81-84. ICSU has been described by Odishaw as "a non-governmental quasi-holding company, composed of subject-matter unions covering '\"arious fields of science with headquarters at The Hague." In Goldsen, ed., International Political Implications of Activities in Outer Space, 59 (1960).
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agement of the program by ICSU and its component scientific
unions took place, with national IGY committees assuming broad responsibilities. The national committees were coordinated under the
title of Oomit.e Special de l'Annee Geophysique International
(CSAGI). It was this group which was to be generally responsible
for the scientific planning of the IGY. 13
In the United States the national committee (USNC-IGY) was
appointed by Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, Chairman, National Science
Board, and President, National Academy of Sciences. The chairman
of USNC-IGY was Dr. Joseph !Caplan, and he was assisted by five
substantive committees in the fields of data processing and Antarctic,
Arctic, Continental, and Equatorial Activities. He was also assisted
by thirteen technical panels, including an earth satellite program
under the chairmanship of Dr. Richard ,V. Porter and a rocketry
program under the chairmanship of Dr. Fred L. Whipple. 14 It is
important to note the titles of the other panels since the satellite and
rocket programs provided n1eans to acquire scientific data in almost
all of these fields. They were aurora and airglow, cosmic rays, geomagnetism, glaciology, ionospheric physics, longitude and latitude,
meteorology and nuclear radiation, oceanography, seismology and
gravity, solar activity, and world days and communications. Scientists in the Soviet Union also organized their research activities
under the foregoing headings.
During the summer and early fall of 19·54, three private international scientific bodies adopted resolutions dealing with the use of
satellites during the IG Y. Of the resolutions adopted by the International Scientific Radio Union and the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, the one adopted by CSAGI at its General Assembly in Rome on October 4, 1954, is most pertinent. The CSAGI
General Assembly, after considering the research capabilities of both
rockets and satellites, resolved as follo·w·s:
In view of the great in1portance of observations during extended periods of time of extra-terrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper atmosphere, and in view of the
advanced state of present rocket techniques, CSAGI recommends that thought be given to the launching of small satellite
vehicles, to their scientific instrumentation, and to the new prob13

Sullivan, "The International Geophysical Year," 521 International Conciliation 269-271 ( 1959).
14 International Geophysical Year, A Special Report Prepared by the National
Academy of Sciences for the Oontntittee on Appropriations of the United States
Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 24-27 (1956).

130
lc1ns associated with satellite experiments, such as po,ver supply,
telemetering, and orientation of the vehicle. 15
. A_s a result of these recom1nendations the USNC-IGY, after deterInining the feasibility of satellites for scientific purposes, on ~!_arch
14, 1955, reco1nmended an IGY satellite program to the President of
the National Academy of Sciences and the Director of the National
Science Foundation. 16 On ~fay 6, 1955 the USNC-IGY special panel
on satellites trans1nitted "the proposed program to the Government
through the National Science Foundation. Late in July, the Government's approv-al of the satellite program permitted the chair1nan of
the USNC to notify CSAGI of our plans." 11
An exchange of informative letters then took place between Dr.
ICaplan and Dr. Chapn1an, who at this time was President of
CSAGI. On July 26, 1955, ICaplan -n~rote:
The Committee on behalf of the National Academy of
Sciences wishes to inform you at this time that, in response to
the CS .A.GI resolution, the progran1 of the United States for the
International Geophysical Year no'' includes definite plans for
the launching of s1nall satellites during the International Geophysical Year.
The United States National Co1nmittee believes that significant scientific data may be gathered as a result of this program
in such fields as geodesy, atmospheric physics, ionospheric physics, auroral physics, and solar radiation. The participation of
other nations engaged in the International Geophysical Year is
invited, and to this end we shall provide full scientific information on the orbiting vehicle so that other nations may monitor
the device and make appropriate observations. The United
States National Committee looks forward to the interest and
15

5 Rocket and Sa-tellite Conference Document 4 (September 25, 1957) ; also
quoted by Odishaw "The Satellite Progran1 for the International Geophysical
Year," 35 Departnwnt of State Bulletin 281 (1956) ; Additional CSAGI resolutions were adopted at the ",.estern Hemisphere Regional Conference, Rio de
Janeiro, 1956, the General Assembly, Barcelona, 1956, the joint CSAGI/CSA
Conference, South Africa, 1!)57, and the 'Yestern Pacific Regional Conference,
Tokyo, 1957. These resolutions dealing 'vith the use of rockets and satellites for
scientific purposes, called for the dissemination of acquired research data, designation of polar orbits, compatibility of tracking and telemetering systems, ,
launching schedules and quality of instrumentation. 5 rt&s Conf Doc. Supra,
5-10.
16 Odishaw, ibid.
17 Ibid.
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cooperation of other nations in what it hopes will be one of the
great scientific achievements of our time. 18
In his -response to Dr. }(a plan dated August 3, 1955, Dr. Chapman
wrote that he was pleased to learn that "your Committee felt able to
resolve to construct and launch small satellites as a part of the United
States contribution to the International Geophysical Year and to
announce these plans publicly." 19 On July 29, 1955, President Eisenhower, through his press secretary, announced that he had "approved
plans by this country for going ahead with the launching of small
unn1anned earth-circling satellites as part of the United States participation in the International Geophysical Year ~ * * The President
expressed personal gratification that the A1nerican program will
provide scientists of all nations this important and unique opportunity for the advancement of science." 20
The foregoing expressions occasionally appear to denote an official
or public character for the United States IG Y rocket and satellite
programs. Although the broad details of the IGY programs were
planned and initiated by scientists around the world, the scientists
were compelled to secure funds, as well as logistic support, from
national governments in order to embark upon their imaginative
plans. 21
The IGY program could, of course, have been managed in several
ways. It might have been implemented through scientists acting independently of their national governments and in cooperation with
scientists, acting as individuals, situated throughout the world. Or, it
might have been approached politically, with the programs being
entirely initiated and managed by governments. In view of the governnlental support needed by and given to the scientists, it might
have been regarded as a mixed effort. It has always been the position
of the United States that the power to make decisions as to policy
and plans was in the hands of the individual scientists (some of
who1n were in the employ of the national government), and that the
policy and planning influences of the government were minimal. In
the United States, government interest in policy matters, to the extent that it existed, depended upon the government's need to be kept
a ware of funding and logistical support requirements. The influence
of such matters on the policies and plans of the scientists was quite
18

Ibid., 281-282.
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20 "Plans for Launching of Earth-Circling Satellites," 33 Department of State
Bulletin 218 (1955) ; Odishaw, supra note 15, at 282.
21 Odisha w, ibid.
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lilnited. The great freedo1n given to United States scientists in this
kind of situation has been applauded by l(illian. He has said that
"international groups of scientists see1n able to achieve cooperation
of great i1nportance 'vhen they are free of political entanglements
and can act freely with the tropisn1 toward cooperation which is
traditional among scientists." 22
In the United States the link between scientists and national government was effected under the "joint auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Foundation." '23 Several
illustrations of the planning, policy, and managerial roles of the
scientists may be mentioned.
In July 1955, plans to send scientists to the Antarctic were fixed
by them at an IGY meeting in Paris. Details were worked out for
the establishment of about 30 scientific stations by about twelve
countries. Further, the scientists "mapped out a coordinated plan for
appropriately spacing the scientific stations and agreed on the establishment of an Antarctic 'Veather Central where information can be
pooled, collated, and disseminated. They worked out common safety
procedures and reached other amiable decisions about their joint
effort." 24 Scientists interested in the IGY rocket and satellite programs coordinated extensively in selecting and manning tracking
and observational facilities. Agreement was also reached as to the
appropriate radio channel for use by the United States radio tracking system for Explorer I and Explorer III and Vanguard I, namely 108 and 108.03 mc.'25 The Soviets received 20.005 and 40.002 me.
for Sputniks I to Ill.
In order to understand the impact of space activities during the
IGY on the development of a customary international law of outer
22

Killian, "Shaping a Public Policy for the Space Age," in Bloomfield, ed.,

Outer Space Prospects for },fan and Society, 190--191 (1962) ; Compare, ~leany,
"Cooperation in Science, Culture and Education," 37 Department of State Bulletin 765 (1957).
2 3 White House Press Release, l\Iarch 28, 1955, 32 Department of State Bulle-

tin 644 (1955). For a delineation of ways in which United States scientists may
be related to the national government, see DuBridge, "Policy and the Scientists," 41 Foreign Affairs 571-573 (1963).
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space it is necessary to characterize the nature of such activities.
Although much of the planning and management of scientific activities 'vere in the hands of private persons-most often scientistssuch activities received substantial governmental assistance. The case
of the United States is illustrative.
Just as many governments gave assistance to their national IGY
com1nittees, so the United States provided substantial assistance to
the United Stares National Committee. Beginning in 1954, Congress
provided some forty-three million dollars for the United States
scientific aspects of the program. 26 The Navy added logistic support
in the Antarctic through the use of the icebreaker, the U.S.S. Atka,
and in Operation Deep Freeze 1. 27 The Department of State "worked
with the American scientists in their planning. It has lent its facilities for developing cooperative arrangements with scientists in other
countries when such arrangements were appropriate." 28
The Department of Defense provided much assistance to the
USNC-IG Y in its rocket and satellite program. 29 Additional assistance came from the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Weather Bureau, and the National Bureau of Standards. Additional assistance
ca1ne fron1 private organizations and institutions, especially the universities. 30
By way of illustration it may be noted that in private negotiations
for the establishment of a 'vorld data center to be located in the
United States and to be used in the collection, collation, and distribution of scientific information, American scientists took the position
that they would commit the United States to an expenditure of two
million dollars. The uniqueness of the situation was described by
Odisha w as follows : "vVe took that position not being in fact sure
that we could guarantee it. We agreed for purely scientific reasons;
yet, one could say that we had committed the United States. Nevertheless, a certain freedom of maneuver was left to the government
because it was not committed officially. Any embarrassment from a
refusal by the U.S. government to implement our share would have
fallen mainly upon the Academy of Sciences and the scientists
involved." 31 Through a 1nyriad of such private understandings,
26
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29 Atwood, supra note 26, at 684.
30 Odishaw, Report on the IGY, 1959, supra note 10, at 20.
31 Odi'shaw, "Comments," in Goldsen, supra note 12, at 77-78.
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buttressed by substantial govern1nental support in 1noney and in serYices, a pattern of international cooperatiYe conduct en1erged.
The IG Y clearly den1onstrated the ability of scientists from sixtysix countries to 'vork together through their nongovern1nental international organizations. 32 The scientists as the "producers, supporters
and consu1ners" 33 of international scientific activity 'vere organized
on a private national basis. Nonetheless, they were frequently nlobilized by governn1ental bodies to e1nbark upon the vast explorations
of the IGY. This 'vas well su1nmarized by Odishaw:
First, it 'vas not a government program, although governments at hon1e and abroad supported it generously. Second, it
was not a military progra1n, although the 1nilitary establish1nents of n1any govern1nents, like our o'vn, provided a variety of
logistic support. Third, it "~as not an 'internationalized' program, even though one of its greatest achievements was in the
field of international cooperation. The very fact that it was none
of these things accounts for a large n1easure of its success, scientific and international.
'VJ1at it was and what it is is this: A gathering together of
private human beings, each of whom had a vital personal interest in a particular subject, each of whon1 felt that this subject
needed, out of its own exigencies, a concerted attack, but one for
which a simple, uncluttered mechanism would suffice.
Thus the IGY was at root an enterprise of private persons, an
enterprise in the hands of doers, and the form and shape it took
largely reflect this. This for1n and shape reveal much about the
character of the IGY and may well afford a pattern worth
noting, worth using again in other areas.
Deliberations at the general assemblies suffered from no obvious considerations of national 'face,' or considerations of official positions in other areas or at other times, as formal governmental deliberations inevitably appear to do. Energies were
directed to the restricted problen1 at hand. By and large, the
problem's own objectivity led to objectivity in discussions, conduct and action. 34
Even before the IGY had come to a close, participants were making plans for continuing the researches conducted during 1957 and
32

33

Atwood, supra note 25, at G82.
Brode, "National and International Science," 42 Department of State Bulle-

tin 736 ( 1960).
34 Odishaw, Repm·t on the IGY, 1959,

~pra note 10, at 19-20. Compare, Odishaw, "International Geophysical Year," 128 Science, No. 3339 (1958) and 129
Science, No. 3340 (1959).

135
1958. The successor organization in the United States was known as
International Geophysical Cooperation-1959 (IGC-59). Thus, public
support for privately initiated space activities was extended in the
years i1n1nediately following the close of the IGY.
IGC-59 was proposed by the Soviets shortly prior to the 1958
CSAG I n1eeting in ~foscow. United States scientists discussed the
proposal advanced by Soviet scientists with representatives of the
United States government in order to ascertain govern1nental policy
on the extension of the IGY. Follo,ving a revie'v of reasons 'vhy
IGC-59 might be established, and after consultations between leading American scientists and representatives, it was decided that
An1ericans ·would cooperate with three programs during the IGC-59.
These three programs dealt 'vith network activities, funded 1najor
programs, and special projects. 1"'he network activities included the
fields of meteorology, ionospheric physics, vertical incidence, geoInagnetism, oceanography, and tide gages. The funded areas included
the Antarctic and space science programs, which the United States
had planned to continue on a national basis in any event. The special
projects areas included investigations of aurora and airglow, cosmic
rays, geomagnetism, glaciology, gravity, ionospheric physics, longitude and latitude, meteorology, oceanography, rocketry, seis1nology,
and solar activity. 35
According to l(aplan there were five major reasons for continued
geophysical cooperation during 1959:
( i) The fact that many IGY programs and projects got started late in 1957; ( ii) observations of large scale geophysical
phenomena, as for example, atmospheric circulation and sea level
changes, incidence of aurora, etc., require extensive observations of the kind fostered by IGY for as long as possible; (iii)
observations of phenomena related to solar effects should be continued through the diminishing part of the solar cycle to capitalize fully on the IGY observations during the peak of the greatest cycle ever observed; (iv) to provide for the possibility of
n1odifying certain progra1ns to secure scientific infor1nation of
greater significance and greater value to the elucidation of early
IG Y information; and, ( v) to maintain international geophysical cooperation on an operational level to provide for continuity
to future cooperative programs (oceanography, space exploration, Antarctic, Arctic, etc.) which are now being planned and
35
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for 'vhich international com1nittees have been or may soon be
established. 36
Because of the un,villingness to ter1ninate a scientific program 'vhich
'vas able to supply valuable data, the IGY 'vas replaced by the
IGC-59, the USNC-IGY 'vas replaced by the USNC-IGC, and
CSAGI ·was replaced by the Special Committee for Inter-Union
Cooperation in Geophysics (SCG). Despite the changes in nomenclature the manifest intent o£ the earth-space scientists, with the approval of their respective governments, was to continue the basic
scientific research engaged in during 1957-1958. The United States
scientists in contemplating IGC-59 were aware. that "rocket and
satellite prograins 'vould be largely under the sponsorship o£ NASA,
and that the 1959 program in the Antarctic was already impleInented." 37 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration had
been created on July 29, 1958, and thereupon established an Office o£
International Progra1ns.
Nonetheless, private scientific space activities involving the use o£
rockets and satellites were to be continued, with such research to be
coordinated through ICSU's new Committee on Space Research
(COSP. A. R). The latter had been established during ICSU's General
Assembly 1neeting in 'Vashington in October, 1958. According to the
ICSU resolution, the purpose o£ COSPAR was "to provide the
''orld scientific community with the means whereby it may exploit
the possibilities o£ satellites and space probes o£ all kinds for scientific purposes, and exchange the resulting data on a cooperative
basis." 38 It 'vas assigned the responsibility o£ "continuing and
fostering, after the end o£ the IGY, international cooperation in all
sciences that make use o£ the ne'v research tools o£ rockets
and satellites." 39
The ongoing work of COSP AR since 1958 has been highlighted by
two essential contributions. Its members have continued to plan and
participate in much o£ the rocket and satellite "~ork accomplished
36 Ibid., 0. Berkner supported continued international cooperation in this field
because of the need to continue the operation of tracking stations in many
countries "telemetry has to be done in different places; there are scientists
abroad who have good ideas that should be incorporated in the experiments in
rockets and satellites * * *" Berkner, supra note 10, at 182.
37 Kaplan, supra note 10, at 9.
38 Soviet Space Progranzs, supra note 10, Chapter I at 177; "Radio Frequency
Control in Space Telecommunications," Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1060). The Charter of COSPAR is
printed in Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Symposium, supra note 9,
Chapter I at 1292-129G.
39 1 CO SPAR Information Bulletin 1 (:March 1060).
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during IGY. However, COSPAR is not an operational activity. Second, it has encouraged a "spirit of scientific cooperation in fields
closely related to space research, and * * * [has] provided a meeting
place for exchange of scientific initiative from all directions." 40 It
has served as a medium for the distribution of space information,
including notice of projected launches by the United States, and
scientific papers presented at annual forums of the organization. 41
The broad scope of its work has been well summed up by Berkner.
He has said that "As its charter indicates, COSPAR is not concerned with the technology of rocketry, with launchings or with
launching vehicles. It is concerned with scientific experiments, onboard and ground-based, which may be conducted by means of rockets and space vehicles. In broad terms, it is concerned with pure
scientific inquiry." 42 It is noteworthy that scientists from all tracking countries, as 'vell as the launching countries, have joined to promote the success of this scientific endeavor.
During IGY the United States satellite program was designed to
launch 12 satellites. 43 While more than 300 research sounding rockets
were launched successfully during the IGY, only eight United States
launches of space vehicles proved to be successful. By comparison the
Soviets successfully launched but three satellites. The United States
was successful in its launch of five satellites, namely Explorer I,
Vanguard I, Explorer III, Explorer IV, and Project Score. The
United States also launched successfully three lunar probes, namely,
Pioneer 1, 2, and 3. The successful Soviet satellite launches were
Sputnik 1, 2, and 3. The perigees of these successful satellites varied
from 115 statute miles to 408 statute miles. The apogees varied from
588 statute miles to 2462 statute miles. 44 All were launched in connection with reasonable scientific research goals. They were engaged in
peaceful, that is, nonaggressive and beneficial uses of outer space.
As is 'veil known, space devices comparable to those launched
during the International Geophysical Year have been continually
employed for comparable purposes during the years since 1958. As of
Schwartz, ':International Space Organizations,'' in Odishaw, ed., The Challenges of Space 246 (1962) ; Schwartz, Internat,ional Organizations and Space
Cooperation 32-55 (1962).
41 van de Hulst, "COSP AR and Space Co-operation," in Odishaw, ed., supra
note 40, at 265-266; Soviet Space Programs, supra note 38, at 177-180.
42 Berkner, "The Continuing Space Program," S'ltpra note 10, at 178-177-180.
43 International Geophysical Year, supra note 14, at 17 (1956).
44 2 STL Space Log 8-9 (December, 1962); 1 COSPAR Bulletin 3-5 (l\1arch,
1960) ; Van Allen, "U.S. Rocket and Satellite Program," supra note 10, at 158,
also includes Vanguard II, launched on February 17, 1959, as a "U.S. IGY
satellite."
40
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Inid-1964, it has been reported that the United States had 100 space
vehicles in orbit, Canada 1, and the Soviet Union 16.45 It should be
recalled that about 150 space vehicles had been orbited successfully
up to 1963, and that a considerable number of launches have failed to
place a vehicle into orbit.
Official confir1nation of the relationship bet\veen government and
scientists in the United States during the IGY was acknowledged by
President Eisenhower on October 9, 1957. After calling attention to
the decision taken by space scientists in Ron1e in October 1954, recomn1ending that a scientific satellite program be instituted, ·which
decision was arrived at by then1 in their private, or nonpublic, capacities, the President stated:
Responsibility within the Govern1nent for scientific aspects
of the program ""as assigned to the National Science Foundations, working in close cooperation with the United States N ationaJ Co1nmittee for the International Geophysical Year. The
Department of Defense was made responsible for supplying the
rocketry needed to place a satellite in orbit without interfering
""'ith the top-priority ballistic missile program. In line "\vith the
reco1nmendations of a group of United States scientists advising
the Department of Defense, the satellite project was assigned to
the Naval Research Laboratory as Project Vanguard. 46
The extent to which national governments supported scientific
efforts during the IGY, particularly so far as outer space activities
were concerned, led to some speculation in the United States and
elsewhere as to the legal implications arising from the launch and
use of space devices. 47 In order to establish a position for the United
States, ~ir. Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser to the Department of
State, in testifying before the Special Senate Com1nittee on Space
and Astronautics as early as ~iay 14, 1958, observed "The arrangements with respect to the International Geophysical Year were not
made on an intergovern1nental basis. They "\Vere arrangements made
between scientific bodies in a private capacity. It is true that certain
governments, including the Soviet Union and the United States, announced in advance that during the International Geophysical Year
they intended to place objects in orbit around the earth. And it was
4 STL Space Log 40 (Summer, 19G4), "Totals include unidentified U.S.
spacecraft." Ibid.
46 37 Departn~ent of State Bulletin 673 (1957) ; White House Press Release,
October 9, 1957.
47 Becker, ":Major Aspects of the Problem of Outer Space," 38 id. 965 (1958).
45
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also stated in connection 'vith these announcements that the purpose
of these satellites ''ould be for scientific investigation." 48
Before coming to any conclusions about the possibility that there
n1ay be customary international la'v governing certain uses of outer
space, it will be desirable to summarize the practices and usages developed during the IGY, as well as subsequently. The IGY and
IGC-59, as previously indicated, we.re essentially the product of
scientists organized through their own private professional organizations. The latter were organized on a geographical rather than a
national basis. In the United States the cooperating scientists were
1nobilized throught the National Academy of Sciences, and in the
Soviet Union the same type of organization was employed. Nonetheless, each of the cooperating national committees received substantial
support of varying kinds from national governments.
A formal treaty did not result from the multiplicity of such private agree1nents and practical acts flowing therefrom. In commenting
on the totality of the IGY experience, Haley has said:
Nevertheless, a valid binding world pact emerged from these
acts of agreement and cooperation. The international pact, in
'vritten form, may be abstracted from the thousands of documents and exchanges from 'vhich the living IGY evolved. There
is nothing about a single formal treaty 'vhich makes it sacrosanct or makes it even an essential source of international law.
In many instances the principles set forth in the treaty itself
1nay have been established in international law long prior to the
signing of the formal document. A rule of international law
does not receive its validity from its enactment into a legal instrument, much of valid international law is not so enacted; and
there are rules of international law which are not valid, although enacted in such instruments. Enactments, therefore, is no
objective criterion for the alleged validity of a rule of internationallaw.49
There can be no doubt that national governments assumed that they
had an interest in the launching and transiti1·1g o£ satellites during
the IGY. It was the government of the United States, speaking
through the office of the President, which announced the participa48 Ibid.

This position was again stated on August 26, 1958 before the American Bar Association; Becker, "The Control of Space," 39 id. 418 (1958).
49 Haley, "Recent Developments in Space Law and l\.:Ietalaw-,Vork of International Groups," 24 Harvard Latv Record 3, Special Supp. (Feb. 7, 1957) ;
Legal Problen~s of Space Exploration, 99-100; "Law and the Age of Space," 5
St. Louis University Law Journal 8 (1958).
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tion of "this country" in the IGY satellite progra1n. 50 Similar announcen1ents during the IGY 'vere n1ade well prior to launches by
the Pre1nier or other oflicials of the Soviet go\ernment. A number of
public international agreen1ents were entered into by the United
States w·ith other countries per1nitting the installation of tracking
and other scientific equipn1ent for the measurement of satellite orbits
and to receive other scientific space data. 51 Further, the United States
and the Soviet Union, as launching states, abstained from discussing
with subjacent states the need for transit permits for orbiting satellites both during the IGY and subsequently. 52
The rocket and satellite program of the IG Y and IGCr-59 cannot
be stereotyped as either a wholly private or a wholly governmental
activity. And even if it ·w·ere considered as an entirely private activity, it is clear that private policy making and the private formulation of international practices may be more influential when effected
by private instrumentalities than when initiated by some governments.53
The i1npact of the IGY experience and subsequent purely national
practice, including occasional joint national efforts, has been appraised variously. So far as the relationship of the IGY to the development of a customary international law of outer space is concerned,
there are varying views. Relying largely on the facts of governmental publicity given in advance of launches and the absence of
national protest respecting orbital missions, Roberts has observed
that "the only rational conclusion is that there is an implied agreement, at least for satellites launched during the IGY, that they
would be allowed to circulate freely in outer space." 54 Yeager has
pointed to the existence of a community of interests during the IGY,
and has concluded that the self-imposed rules flowing from this experience have a material bearing on the development of a customary
law of outer space.55
"Plans for Launching of Earth-Circling Satellites," 33 Depa1·tmcnt of State
Bulletin 218 (1955).
51 Infra, pp. 79-80.
5 2 Roberts, "Outer Space and National Sovereignty," 12 Air University Quarterly Review 60 (Spring 1960).
53 )!iller, "The Adequacy of International Law in :Meeting the Challenge of
the Present Era," 8 Howanl University Law Journal 93 (Spring 19G2) has
asked: "Who would dispute that Aramco is a more significant participant in
the world power process than, say, Costa Rica or ~!ali?'' Compare, ~!iller, "Tbe
Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community," 46 Virginia
Law Review 1539 (1960).
54 Roberts, supra note 52, at 59.
55 Yeager, "A Code for a New Frontier," First Colloquium 119 (1959).
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0 bj ection has been raised by Smirnoff to dra 'ving conclusions
about the evolvement of a custo1nary law fron1 the IGY experience.
In referring to the IG Y "agreement" he has urged that such an
"agreement can only partially be regarded as a juridical basis for
flights in outer space or as a tacit consensus of all the nations of the
world." 56 He bases this conclusion on two facts, namely, that at the
time of the IGY, nations were psychologically unaware of the "imminent dangers which space flights presented to mankind." {) 7 This
position appears to be highly unrealistic and without substance. Secondly, according to Smirnoff, "because of the legal vacuum in outer
space, no one who might have wished to make a protest could find
any firm and stable principles in the law upon which it could be
based." 58 This conclusion has also been subject to attack and
rej ected:59
The unreality of the arguments raised by Smirnoff has become
apparent in recent years. The uses of outer space at the present are
more extensive than at the time of his writing in 1958. Nonetheless,
with this knowledge and with perhaps a broader psychological awareness of space capabilities and practices, no official public protests
have been made. At present the United Nations resolutions, the
Charter, and international law generally are conceded to be applicable to outer space. Still at issue, however, is the extent to which
IG Y and subsequent practices have contributed to a customary internationallaw of outer space.
l(opal cites two non-American authors in support of the view that
"by the resolution of the International Geophysical Conference (sic),
although it was a nongovernmental action, a legal basis for the
launching of satellites has been established, as the attitude of scientific organizations was supported by the agreement of Governments." 60 Since governments entered into no express agreements on launching or orbiting satellites, l(opal appears to refer to
56

Smirnoff, "The Need for a New System of Norms for Space Law and the
Danger of Conflict with the Terms of the Chicago Convention," ibid. at 106
(1959).
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Ibid.
Ibid.

Kopal, "Two Problems of Outer Space Control," Third Colloquium 111, and
footnote 9 at 112 ( 1961) .
60 Ibid., 110. He makes reference to Korovin's article ''International Status
of Cosmic Space," 5 International Affairs (Moscow) 53-59 (January 1959),
Legal Problems of Space Exploration, supra note 9, Chapter I at 1062, and to
the book of the Czechoslovak author, Outrata, International Law 228 (1960).
He also cites Becker, supra note 47. Becker's position is much narrower than
the one advanced by Kopal. Compare, infra, pp. 142-143.
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the practices ''hich developed during the IG Y period. 1\::opal stated
further "The agree1nent on the IG Y undoubtedly represents fro1n
the point of vie'' of International Law an important ele1nent in the
establislunent of the legal regilne of outer space." 61 He supports this
conclusion on the ground that "there does not exist any legal norm
forbidding the flights into outer space and in it for peaceful
purposes.'' 62 This reason is consonant with the broader principles of international la\v set forth in the Lotus case. 63 Under its
rationale international law does not in fact provide specific coverage
of the totality of international relations to the extent that international la\v prohibits only such conduct as in fact is forbidden. This
si1nply means that until the principles and rules of international law
interdict certain acts that such acts may be engaged in. Since international la\v does not interdict the peaceful uses of outer space, it is
clear that it may be used for such purposes. Because of this overriding approach to an understanding of the principles of international
la '"'' it is at least possible to agree with the conclusion reached by
1\::opal as expressed in these ''ords: "Outer space * * * is and should
re1nain freely accessible under equal conditions to peaceful research
and exploitation by all countries." 64 Exploitation, of course, does not
n1ean appropriation. Appropriation \vas specifically prohibited by
paragraph 1. (b) of the terms of General Assembly Resolution 1721
(XVI) .65 Exploitation means the peaceful use of outer space for beneficial scientific and commercial purposes.
Becker, writing during the IGY, noted the limited purposes of the
satellite progra1n, namely, that satellites would be used for "scientific
investigation." 66 Observing that no nation had protested the
announce1nents of the United States and the Soviet Union respecting
the orbiting of satellites, he sought to clarify a misconception with
respect to the rights of the United States. He stated that he had seen
it stated several times that the United States does "not have any
right to protest or take any action with respect to satellites because
Ibid., 110.
Ibid.
63 The S.S. "Lotus" (France Y. Turkey), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, Ko. 10 (1927) ; 2
I-Iudson, 1rorld Court Reports 20 ( 1935).
64
Kopal, supra note 59, at 110. This conclusion of course, is almost identical
with Par. 1. of the statement of principles adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Xations on Deceinber 20, 1DG1, 1721 (XYI). Annex 2, infra, pp.
4-!3-44G.
65 Annex 2, infra, pp. 443-44G.
G6 Becker, sup1·a note 47, at DG5.
Gl
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of the events relating to the International Geophysical Year." 67 He
then indicated :
It follo,vs, therefore, that the only conclusion that can be
reached with respect to the arrangements regarding the International Geophysical Year is that there is an implied agreement
that, for the period of the International Geophysical Year, it is
permissible to put into orbit satellites designed for scientific
purposes. Once the year is over, rights in this field will have to
be determined by whatever agreement may be reached with respect to such objects. 68
After making reference to national air space rights contained in the
Chicago Convention of 1944, and after making a comparison with
the development of rights in the Antarctic, he stated "So, too, in
outer space the United States has already engaged in activities
which, it could be asserted, have given to it certain rights as distinguished from those states who have not engaged in such activities.
Up to this time the United States has made no claims of sovereignty
based upon such activities." 69
From these observations it will be seen that the legal adviser to the
Department of State acknowledged the presence of a process whereby international rights were being established. With the continuation of the IGY through the IGC and subsequent practices, IGY
activities were enlarged and new and extended space progra1ns came
into being. Ho,vever, the space programs continued to demonstrate a
primary and funda1nental interest in peaceful and scientific matters.
Despite the presence of space devices in areas superjacent to nation-states, there have been no reported instances of official or equivalent public protests concerning the launching or the transiting of
such spacecraft and space vehicles. This fact has been commented on
by a very large number of the writers who have discussed space subjects since 1958. 70 In 1961 and again in 1962, John A. Johnson, General Counsel for NASA, referred to the fact that no official protests
67

Ibid.
Ibid.
6 9 Ibid., 966.
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John Cobb Cooper, "Flight-Space and the Satellites," 7 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 82, 87 (1958). Feldman, "An American View of
Jurisdiction in Outer Space," First Colloquium 47-48 (1959). Gatland, "Contribution," ibid., 63. Gorove, "On the Threshold of Space,'' ibid., 74. Smirnoff,
"The Need for a New System of Norms for Space Law and Danger of Conflict
with the Tern1s of the Chicago Convention," ibid., 106 (1959). Haley, "The Rule
of Law in the Space Age," 37 Foreign Policy Bulletin 190 (1958). Legal Problems of Space Exploration, supra note 9, Chapter I, 579. Cheng, "Problems of
Space Law,'' Legal Problems of Space Explorat-ion, ibid., 668. Gatland, "Sur-
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had been n1ade concerning the launching or orbiting of satellites. 71
1\.1nong others this was also noted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Gardner/ 2 and in 1963 by ~{cDougal. 73
No official protests have been filed by governments respecting the
practice developed during the IG Y, and followed every year thereafter, of placing space satellires in orbit. In marked contrast has
been the extensive diplomatic objection to overflights by conventional aircraft and balloons. Force has been employed to prevent the
overflight of U-2 type aircraft. 74
So1ne "\vriters have concluded from the fact that there have been no
official protests resulting from the orbiting of satellites that there
has been a tacit acceptance by states of the legal right for such space
vehicles to be in orbit. 75 A key issue to be resolved is whether official
tacit consent exists and, if so, "\vhat the legal consequences of known
practice may be. This practice includes the orbiting of unmanned
craft during the IGY and the subsequent transiting of manned craft.
It coYers vehicles used for a large variety of purposes, all of which
have been employed for peaceful, that is, nonaggressive and beneficial purposes.
Yeillance from Orbit," ibid., 671. Bastid, Cours de Droit International Approfondi 574 (1958). Lall, "Space Exploration-Some Legal and Political Aspects,"
Second Colloquiunt, 89 (1960). Vallardo, "The Law of Interplanetary Space,"
ibid., 159. Herter, "News Conference of April 8, 1960," 42 Department of State
Bulletin 643 (1960). !{opal, "Two Problems of Outer Space Control," Third
Colloquium., 110 (1961). l\1artin, "International Space Law and Outer Space,''
ibid., 105 (1961). Leopold, "Cosmic Surveillance by Space Flight 1\Iomentum," 6
Wayne Law Review 329-330 (1960). Lipson, "Some Problems of the Near Future and Possible Approaches," in Goldsen, ed., International Political Implications of Activities in Outer Space 82 (1960). Roberts, supra note 52, at 59.
11 .Johnson, 55 Prooceedings of the American Society of International Law 167
(1961) ; "The Future of l\Ianned Space Flight and the 'Freedom' of Outer
Space," N A. SA News Release 6 (August 4, 1962).
72 Gardner, "Law of Outer Space," 56 A.J.I.L. 798 (1962) ; Departntent of
State Press Release No. 159, ( l\Iarch 10, 1962).
73 l\IcDougal, Comments at Conference on "Specific and Urgent Problems in
the Law of Outer Space," 1\Iontreal, April 13, 1963, in Cohen, ed., Law and
Politics in Space (1964) at p. 105.
74 Lissitzyn, "Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 Incidents," 57
A..J.I.L. 135 (1962) ; Lissitzyn, "The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent
Practice and International Law," 47 A.J.I.L. 559 (1953). See Cheng, "International Law and High Altitude Flights: Balloons, Rockets and l\1an-Made Satellites," Legal Problents of Space Exploration, supra note 10, Chapter I, 141;
Roberts, supra note 52, at 58-59; Bloomfield "The Prospects for Law and
Order," in Bloomfield, ed., supra note 22, at 172 (1962).
75 Rivoire, "How to Introduce the Law into Space," Second Colloquiunt, 129
(1960) ; Raucbhaupt, "'\Vorld Space Law," ibid., 125.
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In addition to the problem of the orbiting of artificial satellites, at
heights and for the purposes presently employed, there is also the legal problem of the passage of such craft through traditional airspace
"\V hile en route to and from the orbital altitudes. This raises the
question, among others, of a right of innocent passage by satellites
"\vhile possibly making a descent through the airspace of the nonlaunching state.
The United Nations, through its reports and resolutions, to say
nothing of its being a forum for the presentation of national points
of view, has focused attention on the absence of official objection to
orbital activity and to the concept of tacit consent. The first significant international analysis of the legality of space activity adopted
the language of "permissibility" for the launching and orbiting of
space vehicles. The report is noteworthy because of the early recognition of such rights.
Pursuant to Resolution 1348 (XIII) ,76 December 13, 1958, the
General Assembly created an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space. The Committee concluded its work on June 25,
1959, and filed an extensive report on July 14, 1959. 77 Pursuant to the
above Resolution, paragraph 1 (d), the Committee was told to report
on "The nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying
out of programmes to explore outer space." 78 In connection with the
question of the freedom of outer space for exploration and use, the
report stated:
9. During the IGY 1957-1958 and subsequently, countries
throughout the world proceeded on the premise of the permissibility of the launching and flight of space vehicles which were
launched, regardless of "\vhat territory they passed 'over' during
the course of their flight through outer space. The Committee,
bearing in mind that its terms of reference refer exclusively to
the peaceful uses of outer space, believes that, with this practice,
there may have been initiated the recognition or establishment of
a -generally accepted rule to the effect that, in princi pie, outer
space is, on conditions of equality, freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with existing or future international la"\V or agreements. 79
76

Documents on Disar·ma1nent, 1945-59, Vol. II, 1305. Annex 7.
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78 Ibid., 1.
79 Ibid., 23.
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The Ad Il oc Co1n1nittee's report "~as discussed by the First Cominittee of the General 1\..sseinbly on Decmnber 11 and 12, 1959. 80 Ambassador I.Jodge gave full endorsen1ent to the report. He singled out the
paragraph quoted above and stated that "his delegation supported
the vie'v expressed in * * * [it, and] that it ·was becon1ing a generally
accepted principle that outer space 'vas freely available for exploration and use by all, on an equal basis, in accordance with existing
international law or agreen1ents." 81 General approval of the report
of the .ild Hoc Con1mittee 'vas voiced by representatives from Sweden, Argentina, Cuba, the United ICingdom, Japan, Canada, and
China. 82
International lawyers soon co1nmented on the development of a
rule of international law looking to·ward the permissibility of peaceful uses of outer space. Binet stated in 1959, after referring to the
above quoted paragraph, that the Committee report "may be considered as the first official pronouncement on at least one aspect of the
principle of freedo1n of outer space." 83 ~Iachowski has concluded
that "In view of recent developments [1959], the permissibility of
launching un1nanned space vehicles cannot be objected to." 84 ICucherov in analyzing the 1958 views of the Soviet writer, Galina, has
stated that Galina has "argued that since there is no international
law covering the outer space, any government may indefinitely
launch rockets or satellites into interplanetary space without asking
permission of any other government." 85 In referring to the previously quoted paragraph, Senator Thomas E. l\1artin has described
the work of the Committee as "liberal and forward looking * * * "
and has declared that "This premise appears to have been supported
by the fact that such space activity has been undertaken and that no
8o U.N. Doc.

A/C.1/SR.1079 and A/C.1/SR.1080.

Ibid., 279.
82 Ibid., 281-291.
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Binet, "Toward SolYing the Space SoYereignty Proble1n," Second Colloquiun~, 12 ( 1960).
8 4 :\lacho,vski, "The Legal Status of Unmanned Space Vehicles," Second Colloquiu1n 117 (1960).
85 Kucherov, "Legal Problems of Outer Space, U.S.A. and Soviet Viewpoints,"
Second Colloquiun~, 67-68 (1960). !{opal has provided the following translation
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Kopal, "Two Problems of Outer Space Control," Third Colloquium, 110 (1961).
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authenticity than those of Galina, rejects the view that international law is not
applicable in space, and supports the permissibility of the use of outer space
for peaceful purposes. Kucherov, supra at 68.
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nation has raised objection to the launching o:f space vehicles by another. Thus it would seem to me there has been acceptance o:f the
principle of :freedom of exploration and scientific observation in
much the same manner as was agreed in vVashington last December 1
[1959] with respect to the continent of Antarctica." 86
On the basis of all of the :facts resulting :from the total space experience to date, it is now possible to reach some legal conclusions. In
such an analysis the basic problem is to interpret in legal terms the
quality o:f legal permissibility resulting :from the absence o:f protest,
or tacit consent to, respecting the launching and the orbiting o:f the
type o:f spacecraft and vehicles actually placed in orbit. Has the
clearly established practice been transformed into a customary rule
o:f international la 'v? The author believes that a rule o:f customary
international law now exists making it permissible :for satellites and
other space instrumentalities to be used :for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial purposes, and that so long as such devices are
engaged in such uses that no state may validly object to their employment. It is :further believed that :future commentators will agree
with this judgment, and that ongoing practices 'vill support this conclusion.
Support o:f this conclusion will also depend upon an adequate appraisal o:f the characteristics and nature o:f customary international
law. A brie:f analysis o:f the significant indicia o:f customary internationalla w :follows.
b. The Uniformity of Expectations
The importance o:f custom as a source o:f international law was
recognized by Grotius. In the Prolegomena, he re:fers to the law o:f
nations as being :founded on custom and the testimony o:f those who
are skilled in it. 87 Other :factors which must be weighed in determining the existence o:f a customary law o:f outer space include: how it
is created, its impact on conduct, the extent o:f its duration, the repetitive aspects o:f the practice, the nature o:f those who engage in the
significant practices, the extent to which the practices are accepted,
1\iartin, "International Space Law and Outer Space," Third Colloquium, 105
(1961). Compare Galloway, "The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space," Second Colloquium, 38, 40 (1960). See Johnson,
"Scientific Organizations and the Development of International Law," 54 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 206 (1960).
87 Grotius, The Laws of War and Peace, Prolegamena, 23 (1625). (Classics of
International Law, 1925). Custom was equated to tacit agreement by Grotius.
He wrote, "When many at different times, and in different places, affirm the
same thing as certain, that ought to be referred to a universal cause * * *"
drawn either from the principles of nature or common consent.
86
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the relationship between custom and new· states, the problem of resource states, vagaries of interpretation, and resistance to customary
rules.
\Vhat is custom and how is it created~ Custo1n, as law, requires
confor1nity to a given course of conduct. It depends upon the acceptance by states that certain practices are legally binding, "opinio
juris," and that there is a duty to conform. It derives fro1n past
international conduct during which an adequate consensus has been
reached respecting acceptable behavior.
Past conduct is relevant to custon1ary international la'' since it
assists in clarifying expectations for standardized future behavior.
Conduct is not only a course of action but is also a claim that certain
modes of behavior correspond with current com1nunity benefits and
values. Claims are presented to the w·orld community, based on the
expectation of reciprocity, and 'vhen validated by the decision
makers in the world community, become effective legal rules.
It is the function of the community to determine the validity of
claims. Therefore, the community accepts claims which accord with
its needs and values, even though the claims may be advanced by but
a single nation or other legal personality. In this connection it has
been pointed out that "It is not of course the unilateral claims but
rather the reciprocal tolerances of the external decision-makers
which create the expectations of pattern and uniformity in decision,
of practice in accord with rule, commonly regarded as law." 88
Custom, being the product of common consent, is observable in the
:form of practice, usage, and positive acts. The actors, of course, must
be equipped with the capability to engage in the specific conduct
which is custom building. Thus, in outer space, custom is first of all
the product of the conduct of 'vhat I shall call resource states, namely, those possessing the capabilities of putting into orbit, and
maintaining in orbit, space vehicles. 89 However, since space vehicles
use a dimension which is not suited to the occupation or complete
control of the resource states, and since space activities are earth and
man oriented, it can be stated that the nonresource states have a
valid interest in space activities and may be entitled to be consulted
88 ~IcDougal, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the
Sea," 49 A.J.I.L. 358, footnote 7 ( 1955).
89 Compare l\Iarshall, C. J., The Antelope, 10 Wheat 66 (1825). He based his
conclusions on the practices of only those states "who possess distant colonies *
* *'' These states at that time sanctioned the slave trade, and it was only to
the practices of a limited number of states that ~Iarshall turned to ascertain if
a customary rule of law existed.
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in connection with the use by space vehicles of this environment. 90
Their conduct, like that of the resource states, is an essential factor
in the development of a customary law of outer space. 91
The nonresource states have contributed to the development of a
customary rule of law permitting the peaceful uses of outer space by
their tacit consent to the orbiting of space vehicles. The fact that
such states have not officially protested the pattern of conduct of the
resource nations constitutes a silent acknowledgment of the development of a customary rule of international law. The legal equivalence
of tacit consent and tacit agreement was accepted by Vattel in Le
Droit des Gens. 92 Through the tacit acceptance on the part of nonresource states of the conduct of resource states, they have helped in
the creation of the customary rule of peaceful, that is nonaggressive
and beneficial, uses of outer space.
The validity of this conclusion must be tested against the other
considerations mentioned above. It is generally agreed that a customary rule of law depends upon the existence of a continuous situation. The essential practice, usage, positive acts, and tacit consent or
agreement, as measured by lack of protest, must meet the test of minimum duration.
The time span of minimum duration for space vehicles must take
into account the tempo of modern times, and this is not uninfluenced
by the speeds achieved and achievable by satellites which can now
orbit the earth in approximately one hour. There is a general consensus that customary rules of international law may develop over
quite short periods of time. It is also agreed generally that the recognition of the existence of a rule is more important than the mere
lapse of time.
The traditional view has been stated by Hackworth. He has written "Customary, as distinguished from conventional, international
law is based upon the comn1on consent of nations extending over a
period of time of sufficient duration to cause it to become crystallized
into a rule of conduct." 93 Several writers have noted that in fact
customary law has in the past developed "slowly" 94 or "after a long
90

The concerns of nonresource states for legal principles and rules for outer
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91 Jenks, "The International Control of Outer Space," Third Colloquium/ 6
(1961).
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historical process." 95 They, as 'veil as others, point out, ho,vever, that
customary international law has solidified quickly in son1e circumstances. Custo1nary international law developed slow·ly with respect
to diplo1natic privileges and immunities and the right of coastal fishing ships to be i1nmune from capture during hostilities. 96 ~1oore suggested that the passage of 100 years in the instance of coastal fishing
ships was "amply sufficient to have enabled what originally may
have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by
the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of international law." 97 In the area of private law, it has also been accepted
that the La'v ~ferchant evolved slowly from practice to customary
law.
On the other hand, 'vhere simultaneous interests based upon mutual advantage have existed, practice has evolved very quickly into a
rule of international la 'v. This has been seen in the area of maritime
rules of the road, 98 international air law ,99 the continental shelf/ 00 exemptions from local jurisdiction of ar1ned forces authorized to cross
national boundaries, and where practice has been approved by the
resolution of an international organization. 101
l(unz also has observed that the length of time during which a
practice is follo,ved is not determinative of the existence of a customary rule of international law. 102 Tunkin agrees with Kunz that it is
not juridically necessary for a "customary rule to be 'old' or of long
95 Starke, An Introduction to International Law 32 (3d ed. 1954). Dickinson
has suggested that customary international law "grows glacially." Law and
Peace 117 (1051). A German court in Lubeck v. Mecklenburg-Schwer-in stated
"If, as is generally recognized, no general rules can be drawn up as to the
number of customary acts and their duration, one single case of usage does not
suffice as a rule." The Court added that Triepel's comment to the effect that
"under certain conditions one single act of international practice based on
usage may suffice for a conclusion as to the existence of a rule of international
law to be ventured" did not suggest that a single case of usage would normally
constitute the basis for a customary rule of law. I (2) Zeitschrift fur
AusUindisches Ofjentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 180, 183-186 (1929) ; translated in I Hackworth, Digest of International Law 15-16 (1940).
96 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
97 I 1\Ioore, A Dige8t of International Law 7 (1906).
98 The Scotia, 14 Wallace 170, 188 (1871).
99 Jacobini, supra note 94, at 4.
100 Young, "Sedentary Fisheries and the Convention of the Continental Shelf,''
55 A.J.I.L. 369 (1961) ; Josef L. Kunz, "Continental Shelf and International
Law: Confusion and Abuse," 50 A.J.I.L. 823 (1956) ; Jacobini, supra note 94, at
4.
1o1 Starke, supra note 95, at 35, footnote 3.
1 0 2 Kunz, "The Nature of Customary International Law," 47 A.J.I.L. 666
(1953).
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standing," 103 and then stated "Although in fact time plays a big
part in the process of formation of a customary norm of internationallaw, juridically the element of time cannot in itself have a decisive
significance. Depending on circumstances, a customary norm may take
a long time to develop but may also be formed in a short period of
time." 104
In support of the practical needs of the world community, Wilson
has rejected specific limitations upon the factor of duration. He has
written that "If for a time international intercourse follows certain
methods, these methods are regarded as binding in later intercourse,
and departure from this procedure is held a violation of international right." 105 The well known analogy between the formation of a
path across a common and customary international law is particularly appropriate to practice, usage, and positive acts in space. In
pointing to the fact that usage develops into custom, Pitt Cobbett
wrote:
At first each wayfarer pursues his own course; gradually, by
reason either of its directness or on some other ground of apparrent utility, some particular route is follo,ved by the majority;
this route next assumes the character of a track, discernible but
not as yet well defined, from which deviation, however, now becomes rare; 'vhilst in its final stage the route assumes the shape
of a well-defined path, habitually followed by all who pass that
way.1os
The illustration provided by Cobbett suggests that custom results
from repetitive acts carried on at presumably rather frequent intervals. Although repetitive conduct provides notice to the world of a
practical state of affairs, it is far from clear that either highly repetitive conduct or such conduct over an extended period of time is
required for the development of customary rules of international
law. As has been previously suggested there is a body of opinionTunkin, "Remarks On the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law," 49 California Law Review 419 (1961). Compare, Krylov, "Les
notions principales du droit des gens," 70 Recueil des Oours 441-443 (1947).
1 0 4 Ibid. He cites in support of this conclusion Verdross, Volkerrecht 85 (4th
ed. 1959). Kunz has characterized other parts of Tunkin's article as a "defense
of the obsolete and fictitious construction of international customary law as
pactum tacitum, a construction so dear to nationalistic writers, some time ago
* * *" Kunz, "The Changing Science of International Law," 56 A.J.I.L. 498,
footnote 34 ( 1962) .
1os Wilson and Tucker, International Law 39 (8th ed., 1922).
106 Cobbett, Oases and Opinions on InternaUonal Latv, 5-6 (3d ed., 1909).
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certainly not predominant-that custom must be the product of slow
and repetitive conduct, \vell admixed \Yith extended and complacent
meditation.
This myth has been invalidated by Fenwick who has pointed to
the need to examine different types of conduct in different situations
before forming judgments on the subject. In contrasting the development of rules during occasional periods of maritime warfare with
frequent, if not daily, co1nmercial activities, he has indicated the way
in \vhich customary law is developed. He has "~ritten:
l\1any of these rules, such as those relating to maritime warfare, had their origin in the practice of a single state which was
able to in1pose its \vill until the rule came to be accepted by other
states without protest.
Other rules, notably those relating to commerce, had their origin in the voluntary practice of a small group of states, and
being found useful and convenient, were gradually accepted by
other states until the established practice became a binding
rule. 107
The practice of orbiting space vehicles has been both continuous and
uninterrupted since 1957. In view of these facts, it is noteworthy that
Tunkin has observed that "Some authors are of the view that only
continuity of international practice can lead to the establishment of
a customary norm of international law. This is not so, however. It
would be more correct to say that not one norm of international law
has appeared as a result of international practice that had no
interruption." 108 Tunkin qualified this conclusion somewhat
by adding that discontinuity might-depending on the character of
the modification of practice-affect the creation of customary international law. In last analysis, however, in his vie,v, neither the element of time nor the factor of continuous conduct play "a decisive
role" 109 in the development of custon1ary international law.
The number of states engaging in a common practice also conditions the development of customary international law. It is not correct to pass judgment upon the development of a customary interna1o1 Fenwick, International Law 72 (3d ed., 1948). The influence of a single
state, England, in the development of certain customary sea law rules is well
known. The Scotia, 14 Wallace 170, 188 (1871). For a recent interpretation of
the holding in the case of The Scotia, see Goldie, "Special Regimes and Preemptive Activities in International Law," 11 Int'l & Oomp. L. Q. 681-683
(1962).
108 Tunkin, ::;upra, note 103, at 420.
109 Ibid., 421.
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tional law for space based on the fact that there are but t'vo major
space states. vVhile it is true that the United States and the Soviet
Union possess advanced space technology and have engaged in successful space launches frequently since 1957, there are other factors
to be taken into account. As has been pointed out, the United States
has joined in launches with other countries. 110 Agreements have been
entered into among European states for launching projects. 111 International agreements between the United States and many states permit such collateral and necessary activities as monitoring, data accumulation, and dissemination within such states. 112 The United States
has made many offers of scientific cooperation with other states for
cooperation in space activities. lVIany of such offers have been accepted and practical programs have been placed in operation. Further,
the policies respecting the peaceful uses of outer space have been put
forward by the launching states and have been based on the belief
that such policies were to the advantage not only of the states having
an advanced space technology but also beneficial for all states. The
determination of international space policy has been the product of
the community of states-not just those possessing advanced launching and orbiting capabilities.
It is true, nonetheless, that at the present there are but two launching states which are well equipped with substantial space capabilities. These are the space resource states, and it is necessary to examine their unique contributions to the development of a customary
international law of outer space. Do their clain1s-in the for1n of
demands presented to the world community-have a special quality,
and do their practices largely condition the customary law of space?
It is clear in the formulation of custom that claims of a unilateral
character are advanced, and further, that decisions as to whether
such clain1s will be recognized as custon1 depend not only upon the
views of such states, but also upon the views of nonresource or nonclaimant states.
The role of resource states has been described for the law of the
sea by Colombos. He has asserted that "Custom is the most important source of the international la'v of the sea and the usages of the
110

See sup1·a, pp. 78, 99. The United States has invited nations of the world
"in advance of each launching of its meteorological satellites * * * to co-ordinate weather observations of their own with data obtained through simultaneous
passes of the [United States] satellites above their skies." U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/PV, 18 (1962). By l\Iarch, 1962, some thirty states had participated
in such activities as a result of the invitations.
111
Supra, pp. 17, 81-84.
l.12 Infra, pp. 78-80.

154
great 1naritime States must therefore always exercise a weighty in·
fi uence on its develop1nent. There is good justification for such a
claim on the ground that the Powers most concerned with a subject
are able to understand it best." 113 It is only common sense to conclude
that the resource states must initially establish usages and practices,
and may establish customary procedures for themselves. The role of
other states, although important, is initially subsidiary. "\Vhile the
clanns of other states "may be of importance in the recognition of
the genesis of a right * * *," such claims "cannot in themselves alone
establish international customary law." 114
While "common consent is the basis of all law," 115 and while custom is "that line of conduct which the society has consented to
regard as obligatory," 116 customary law is the ultimate product of
the initial claims of resource states as determined to be binding by
the world community. Thus, while unilateral acts may be required to
start the process of customary law on its way, and may even thereby
perhaps "create legally binding effects in international law," 117 it is
through the processes of mutual accom1nodation or "mutual
toleration" 118 based on the expectation of reciprocity that the
true consensus of agreement is arrived at.
l\fany sources must be considered in determining whether the accumulation of mutual tolerances in the area of outer space has in fact
produced a customary international law of peaceful, that is, nonaggressive and beneficial uses of outer space. These include: the statements of publicists 'vho have examined the facts of space activity in
a legal context; records of diplomatic instructions and negotiations;
statements of diplomats who have participated in the formulation of
legal rules; judicial acknowledgment based on evidentiary attestation; international resolutions taken by international organizations;
practices of international organizations, including both private and
public bodies; municipal laws, treaties; and, of utmost importance,
the actual existence of observable common conduct so broadly re·
spected as to eliminate doubts as to its existence and as to the duty to
Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 7 (4th ed. 1959).
Lubeck v. ~Iecklenburg-Schwerin, I (2) Zeitschritt fur AusUindisches
Ofjentlichcs Recht und Volkerrecht 180, 183-186 (1029), translation in I Hackworth, supra note 93, at 16.
11s I Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International Law 15 (8th ed. 1955).
ns I Westlake, International Law 14 (2nd ed. 1910).
113
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Abi-Saab, "The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations," 8 Howard University Law Journal109 (1962).
u s nlcDougal, "Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space," 52 A.J.I.L. 430
(1058).
111
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conform. The clahns which take these forms "create expectations
that effective power will be restrained and exercised in certain uniformities of pattern." 119 Chief Justice Marshall, in deciding a case
dealing with practical experiences of resource nations, concluded that
"The modern usage of nations" may become law and that which is an
established rule or practice is the basis for such law .1:20
It bears emphasizing that the pattern of conduct which leads to
customary international law may be· the conduct of different legal
persons. Thus, in principle it 1nay be the conduct of states, or of
international organizations both public and private, and of individuals acting either personally or collectively. In the launching and
orbiting of space vehicles, the conduct has been that of states, both
individually and collectively, and of individuals-with the support
of states, both individually and collectively. Examples of the latter
include corporate or group activities by such organizations as the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, and the different private scientific groups during and after the International Geophysical
Year.
Maritime customs have been created by individual mariners. The
Law Merchant was the product of individual traders. Early communications practices and usages of commercial companies were readily adopted by national governments because of the inherent practicability of their activities.121 Usages perfected by private entities
have been sponsored and carried forward by governments. Changes
by both the private entities and by governments have led to suitable
practices, and these have provided the pattern for the development
of customary law. 122 This has been equally true for space vehicles.
1\fcDougal, supra note 88, at 356. Compare, Kunz, supra note 102, at 667; I.
Hyde, International Law Chiefly a.s Interpreted and Applied by the United
States 11 (2nd rev. ed. 1945) ; Kopelmanas, "Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law," Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 127 (1937) ; Gianni, La Ooutume
en droit international (1931).
12 0 United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters 51, 87 (1833) ; Compare Finch, Les
sources modernes du droit international, 53 Recueil des Oours 581 et seq.
(1935) ; Jaffe, "Reliance Upon Custom and General Principles in the Growth of
Space Law," Military Law Review, Department of the Army Pamphlet
27-100-20, 167 (April1963). In this article Jaffe has sought to repudiate earlier
views contained in his "International Law and Space Exploration," 6 St. Louis
University Law Journal68-69 (1960).
121 DeWolf, "Telecommunications in the New World," 55 Yale Law Journal
1281 (1946). Glazer, "The Law-Making Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and in Space," 60 Michigan Law Review 269
(1962).
122 Cobbett, supra note 106, at 6.
119

156
Practices similar to those conducted during the IGY have been continued under governmental management. ~!odifications of private
practices have been initiated. Old and ongoing private practices have
merged with governmental practices. The latter have been creative
and extensive. The resultant blend of private-public practices has
fallen more and more under the management and control of governments, so that what was initiated as a private scientific effort has
beco1ne a full-fledged government concern with a very large part of
planning, management, and operations now falling within the dotnain of governments.
A substantial product of this transitionary situation has been for
practices-both early and late-to constitute customary legal claims.
Through practice and usage, meeting the requirements set out herein,
a customary rule of international law permitting the launching and
orbiting of space vehicles of known and future types for peaceful,
that is nonaggressive and beneficial purposes, has been established.
This conclusion is based on the premise that resource states and
interested nonresource states have given their approval to this vie,v,
and that this view has come "to command a general assent * * * ".123
This raises the question of whether general assent or something
n1ore or less than such assent is required to establish a rule of customary international law. vVestern authorities are of the opinion that
general assent is all that is required to demonstrate the existence of
a customary rule of international law .124 1\:unz holds that general assent, as demonstrated by general practice, rather than unanimous or
universal practice, proves the existence of a valid rule of customary
internationallaw. 125 But, he also has concluded that "a mere majority
of states is not enough." 126 Quadri has taken into account the qualitative condition of states in terms of the totality of power at their
disposition in arriving at the conclusion that the political effectiveness of states, as brought to bear on usage and practice, largely affects
the existence of customary rules of international law. States possessing a preponderance of force, that is, having the "'vill, decision, and
action common to a definite group capable, if necessary, of imposing
Ibia.
Kelsen, Principles of International Law 313 (1952) ; 1 Guggenheim, T1·aite
de Droit International Public 49 (1953) ; l\Iorelli, Nozioni de Diritto Internazionale par. 19 (3d ed., 1951) ; Basdevant, Regles generales du droit de la paix,
58 RecueU de8 Cours 509 (1936) ; Sierra, Tratado de Derecho Internacional
Publico 25 (2d ed. 1955).
125 Kunz, 8upra note 102, at 666.
126 Ibid.
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its power * * *" are capable of maintaining valid customary legal
rules. 1 .27
The Soviet writer, Tunkin, has distinguished between factual and
juridical considerations as respects the development of customary international law. While acknowledging that the position of the
"Great Powers in the first place, is of decisive significance in the
creation of generally accepted norms of international law* * *" 128 he
has also indicated that from a juridical point of view "the wills of
the different states in the process of creation of norms of international law are equivalent to each other." 129 He then argues against the
universality of application of customary legal rules arrived at only
by a preponderance of resource states. It is his contention that customary norms of international law "being a result of agreement among
states, the sphere of action of such norms is limited to the relations
between the states which accepted these norms as norms of international law, i.e., the states participating in this tacit agreement." 130
His conclusion is entirely too narrow, and fails to take into account
the fact that customary international law has always been a formidable and valuable device to bind a state even against its will in some
situations. His argument suggests that general customary international law or universal customary international la'v can only be the
product of either general or universal consent of nations.
A quantitative vote built on Tunkin's vastly oversimplified premises 'vould destroy the utility of customary international law and
stagnate the totality of international law. Both practical necessity
and moral responsibility require only that international customary
law be practiced and accepted by resource states generally and not
universally. It is always subject to the community test of reasonableness. So far as the peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, use
of outer space is concerned, the resource states constitute the select
Quadri, Le fondement du caractere obligatoire du droit international public 80 Recueil des Oours 583, 625 (1952). Compare Quadri, Droit international
cosmique, 98 Recueil des Oours 524-539 (1959).
12 8 Tunkin, supra note 103, at 427; Korovin bas stated that for space law this
must be "the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.-tbose most concerned with the problems." Conquest of Outer Space 94 ( 1959). Quoted in Soviet Space Programs,
supra note 10, Chapter I, at 217. However, in 1960 the Soviet writer, Zhukov,
stated that the United Nations "must take the necessary measures to ensure
that the conquest of outer space serves only peaceful purposes." Zhukov, "The
U.N. and the Peaceful Use of Outer Space," 1960 Soviet Year-Book of International Law 186 (1961). Compare Zhukov, "Practical Probleins of Space Law,"
International Affairs (Moscow) 27-30 (May 1963).
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid., 428.
127
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fortun in "~hi ch the rules are created and iinple1nented. It is, nonetheless, important to note that through the resolutions of the United
Nations General Assmnbly, a vast 1najority of the world's states, and
all of the members of the UN, have subscribed to the principle of the
peaceful uses of outer space.
The emerging customary rules of international law applicable to
outer space apply with equal force to all members of the world community. The customary rule of peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, uses of outer space has come into being simultaneously with
the death of empires and with the creation and proliferation of new
states. Since they by their conduct have accepted this rule, the fact
that some of these states have made unspecific criticisms of the role
of customary international law in effect at the moment of their being
accepted into the world community is lacking in significance. It
should, perhaps, be noted in passing that several countries, particularly the Soviet Union and some of the new nation-states which have
not yet overcome the forces of excessiv_e nationalism, have urged that
the only true source of international law is the express or written
agreement. From this unacceptable premise all kinds of weird conelusions have been dra,vn, including the false concept that new states
are not accountable to customary law created prior to their existence
and that practices must be accepted universally before customary
rules of international la "\V can exist.
Tunkin has set forth the Soviet viewpoint that customary international law is subject to "reservations" on the part of new states
which "have the juridical right not to recognize this or that customary norm of international law." 131 From this he has argued that
"agreement between states lies at the basis of the process by which
customary norms of international law are created." This condition is
attributed by him to the existence of states based on different and
opposed social systems. On these grounds he has concluded that it is
not possible to create "norms of law binding upon the states of both
systems, except by agreement between them based on equality." 132
This observation reflects the Soviet preference for specific 'vritten
consent as a condition precedent to the existence of legal obligations.
The current Soviet dissatisfaction with customary international
law, as well as some treaty law, has been noted by Crane. He has
131
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val War College Review 1 (1961).
132 Tunkin, Bupra note 103, at 430. So far as

~orne of the new states are
concerned "The Soviet Union's outspoken attitude toward custom has provided
them with a powerful example." Abi-Saab, 8Upra note 117, at 106.
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stated that Soviet writers, such as Korovin, Kozhevnikov and Zadorozhniy, have held that customary international law "must represent
the wills of the socialist countries in order to be binding," and that
this fact is determined by Soviet "consent." 133 Crane has concluded
that Soviet resistance to customary international law is based on the
vie'v that "an absolute agreement of wills between socialism and capitalism is impossible any,vay." 134 While the Soviets acknowledge
the existence and importance of international law, they regard it as
being in a condition of progressive transformation to the end that it
will more proximately serve the political goals of the Soviet state.135
Lurking in the not too distant background of Soviet thinking on
the development and force of an international customary law of
outer space is the matter of security and self-defense. As a closed
society the Soviets have long maintained an almost irrational concern for secrecy and for the elimination of information gathering
concerning their activities. It has been in this light that in July 1960,
Soviet writers alleged that the United States was trying to develop
evidence of "customary norms of law" so that the United States
might be able legally to employ reconnaissance satellites. 136 It has
been the contention of Soviet officials and writers that the use of
such satellites would be provocative and aggressive conduct. The
United States has maintained such uses to be peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial.137
rreeming difficulties exist in relying upon customary international
law as an effective source in the ongoing legal process. The judicial
133

Crane, "Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law," 56 A.J.I.L. 719
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134 Crane, ibid., 719.
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135 1\IcWhinney, "'Peaceful Co-Existence' and Soviet-Western International
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test of constant and uniform usage was applied in the Asylum Oase
in 1950. The Court said:
The party which relies on custom * * * must prove that this
custom is established in such a manner that it has beco1ne binding on the other party * * * that the rule invoked * * * is in
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the
States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a
right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incun1bent on the territorial state * * *.138
In that case the contentions based on the alleged existence of a
customary rule 'vere rejected. The cumulative effect of the foregoing
factors produced that result. The Court thought that the facts disclosed too much uncertainty and contradiction in the exercise of the
practice. It was also held that there had been too much fluctuation
and discrepancy in the practice. Many differences of opinion over an
extended period had been voiced by officials, and no clear pattern was
identifiable. According to the Court, existing international agreements failed to establish a required pattern. Earlier political expediency had too largely infiltrated the claims of the decision makers.
The Court's decision reflected the two major difficulties with respect to custo1n, namely, "(1) the difficulty of proof, and (2) the
difficulty of determining at what stage custom can be said to become
authoritative." 139 Kunz has emphasized the latter, and has noted
that "here is the difficult field of distinguishing between a new
customary nor1n which has come into existence, and mere proposals
for or tendencies toward creating such new norm." 140
In addition to the defects as to content and method of proof,
which characterizes customary law as uncertain law, it usually
suffers by reason of relatively slow growth and reliance upon precedent. Usually growing fairly slowly it may be difficult for it to keep
abreast of the tempo of the times. "Being based upon precedent, [it
has been] * * *unable to fill up the gaps in international law as these
were disclosed by the development of clearer conceptions of internaAsylum Case [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 276-277; Haley, in "Recent Developments
in Space Law and ~Ietala,v-\Vork of International Groups," supra note 10,
Chapter I, at 102-106 points out that prior to the development of efficient
communications it was difficult to know bow extensive common practices actually were.
139 Cobbett, supra note 106, at 6.
140 Kunz, supra note 102, at 668.
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tiona! justice." 141 Jurists, themselves, have been at fault in not distinguishing clearly enough between customary rules which were "generally adopted by the nations as a body and those to which t'vo or
more nations, their own included, have given their consent." 142
Further, this law is "highly suspected by the new nation-states who
have had little direct participation in the past uniformities of behavior from ·w·hich implicit policies are sought." 143
McDougal and Feliciano note additional difficulties with custom as
a source of international law. They point out that it provides "few
clarifications in terms of detailed principles of content and procedure* * * ".144 vVhile agreeing that customary law is not based on the
principle of unani1nity, they also point to the vagueness of the rules
which have been created. This of necessity leads to "many vagaries
in interpretation * * * ".145 This in itself is not a unique restriction on
the customary law of outer space. All law, and especially that portion dealing most intimately with principles, is subject to the vagaries of interpretation. Further, the "soft" law of custom, as opposed
to the "hard" law of treaties, particularly lends itself-through interpretation-to the dynamics of the space complex.
Another serious indictment of the customary process is its relative
inability to deal with certain types of situations. The process pern1its,
forms of conduct but does not cope adequately with the need to.
negate m1practiced conduct of an antisocial nature. Thus, although
the uses of space for purposes of contamination or as an environment
for weapons of mass destruction are universally condemned, custom
is not so effective in inhibiting unpracticed conduct as in upholding
practiced conduct. Nonetheless, it must be argued that the tacit
agreement of resource states not to engage in such space practices as
these may be creative of an international customary legal duty to
abstain from such uses. Explicit treaty arrangements provide a prac·
tical form for such law.
Perhaps the gravest problem is to ascertain when practices and
usages, 'vhich have had no binding legal obligation, are transformed
into obligatory legal rules of customary international law. Since
custo1n does not speak for itself, it has long been the duty of legal
141
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commentators to acknowledge the existence-thereby confirming its
past factual existence-of custon1ary legal rules. Customary law
must be promulgated by the expert. The scholar has had the duty of
examining the evidence-using materials from whatever quarter
available-bearing upon the existence of the customary rule. In such
a process the evidences of customary law have often been hardly
distinguishable "from the custon1s themselves which made up the
law." 146
In making the required tests to determine the existence of a customary rule of law, the scholar is confronted by two major concerns.
He must first be convinced of the existence of the fact of customary
law. International morality and courtesy typically precede international practice. At the point where they have been absorbed by
"opinio juris," there is no longer the problem of the existence of custom. Rather, it has now become a separate problem of identifying an
existing custom with satisfactory evidence. Evidence, in this situation, becomes a "matter of observation and appreciation, and not of
logical and mathematical decision, just as is the answer to the question, How many grains make a heap~" 147 The conduct is a matter of
fact, not of theory, and the role of the lawyer then is simply to
acknowledge that "the rule which may be abstracted from such conduct is a rule of customary International Law." 148
Secondly, the scholar must be aware that although international
morality and courtesy may precede the acceptance of the customary
rules of international law, such law need be neither just nor
humane. 149 However, in promulgating the existence of customary
international law the scholar need not be deterred by the fact that
the customary rules may suit the higher needs of the world community, as, for example, the rule that outer space shall be used only for
peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial purposes. That the scholar
has some election is attested to by the fact that the rules do not speak
for themselves and by the further fact that practices may and do
vary from those with a high and a low content in justice and humanity. This has been clearly indicated by Fenwick in calling attention
to the role of Grotius in setting forth customary rules of international law, and whose views served the needs of the social complex. Fenwick has said :
The great treatise of Grotius would have fallen short both of
the author's high purpose and of the world's needs had he been
Fenwick, supra note 107, at 73.
Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, supra note 115, at 17.
148 Ibid., 27.
149 Kunz, supra note 102, at 666.
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content to do no more than record the actual practices of nations. The urgent task, as he felt, was not to set forth the uncer-tain and unjust usages of the time, but to lay down better rules
of conduct based upon inferences from moral principles acknowl~
edged in the abstract but consistently violated; and his appeal
from existing practice to the ideal conduct was so forcible that
his words became authoritative arid statesmen relied upon his
judgments as the correct inference from accepted general
p rinci ples. 150
The development of a customary law for outer space has been eased
by the fact that there have been only consistent practices whereby
outer space has been used for peaceful purposes. It is, however, perhaps fortunate that the customary law of outer space relating to
peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial uses, can look to both established usages and also to broader and more fundamental principles, namely, the extended moral and social values to which the
rule so measurably contributes.
"\Vhile nation -states have not denied the existence of a customary
rule of international law requiring that outer space be used for
peaceful purposes, and while such states have acted continually in
support of this rule, several unofficial commentators have suggested
the possibility that such a customary rule does not exist. It should be
noted at the outset that these scattered views generally have come
from authors who maintain that formal or written international
agreements constitute a preferred source of international law. Such
authors generally are the spokesmen for a few of the newly independent states. In the latter category are the writings of Abi-Saab 'vho
has urged that "Custom as a source of international law is generally
on the decline." 151 The socio-economic orientation of such writers
have been attuned occasionally to Soviet protestations. Thus, AbiSaab has objected to an extended role for customary international law
because it "developed in a social milieu radically different * * *" 152
from that of the newly developing states. Such writers also have
sought to base their opposition to custom on the fact that custom has
borrowed from legal systems other than those which are being experimented with in some newly independent states. A further objection
to custom, as previously indicated, is that it minimizes extreme notions of sovereignty fostered in the Soviet Union and in states falling under the latter's political influence.
Fenwick, supra note 107, at 73.
Abi-Saab, supra note 117, at 106.
l52 Ibid.
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At least one author has come to conclusions respecting the legal
tneaning of the IGY experience different from those arrived at in
this study. 153 ''Triting before the IGY had been concluded, Gorove
has sought to negate the intimation of such writers as John C.
Cooper 154 that "a broad rule of international law has already been
created." 155 Because his views were expressed so early, Gorove
failed to haYe the benefit of the total IGY effort and the continuation of its essential elements after 1958. Thus, his conclusion that the
IGY failed to produce any "authoritative prescriptions" 156 can be
largely discounted.
The absence of official protests respecting the satellite practices
inaugurated in 1957, is clearly one of the major factors in the establishnlent of a custo1nary rule for space vehicles. However, the effect
of a customary rule of international law may always be so1newhat
influenced by future and as yet unknown national proclamations.
The significance of such a contingency has been taken into account
by l(unz, who has said: "Protests by other states or declarations that
they, even if submitting to this practice, do so only ex gratia; protests against the norm on which an international decision is based,
e\~en in carrying out this decision, preYent the con1ing into existence
of a new norm of customary international law." 157 Kunz places emphasis on the condition of universality of acceptance rather than on
the practical fact of common practices of resource states.
153
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Cooper, "Flight-Space and the Satellites,'' 7 Int'l &; Comp. L. Q., 82, 87
(1958).
155 Gorove, "On the Threshold of Space: Toward a Cosmic Law," First Colloquitun 74 (1959).
lsG Ibid., 76. It is submitted that the conclusion of Leopold who wrote in 1960
is to be preferred. He stated that "the repeated unprotested passes of orbiting
space craft launched by one state, over the domains of other states during the
past two years, seems indicative that at least a customary rule of international
la'\\ has been generated to the effect that irrespective of the altitudes to which
the sovereign territorial air space of surface states may ultimately be codified
as extending, orbital flight should be considered as exempt therefrom, i.e., orbiting vehicles and vehicles in powered flight characterized by momenta greater
than the orbital momentum could be considered as enjoying rights of transit
analogous to easements or rights-of-way, over the domain of other states."
Leopold, "Cosmic Surveillance by Space Flight :Momentum," 6 1Vayne Law ReL"iew 329-330 (1960). This comment must, of course, be restricted to peaceful,
i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial uses.
l 5 i Kunz, supra note 102, at 667. Kunz does not cite any authority for this
proposition, although the observation represents the state's interest in protecting its sovereign choices.
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Since, as has already been pointed out, universality is not the test
for the establishment of a customary rule of international law, and
further, since it is true, as McDougal has urged, that the ultimate
function of international custo1nary la'v is to bind states against
their objections, there would not seem to be any difficulty in concluding that international customary law can tolerate some affirmative
opposition and still be a binding source of law. At this time, in the
absence of official protests regarding satellites presently in orbit, the
problem has not arisen as to whether a customary rule of internatjonal space law can bind a state against its consent. The ongoing
space practices and usages have been so generally accepted and conformed to as to permit the international community to disregard the
prospective objections or claims of a dissident minority. It may be
asserted that space practices and usages have hardened to the point
that there now exists a customary rule of law requiring that outer
space be used for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes.
This discu.ssion to this point has been concerned exclusively with
the peaceful uses of outer space and has not been concerned with the
fact that while a customary international law for peaceful uses was
being developed that other rules of customary international law were
also emerging. A collateral development has to do with the problem
of sovereignty over the airspace and outer space. Two discerning
writers have endeavored to appraise the condition of lack of protest,
or tacit consent respecting peaceful uses, in terms of lack of national
sovereignty over outer space.
Goedhuis, writing in 1962, referred to the American Bar Foundation Report prepared by Lipson and Katzenbach.158 According to
Goedhuis, the conclusion that "the failure of States to register formal
protests against space activities is reasonably-though not concl usively-to be construed as an acknowledgment that territorial air
space does not extend to the perigee of any of the satellites so far
launched * * *," is not convincing. 159
Goedhuis has endeavored to distinguish between the fact that satellites do orbit freely and the legality of such action. Thus, while he
has admitted that the current practice is based on enlightened selfinterest, and that tacit consent does result from the permissive action
presently engaged in, yet for him this is not enough. First he has
158 Legal Problems of Space Exploration, supra note 10, Chapter I, at 779,
784-787.
159 Goedhuis, "Some Trends in the Political and Legal Thinking on the Conquest of Space," 9 Netherlands Law Review 122 (1962).
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pointed to the failure of states to give reasons for per1nitting satellites to orbit freely in superjacent areas. Secondly, he has noted the
fact that states have not arrived at an agreement as to the upper
limits of their sovereignty in airspace. Third, he has made the point
that satellites operating at perigee levels are situated in an environment where there is at least some air, ho,vever minute such particles
n1ay be. Finally, he has asserted in effect that states may change
their positions, and at some future, but undisclosed date, a state may
protest against the presence of superjacent satellites on grounds of
sovereignty. 160
vVith respect to national protests he has claimed that "The present
Russian lack of protest against the American reconnaissance satellites is most probably due to a variety of reasons amongst which are
the present unavailability of effective means to stop them, the danger
of security not being thought to have been such as to call for a proM
test, and last but not least to the advantage of mutual toleration at
the present moment." 161
Goedhuis has recognized that he must assume the burden of negating the effect of the resolutions adopted at the United Nations if his
argument is to receive any credence. Thus, the provisions of the General Assembly's unani1nously adopted resolution on "International
Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space" 1721 (XVI), December 20, 1961, setting forth the principle that outer space is free
for exploration and use by all states, is characterized as an "equivocal passage." He then asserts that it would be "erroneous" to conclude as a result of the Resolution that "a rule of international
customary law of freedom of passage of foreign satellites through
national airspace already exists * * * ".162
Goedhuis' error lies in assuming that there is a legal relationship
between areas where air may be found and the use of this as a demarcation between outer space and airspace. Such a line, if and when
drawn, will not be the product of purely scientific considerations, but
rather will be very largely the product of political-legal factors. 16 a
Ho,vever, 'vere one to assume, with Goedhuis, that satellite perigee
levels and landing patterns fall into an area or within a zone in
which a minute amount of air may be found, this could not negate
Ibid., 122-123.
Ibid., 124-125.
162 Ibid., 125. Goedhuis relies on B. Cheng, "United Nations and Outer Space,"
Current Legal Problems, (n.p.) (1961).
163 Johnson, "The Future of :Manned Space Flight, and the 'Freedom' of Outer
Space," NASA News Release 11-14 (August 4, 1962).
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the validity of the practices and the claims advanced and accepted in
the international community since 1957.
These claims have been formalized by national acknowledgments
of known practices and by the force of the United Nations discussions and resolutions. For exan1ple, Secretary of State Rusk in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on August
6, 1962, in referring to UN Resolution 1721 (XVI), declared that
through it "a firm foundation of fundamental princi pie has been laid
* * * " for the law of outer space. In his view the Resolution constituted a "basic source of legal princi pie," and though he noted that
the Resolution merely commended the principles to member states,
"the United States takes the position that these princi pies are presently the law ; the unanimous action of the General Assembly in
adopting the resolution, as action by the governments of the world
assembled, confirms this view." 164
In view of such unequivocal declarations on the part of the major
resource state in the field of outer space, it would appear that fears
on the part of Goedhuis, that the requisite conviction that the peaceful uses of outer space had become a legally binding practice, have
little merit.
Significant conclusions have been advanced by Johnson in his analysis of space practices as related to both the problem of sovereignty
and the problem of peaceful uses. His analysis does not take into
account UN Resolution 1721 (XVI) since his position was stated in
April, 1961, prior to the action of the UN. J olu1son, after referring
to three and one-half years of space activities-including launching,
orbiting, and return-on the part of the resource states, asked what
legal conclusions could be drawn from the fact that "No permission
was sought in advance, none was expressly given by any state, and
not a single protest has been registered by any other states." 165 As
general counsel of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, his views are most significant :
Alternative conclusions, I believe, can be drawn. The first of
these is that territorial sovereignty does not extend as high as
the minimum altitude at which the orbiting of these satellites
has taken place (about 100 miles) and that no state has the right
164
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to exclude other states from the use of any p_a rt of 'outer space'
above this altitude. The alternative theory is that, so long as the
upward limit of territorial sovereignty is not defined by explicit
agreement, the practice of the past three and a half years serves
only to establish a right of passage for spacecraft of a scientific,
exploratory, and non-military nature; but that the claim of territorial sovereignty might still legally be invoked to exclude
other types of spacecraft serving other purposes.
At n1ost, the practice of the past three and a half years leads
to the conclusion that territorial sovereignty does not extend
higher than the point at which the :free orbiting of a useful
earth satellite can occur. It is not necessary to conclude from
this that territorial sovereignty should extend that high.166
Jolmson also clearly stated the relationship between the doctrine
of national sovereignty and the right to take action of a defensive
nature. He said:
It should be noted that the upward delimitation of territorial
sovereignty does not imply that activities which threaten peace
and security are to be permitted in outer space, nor does it mean
that a state would not be :free to take legitimate self-defensive
measures in outer space. The extent of territorial sovereignty is
not the criterion :for such matters.167
Johnson's comments highlight the interrelationship between national self-defense in all environments, the concept of sovereignty as
related to security, the fact that there is no rule of law separating
airspace :from outer space/ 68 and the need :for mankind to benefit
:from the :free and peaceful launching, orbiting, and return of useful
satellites. These :factors have affected the development of a rule of
customary law calling :for the peaceful uses of outer space. On the
basis of experience observed :from the vantage point of 1963, the first
of Johnson's tentative alternatives needs to be amended slightly.
With the current emphasis on free and peaceful uses, rather than
sovereign zones, his reference to "use" only appears to be too narrow.
It is submitted that nonpeaceful uses of space devices at any altitude,
being in conflict ·w·ith the rule that peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and
beneficial, uses may be engaged in, will be considered to be illegal.
Ibid.
Ibid.
t6s Schachter, "Who Owns the Universe?" in Ryan, ed., Across the Space
Frontier 130 (1952) ; Roy, "Remarks," 50 Proceedings of the American Society
of International Law 94-96 (1956) ; Lipson, "Remarks," 55 ibid. 184-185
(1961).
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Johnson's alternative theory also has much to commend it. However, in seeking specificity he has employed the term "non-military
nature" without defining it to mean nonaggressive military activities.
With this modification the alternative theory conforms to current
usages and has been incorporated into the customary international
law of outer space. Both alternatives call attention to the need for
clarification of what is meant by "peaceful uses."
Reassessing the practices of states in outer space on August 4,
1962, Johnson arrived at a conclusion which is implicit in what has
just been stated. He noted the need to formulate some kind of "international control directed toward specific space activities, regardless
of the location of their occurrence." 169 In arriving at such control
Johnson urged the establishment of a realistic ceiling for "the
·'closed' space which is under the exclusive unilateral control of each
underlying State. If we are serious about the freedom of space exploration, we must not underestimate the area of 'free' space which is
required for that activity." 170
After referring to the practices of nations from 1957 to August of
1962, Johnson arrived at a single legal conclusion, thereby making
.a n election between the various possibilities suggested by him early
in 1961. This conclusion, which was patently influenced by both repetitive space practice and usage and by the United Nations Resolution
QI December 20, 1961, was that "the nations have not regarded territorial sovereignty as extending as high as the point at which the
orbiting of these satellites has occurred." 171
From this analysis it will be seen that practices of states which
have led to the creation of a customary rule of international law of
the peaceful, that is, nonaggressive and beneficial uses of outer space,
have also contributed very materially to the establishment of a cusJohnson, "The Future of l\fanned Space Flight and the 'Freedom' of Outer
Space," sttpra note 71, at 5.
170 Ibid., 3.
171 Ibid., 6. The early views on the most desirable specific elevations separating sovereign from nonsovereign areas were in wild discord and have left no
lasting impression on the substantive law of outer space. l\fajor opinion presently suggests that a line between sovereign control over airspace and the
free use of outer space for peaceful purposes should be at a relatively low
elevation-from twenty-five to one hundred miles above the surface. Arguments
for a low boundary are based on the need to provide suitable freedom to
descending vehicles, reduction of disputes, facilitation of evidentiary accumulation, general ease of management for hybrid type craft, and the increasing
recognition that any such boundary bas little or no relationship to the maintenance of international peace and security or national self-defense.
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tomary rule of free movement in certain areas superjacent to a state ..
In arriving at a conclusion on this subject it is important to note
that the extent of sovereignty will never depend upon artificial,.
scientific, or arbitrary views as to a line of delimitation between airspace and outer space, but will rather depend, as suggested earlier,.
on political-legal considerations as affected by considerations of international peace and security and national defense. Although there·
is no doubt that a state may protect itself in areas not subject to its
sovereignty, still the approach to delineating airspace from outer
space suggested by Johnson is sound. According to him the "pri1nary
question is not where outer space begins but where the upward reach
of the exclusive power of the underlying state ends." 172
Taking into account the total space experience, Johnson has suggested the existence of substantive law going beyond the concept of the·
peaceful uses of outer space, as used herein, to include the presence
of law fixing the physical limits subject to the exclusive control of a
state. He has summed up the situation by stating "it appears that the
existing state of the law is that we have an area of space extending
upward from the surface of the earth for an indefinite distance·
which is exclusively controlled by the underlying state-an absolutely
'un-free' area, one might say-and above that, beginning at some
undefined point, lies the 'free' realm of outer space." 173 The contrast
between the views of Johnson and Goedhuis respecting the development of rules of customary international law from the total space
experience is manifest.
On the basis of the numerous views presented above it may be
concluded that there now exists a customary rule of international
law requiring that outer space be used freely for peaceful purposes~
and that such peaceful purposes include all of the nonaggressive and
beneficial uses for which space vehicles have been employed up to
and at this time. It may be concluded also that the same practices
which have made it possible for such a rule to come into being
uphold the principle (or rule) that at a given but unascertained
point, which point will be duly ascertained and established in the
future, the exclusive control of the subjacent state terminates.
\Vhile aggressive uses of space are objectionable no matter where
engaged in, and while peaceful uses may be engaged in freely at
elevations countenanced by present customary law, there remains an
ongoing problem respecting the transiting of a space satellite at ele172
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vations commonly employed at present by aircraft and balloons.
\Vhile it is entirely probable that space satellites, either in the course
<>f launch or while returning to earth for landing, may transit over
nation-states at very low altitudes (from fifty miles down to the surface), it is also clear that there has been no final fact respecting this
potential capability. There is, however, increasing evidence that
landing vehicles may be obliged to transit for as many as 5,000 miles
at elevations under 50 miles while preparing for, and engaging in
landing procedures. Thus, there does not appear to be any practical
legal answer at this time to this problem except insofar as the resolutions taken at the U.N. may provide guidance.
The need to consider this problem has been noted by Johnson, who
has observed that if it is to be solved "it will be done on the basis of
an accommodation of the political interests of the States
concerned." 174 In recalling that the U.N. Resolution of December 20, 1961, laid stress on the freedom of outer space, Johnson
has pointed out that this means "the principle of freedom from unilateral control-freedom from the power of an individual State to exclude others from the enjoyment of this great new resource." 17'5
Johnson has summarized the needs of nations qualified to engage
in space activities in these words: "The area within which the underlying State possesses the right to 'veto' the activity of another
State must not be permitted to extend to altitudes which would
hamper the freedom of space exploration." 176 The use of outer space
depends as much on the ability to transit freely through the lower
airspace en route to and from orbital voyages as it does upon :freedom of orbital transit. Since manned space flight is presumably constructed on the thesis that the current space traveler expects to return
safely to earth, and this in turn assumes that he contemplates peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial activities while located within
his space vehicle, it may very well arrive that a kind of "innocent
passage" will be accorded such travelers and their space vehicles
while situated in the lower airspace while en route to or from orbital
elevations. If this concept appears reasonable for manned space
flight, there would seem to be no reason for not applying it, under
the same relevant conditions, to nonmanned space flight. The dictates
174 Ibid., 14. In discussing a situation in which a merchant vessel has entered
the territorial waters of a foreign state, it has been urged that there ought to
be "in the interests of stability and certainty of international intercourse, mutual restraint in the assertion of jurisdiction by the coastal state • * *" Boczek,
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of international peace and security and national self-defense 'vould,
of course, impose reasonable limitations in both cases upon the exercise of such a right.177
A brief recapitulation of the significance of customary international law as related to outer space is in order. At this time, as in
times past, custom is the very life of the common law of nations. It
is an accumulation of favored ways of doing things. It is not so
much so1nething \rhich has already been settled as it is the means or
process whereby the required consensus is effected. This consensus
may be the product of affirmative action or may result from the acceptance of a condition. The process of custom demonstrates that
outer space usages do in fact exist and that they have been generally
accepted by enough states, including the resource states, as to be considered obligatory. "\Vhere such common expectations exist a deviation therefrom n1ay be regarded as a violation of the applicable customary legal norn1. In this way customary international ]a 'v serves
the important purpose of creating a line between permissible and
impermissible conduct. In the long run the effectiveness of this process depends upon the willingness of states to engage in mutual accommodations, which is as central to international la'v as to other
legal forms.
The role of customary law is particularly important in the world
community's legal order. Here the legal order is built around a
highly decentralized decisional process, particularly when compared
with the integrated decisional process of a nation-state. The dispersed international forum with its primitive legislative process
comes into high relief when compared with national processes. The
difficulty of obtaining written agreements when the negotiators
number into the hundreds needs no emphasis here. It does, however,
argue for the creative use of customary law. So far as detailed outer
space problen1s are concerned, despite 1nany demands for particular
written conventions, the varying national points of vie'v at the time
of this writing have prevented the achievement of forn1al treaties.
The result is that outer space is essentially free of conventional ]a,v ..
Further, the treaty process, even at its best, is generally unequipped
to deal with but a fe,v of the myriad interstate transactions and
events. This has been especially true "in questions touching the possession of rights." 178
As a result of these facts, general policy considerations advantageous to states at large favor the facilitation of the development of
177
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law through practice and usage. The needs o:£ the world community
are not served by placing unreasonable obstacles in the way o:£ the
customary process.
Law can be produced only by consent. Consent, however, is derived
:from total conduct, o:£ which express agreement is but one o:£ many
variations. The law o:£ contract :frequently places emphasis upon injurious reliance or inducing behavior as well as upon the meeting of
'vills in an oral or written compact.179 Through reliance upon custom
as a source of law it becomes possible to base consent upon implicit
or tacit behavior as well as upon express and written agreement.
Custom, in addition to meeting the problems o:£ a loosely organized
\vorld community, also possesses certain practical advantages. It
avoids the need o:£ unanimity, which so :frequently burdens the :formal treaty process. Further, customary la'v can bind the entire community. So :far as the law of outer space is concerned only the major
resource states need align themselves with and conform commonly to
a given practice for it to take on the quality o:£ a rule of customary
international law. Such law must necessarily serve the needs of the
entire community. Such law, when established with appropriate consent-whether implicit, tacit, express, or overt behavior-becomes
binding upon the many. Sir Frederick Pollock expressed this as follows: "As among men, so among nations, the opinions and usage of
the leading members in a community tend to :form an authoritative
example :for the whole." 180 When such law has become binding it cannot be lightly cast aside, and occasional breaches or :failure to conform do not render it invalid.
This is true because such la 'v is based upon the :fact o:£ comparable
capabilities in outer space on the part o:£ the leading members o:£ the
world con1munity-,vhose practices and policies it must be noted are
not entirely self-centered and must take into account the needs of
like-minded nations. In this process the resource states must represent the needs of the whole community, :for even as betw'een contending members of the world community there exists a range o:£ :fundamental, common expectations and mutual interests.
Such expectations and interests are derived :from the conduct of
persons in the general legal sense, namely, the practices o:£ individuals, private business organizations including such enterprises as
corporations and comparable legal entities, scientific organizations
both national and international in scope and composition, nation179
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states through 'vhatever departn1ent, agency, or facility they elect to
employ, and, of course, international organizations-both public and
private. The nature of the practice or usage is central to the development of customary international law rather than the precise instrumentality through 'vhich the conduct is 1nanaged or takes place.
Resource states, themselves, and through permission granted to
other legal persons, by engaging in space progran1s-including
launches and orbital activity-have asserted a legal right to engage
in the peaceful uses of outer space. No resource state has either expressly or by i1nplication suggested that such uses of outer space are
tainted with illegality. The lack of protests on the part of the nonresource states, together with their tacit acceptance of existing space
practices, are established facts. The only conclusion which has been
drawn and which reasonably may be draw·n is that the present, ongoing factual pattern of peaceful space conduct is permissive under
-customary international ]a,v. The nonresource states have frequently
attested to this fact at the United Nations by urging that outer space
without law can only result in chaos and that a rule of peaceful uses
will be of benefit to them. Further, they have frequently described as
urgent the need for universal recognition of these facts. The views
expressed at the U.N. are of singular importance, since national ex})ressions in that forum and the reports presented and resolutions
&nd recommendations adopted possess a very high degree of credibility as to the substance of customary internationalla,v.181
In short, the facile recognition of the development of customary
rules of international space law avoids the need of forn1al and express unanimity in the international decisional process and it also
suits the needs of all states, large and small. While the existence of
a customary rule of law for outer space may contribute to the enhancement of stabilizing influences, it is obvious that the mere existence of such a rule can not produce favorable results automatically.
Customary international law has the further advantage in that it
may be consciously creative. It may require new patterns of conduct,
and it may move as swiftly or as slowly as the requirements of the
social co1nplex dictate. It may also carry for,vard old usages, and
new men1bers of the "·orld community may be confronted with the
-duty to conform. New states admitted to the United Nations become
ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38 of that Statute provides, in part, that the Court deThe position of Ceylon as stated by 1\Ir. l\Ialalasekera on December 10, 1962,
before the First Committee of the General Assembly, fully illustrates this gener-al attitude. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1296, 32-42. See pp. 195-205 infra for a n1ore
-detailed analysis of this position.
1st

175
cides disputes in accordance with international law, by applying international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted by law.
It should be noted that the Article simply calls for a general, rather
than a universal practice.
Customary law, as a source of international law, is confronted
with abundant problems. Perhaps the most difficult is that it does not
speak in recorded form. Because of 1ts nature it constantly stands in
need of human approval and promulgation. Traditionally the role of
publicists has been to declare its existence. Each new rule of customary international law depends upon its own evidence, and this must
vary according to different times, communications, needs and scientific capabilities, among others. Nonetheless, customary rules of international law have contributed significantly to acceptable human
behavior as regards the seas, the continental shelf, airspace, and now
outer space. While the role of the publicists in recognizing the existence of customary rules is an important one, it is also a preliminary
one. Official recognition through judicial imprimatur may give it
higher acceptability. 182 Treaties may acknowledge the express existence of inherent customary rights. 183 But la\v without the process of
custom would be slow in acceptance and late in helping to resolve the
needs of the world.
Turning from the processes \vhereby customary international law
is created to the substance of the rule providing for the peaceful uses
of outer space, it should be noted that this rule supports a standard
of values of utmost importance to the social complex. The policy of
the United States has been that the introduction into outer space of
weapons of mass destruction, capable of being used for aggressive
purposes, could not serve the interests of the United States or of
mankind. Thus, if the world can come to live with and by the rule of
peaceful uses of outer space, there may be a possibility that the rule,.
because of its fundamental reasonableness, may be extended to other
areas of man's total conduct. It could even serve as a foundation
upon which other fields of substantive law might be based. In this
connection it should be remembered that the substantive law of outer·
space, both in existence and now in the process of building, is subject
to legal principles wherever they may be found. In addition to the
principle or rule of peaceful uses of outer space, that environment isalso subject to the terms of the U.N. Charter and to applicable rules
of general internationalla w.
New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361,383-384 (1934).
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, for example, acknowledges the·
existence of the prior inherent and customary right of self-defense under inter-·
national law.
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2. General International Law· and Co1nity

It has been suggested that certain space practices and usages have
ripened into custo1nary rules of international law·, and, as such, are
binding upon the members of the "\Yorld community. It might, however, be contended that such practices and usages w·ere merely the
product of the condition of comity. The distinction bet"\Yeen law and
co1nity is well kno·wn.
Comity is a relationship enjoyed by states. Practices are freely
engaged in as a 1natter of courtesy, and are not mandatory. Such
practices are not required by law. United States courts ha\e provided suitable explanation of the concept.
The Court of Appeals of New York has stated that "Co1nity may
be defined as that reciprocal courtesy which one member of the family of nations o'Yes to the others. It presupposes friendship. It assunles the prevalence of equity and justice. Experience points to the
expediency of recognizing the legislative, executive, and judicial acts
of other powers. e do justice that justice may be done in return." 184
An earlier decision by the United States Supreme Court held that
"'Con1ity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good ·will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allo,,s " .. ithin its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons "\vho are
under the protection of its la ''s * * *" 185
The practices performed under the concession of co1nity create no
legal rights, per se. Nonetheless, such practices when they have ripened into usage may assume the form of customary international
law. In view of the facts presented above it is believed that the current vie'' most co1nn1ensurate with reality is that the com1non demands for free and peaceful uses of outer space have gone beyond
the reach of comity, and have become principles or rules of international law.

''T

3. National and International Expressions: Claim and
Acquiescence

a. Special International Law
Special, as distinguished from general international law, is the
product of a different process than that involved in the creation of
184

Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Oibrario, 235 N.Y. 255

(1923).
1ss Hilt011. v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).

177
~customary

rules of law. The custon1ary process emphasizes the role
of accon1plished action. In the realm of special international law the
e1nphasis is upon limited or restricted claims. In both instances the
claims contemplate the bargain of reciprocal action based on mutuality of interests, and where action follows such claims the acquiescence,
particularly if spelled out in some kind of written understanding,
takes on the quality of international la'v valid for the bargaining parties. Thus, special international law may result from the acceptance by a nation of the offer of another nation as put forward
originally in a unilateral claim. The obligation becomes that of the
negotiating parties. If many parties make and accept the same
-claims the obligation becomes a general one. Claim and acquiescence
may be bilateral and multilateral.
So far as outer space is concerned the bilateral claims have been
promulgated by the two major resource nations principally through
known practical conduct and by exchanges of correspondence by the
respective heads of states, although in a larger sense the claims are
reflected in all public official statements. Claims have been addressed
to the international con1munity at the United Nations and have resulted in significant resolutions. Clai1ns have also been expressed at
other public and private international conferences.
( 1) National Claims
Under this heading only the claims of the twro major resource nations will be discussed. An additional limitation will be imposed
whereby only the exchanges of viewpoints by the heads of states will
be considered at this time.
At the outset it must be remembered that claims relating to the use
of outer space and respecting its management and control generally
have not been separated from other considerations. That is, claims
relating to space have almost always been attached to or encumbered
with other political-legal problems. Hence, the importance of such
other problems as disarmament, international peace and security, national self-defense, foreign military bases, and comparable international difficulties has manifestly affected the environment in which
space claims have been made and received. 186 The interrelated quality
of such claims has resulted in the exercise of great caution in their
lS6 It is not necessarily a paradox that during periods of international tension
limited agreement is often reached on specific subjects. During such periods of
cold-war maneuvers, and possibly even because of this condition, space was
used for the peaceful purposes indicated above. Acceptable space practiceswith their impact upon customary law-have been engaged in by the t\vo major
powers during the cold war.
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analysis and appraisal. It has also resulted in the transfer in son1e
measure of the decisional forum from the political-legal to the scientific and technological policy maker. This has produced substantial
international cooperation among those who actively manage and direct space programs. Their scientific and teclmological orientation
has facilitated their putting to one side typical political-legal problems ''ith the result that cooperative action has been facilitated.
Their action, of course, has had a profound effect upon the growth of
customary rules of law.
The first effort to clarify United States-Soviet attitudes on outer
space at the heads of state level goes back to Premier Bulganin's
letter to President Eisenho,-rer shortly after the launch of the first
successful Sputnik. In his letter of December 10, 1957, Bulganin referred briefly to the Soviet launching of an artificial earth satellite,
Soviet scientific and technological advancements, Soviet peaceful intentions, and the "mistake" of the U1~ited States and NATO countries in 1nisjudging Soviet intentions in the light of Soviet space
capabilities.187
On January 12, 1958, in reply, President Eisenhower introduced
his proposal relating to the use of outer space by stating:
I propose that we agree that outer space should be used only
for peaceful purposes. \Ve face a decisive moment in history in
relation to this matter. Both the Soviet Union and the United
States are now using outer space for the testing of missiles designed for military purposes. The time to stop is now.
I recall to you that a decade ago, when the United States had
a monopoly of atomic weapons and of atomic experience, we
offered to renounce the making of atomic weapons and to make
the use of atomic energy an international asset for peaceful purposes only. If only that offer had been accepted by the Soviet
Union, there would not now be the danger from nuclear 'veapons
which you describe.
The nations of the world face today another choice perhaps
even more momentous than that of 1948. That relates to the use
of outer space. Let us this time, and in time, make the right
choice, the peaceful choice.
There are about to be perfected and produced powerful new
weapons 'vhich, availing of outer space, will greatly increase the
capacity of the hun1an race to destroy itself. If indeed it be the
view of the Soviet Union that we should not go on producing
187
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ever newer types of weapons, can we not stop the production of
such weapons which would use or, more accurately, misuse, outer
space, now for the first time opening up as a field for man's
exploration~ Should not outer space be dedicated to the peaceful
uses of mankind and denied to the purposes of war~ That is my
proposal. 188
In this manner the great discourse respecting the peaceful uses of
outer space began. In the following month the heads of the two resource states again exchanged 'vritten views on the uses of outer
space.
Premier Bulganin on February 1st, 1958, wrote an extended letter
to the President sum1narizing Soviet views on numerous cold war
subjects. On the subject of outer space he wrote:
vVe, of course, do not deny the importance of the question of
using outer space for peaceful purposes exclusively, i.e., first of
all, of the question of the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. I hope, however, Mr. President, that you will agree that this question can be considered
only as a part of the general problem of the prohibition of nuclear and rocket weapons. It is for that very reason that the
Soviet Union, in the interest of strengthening peace and reaching agreement on questions of disarmament, is also prepared to
discuss the questions of intercontinental missiles, provided the
Western powers are prepared to agree on the prohibition of nuclear and hydrogen weapons, the cessation of tests of such weapons and the liquidation of foreign military bases in the territories of other states. There can be no doubt that in such a case the
reaching of an agreement on the use of cosmic space for peaceful
purposes exclusively would not meet with any difficulties. 189
The Soviet vie'v that a consideration of the designated proble1ns
disturbing man on the earth's surface would have to be discussed
concurrently with the problems of outer space, before the latter situation could be expressly clarified, has frustrated the rapid development of formal written agreements affecting the space environment.
The remaining exchanges between the two heads of state have floundered on this point.
President Eisenhower in responding to the Bulganin note again
gave important recognition to his earlier claim that outer space
"President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin Exchange Correspondence
on Proposals for Reducing International Tensions.'' 38 ibid. 126 (1958).
(Italics added.)
189 "Premier Bulganin to the President," 38 ibid. 379 (1958). (Italics added.)
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should be used only for peaceful purposes. In this context he wrote
on February 15, 1958:
Another ne'v idea was that outer space should be perpetually
dedicated to peaceful purposes. You belittle this proposal as one
made to gain strategic advantages for the United States. Mr.
IChruschchev in his l\finsk speech [of January 22, 1958, which,
in a longer and more intemperate vein, 'vas the basis of the Bulganin letter] said, 'This means they 'vant to prohibit that 'vhich
they do not possess.'
Since the record co1npletely disproves that uncalled for statement, may we no'v hope between us to consider and devise cooperative international procedures to give reality to the idea of
use of outer space for peace only.
'Vhen the United States alone possessed ato1nic weapons and
the Soviet Union possessed none, the United States proposed to
forego its monopoly in the interest of world peace and security.
e are prepared to take the same attitude now in relation to
outer space. If this peaceful purpose is not realized, and the
'vorse than useless race of 'veapons goes on, the world will have
only the Soviet Union to blame, just as it has only the Soviet
Union to blame for the fact that atomic and nuclear po"rer are
no'v used increasingly for ·weapons purposes instead of being
dedicated wholly to peaceful uses as the United States proposed
a decade ago. 190
Premier Bulganin replied on l\farch 3, 1958, by stating that the
Soviets 'vould be willing to discuss at a summit conference "the
questions of prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes.
and the liquidation of alien military bases on foreign territories." 191
A broader Soviet proposal, ho,,ever, 'vas received on l\farch 15,.
1958:
In order to ensure the security of interests of all States to the
maximu1n degree, and also in the interests of developing international co-operation in cos1nic-space research for peaceful purposes, the Soviet Government proposes the conclusion of a broad
international agreement 'vhich would include the follo,ving basic
proviSions :

''r

1. A ban on the use of cosn1ic space for military purposes and
190 "President Calls for PositiYe Response from Soviet Union on Establishing
Better Relations," 38 ibid. 373-374 (1958). (Italics added.)
191 "Letter of Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower, :March 3," 38 ibid ..
650 (1958).
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an undertaking by States to launch rockets into cosmic space
only under an agreed international programme. 192
The Soviets also proposed the establishment within the framework
of the United Nations of an international system of control to
achieve the foregoing objective. Additionally, the Soviets proposed
the creation of a United Nations agency for international cooperation in the study of outer space, having the following functions:
To work out an agreed international programme for launching intercontinental and space rockets with the aim of studying
cosmic space, and supervise the in1plementation of this programme;
To continue on a permanent basis the cosmic-space research
now being carried on within the framework of the International
Geophysical Year;
To serve as a world centre for the collection, mutual exchange
and disse1nination of information on cosmic research;
To coordinate national research progra1nmes for the study of
cosmic space and render assistance and help in every way towards their realization.1. 93
The Soviet govern1nent also presented these proposals to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As
before, the Soviets connected the space issue with other cold war
subjects and tied the foregoing proposals to the elimination of foreign 1nilitary bases on the territories of other states.
\Vith the taking of the office of Premier by Mr. Khrushchev, world
attention was directed to the announcement by the Soviet Union on
April 1, 1958, that it was unilaterally suspending atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. This was conveyed to President Eisenhower in a
letter dated April 4, 1958, from the Soviet Premier. 194 In his reply of
April 8, President Eisenhower referred, among other subjects, to his
earlier representations in favor of the peaceful uses of outer space.
He stated "You will also recall 1ny proposals for the international
use of outer space for peaceful purposes emphasized in my recent
correspondence with Chairman Bulganin. These proposals await
Soviet acceptance." 195
192 II Docuntents on Disarntament, 1945-1959 976-977; Legal Problents of
Space Exploration, supra note 10, Chapter I, at 994.
193 Ibid.
194 "Premier Khrushchev to the President," 38 Departnwnt of State Bttlletin
680-681 ( 1958) .
195 "President Asks U.S.S.R. To Agree To Begin Study of Specific Disarmament 1\ieasures," ibid.
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Premier l{hrushchev replied on April 22, 1958. In referring to the
prior exchanges on the subject of outer space, l{hrushchev, on April
22, 1958, stated that the Soviets had "seriously considered" earlier
American proposals that outer space be reserved for peaceful purposes only, and he noted that the Soviets had previously been on
record that they "'-vere prepared to consider at a summit meeting the
question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military
purposes and the liquidation of military bases in foreign
territories." 196 l-Ie further stated that the Soviet Union \vas
"prepared to conclude an agreement which would provide for the
prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes and
would permit the launching of rockets into outer space only in accordance \vith an agreed international program of scientific research." 197
He conceived of the American proposal for the use of outer space for
peaceful purposes only as limited to the "prohibition of intercontinental ballistic 1nissiles alone * * *" 19·8 and as a proposal failing to
take into account other important aspects of the space proble1n. He
therefore related the concept of peaceful uses of outer space to the
general proble1ns of national security and self-defense, and arrived
at no fixed response. His position was based on his fear that the
American proposal would result in a favored military position for
the United States.
President Eisenho,ver's reply to the Soviet note was very brief. He
restated his belief that "the international use of outer space for
peaceful purposes * * *" 199 \Vas a significant goal and that the proposal constituted an open and ongoing offer.
In l{hrushchev's reply on l\{ay 9, 195!8, he confined his letter to the
ending of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests and made no reference to
the subject of the peaceful uses of outer space. 200 President Eisenho,ver's note of l\iay 24, 1958, also dealt exclusively with disarmaInent problems. 201 In a talk delivered by Secretary of State Dulles on
June 6, 1958, reference was made to the proposals contained in President Eisenho\ver's letter to Premier Bulganin of January 13, 1958.
The President had called for the use of outer space only for peaceful
purposes. The Secretary of State noted that "so far the Soviet reply
"Premier Khrushchev to the President," ibid. 814 ( 1958).
Ibid.
19 8 Ibid. He stated "The essence of your proposal is to prevent, through the
prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles, a nuclear counterblow through
outer space from being delivered against yourselves."
199 "The President to Premier Khrushchev," ibid., 811 (1958).
2 00 "Premier Khrushchev to the President," ibid., 940-942 (1958).
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has been evasive * * * [but that the government would nonetheless
endeavor to] devise and implement programs for the peaceful use of
outer space." 202
By mid-1958, the two major resource states had become so concerned with major security issues, particularly disarmament and
atomic and hydrogen weapons testing, that exchanges on the subject
of the peaceful uses of outer space were discontinued, although the
President continued to be firm in his support of his announced policies. It was, for example, in this vein that in his State of the Union
Address in January, 1959, that he stated "'Ve seek to prevent war at
any place and in any dimension." 203
American discussions with the Soviets respecting the establishment
of a formal written rule that outer space might be used only for
peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes, although it did
not result in a 'vritten -a greement, was, nonetheless, not a loss. The
development of customary principles was not impeded. The respective positions were well publicized, and the world community was
made aware of the nature of the American claim.
The United States, concurrently, with its bilateral negotiations
with the Soviets during 1958, presented space claims to the United
Nations. Here, the Soviets again, at first, sought to prevent consideration of the subject by linking the peaceful uses of outer space with
their policies respecting the overseas military bases of the NATO
nations.
It now becomes necessary to analyze the reception accorded in the
forum of the United Nations to the de1nands of many states that
outer space be used freely for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes.
( 2) Deliberations at the United Nations
The United Nations becan1e a forum for the consideration of
claims for the establishment of principles and rules of law for outer
space as early as 1957. 204 The discourse which was begun at the United
Nations permitted the two major resource nations, together with
the other members of the world community, to enunciate space policies and legal goals. As a result of such negotiations committees were
created, and reports, reco1nmendations, and resolutions have been
prepared and adopted. Proposed statements of principle and draft
Dulles, "The Challenge of Change," ibid., 1037 (1958).
Eisenhower. "The State of the Union," 40 Department of State Bulletin 116
(1959).
204 See supra, p. 34, and Annex 6, pp. 455-456.
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technical agreements have been submitted, and there has been a general clarification of legal rights and duties. At the same ti1ne that the
United Nations beeame the major forum for the discussion of space
problen1s, nations continued their bilateral discussions and other international organizations ''ere called upon to share in the responsibility of 'vorking out practical solutions to special problems. The probleins of disann::unent and the testing of nuclear weapons particularly
''ere in1pressed upon space negotiations. An analysis of the legal
i1npact of the different actions taken, including the adoption of General .A.ssembly resolutions and recommendations will follow.
rfhe United States, during the IGY, sub1nitted a memorandum to
the First Committee of the General Assembly asking it to take into
account the presence and capabilities of space devices in outer space.
On January 12, 1957, the United States proposed as a first step that
the United Nations should work toward "the objective of assuring
that future develop1nents in outer space would be devoted exclu~ively
to peaceful and scientific purposes * * * [and that this might be
accon1plished by] the testing of such objects m1der international inspection and participation.'~ 205 On November 14, 1957, the General
Assen1bly adopted Resolution 1148 (XII) which urged that a disarmament agree1nent ought to make provision for the "joint study of
an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects
through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific
purposes." 206
On ~larch 15, 1958, the Soviet Union deposited with the SecretaryGeneral a proposed agenda item for consideration during the 1958
session of the General Assembly. This proposal linked the "banning
of the use of cosmic space for military purposes, the eliinination of
foreign bases on the territories of other countries, and international
co-operation in the study of cosmic space." 207 The United States on
September 2, 1958, also proposed that the Assembly's agenda include
an inquiry on "international co-operation in the field of outer
space." 208 This was follow·ed by Secretary of State Dulles' proposal
to the General Assembly on September 18, 1958, that it establish
II Docu,ments on Disarnuzment, 1945-1959 733 (1960), (Italics added).
20s Ibid., 901-902; Annex 6, infra, p. 455.
201 U.N. Doc . .A/3818; II Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959 976; Legal
Problems of S]Jace Exploratio-n, supra note 10. Chapter I, at 994. Compare Taubenfeld, "Consideration at the United Nations of the Status of Outer Space," 53
A ..J.I.L. 400 (1959).
2os U.N. Doc. A/3902; Ambassador Lodge filed an explanatory memorandum
with the request. Legal Problen~s of Space Exploration, supra, note 10, Chapter
I, at 99G-997. Annex 11, infra, p. 460.
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an Ad Hoc Committee "to prepare for a fruitful program on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space." 209 Secretary Dulles explained his proposal as being in the interest of humanity since it would maximize the constructive and beneficial uses of
space.
The General Assembly under the agenda title of "Question of
Peaceful Use of Outer Space" referred the matter to the First Committee which engaged in extended maneuverings in meetings conducted from November 11 to November 24, including the discussion
of United States 210 and Soviet 211 draft proposals. In addition to the
substantive problem of the peaceful uses of outer space there was at
issue the Soviet effort to force a consideration of overseas bases and
the composition of the proposed Ad Hoc Committee.
By November 28, the original United States proposals, which at
this time had come to be known as the 20-power draft, were approved
by the First Committee by a vote of 54 to 9 (members of the Soviet
bloc), with 18 abstentions. 212 The subject was then referred to the General Assembly and was adopted on December 13, 1958, as Resolution
1348 (XIII) .213 The Resolution stressed the need for "international
and scientific cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space," and
that "oute1· space should be used for peaceful purposes only." 214 It
required the Ad Hoc Committee to prepare a substantial report on
space problems including "The nature of legal problems which may
arise in the carrying out of programmes to explore outer space." 215
The debates in the First Committee ranged widely over many subjects including the problem of security, the possibility of establishing boundaries between airspace and outer space, whether space
might be acquired by states, the extension of sovereignty into space,
and jurisdiction over events in space. Curiously, few delegates urged
that nations were entitled to free and equal rights to the use of outer
space, although the Swedish representative stressed the need for free
use of space for peaceful traffic as in the case of the high seas. 216 The
Dutch delegate advanced a position which now has come to be gener2o9 39 Department of State Bulletin 529 (1958) ; Legal Problems of Space
Exploration, supra note 10, Chapter I, at 997.
21o U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.220 and U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.220 Rev. 1.
2n U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.219 and U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.219 Rev. 1.
212 U.N. Doc. A/4009.
213 II Documents on Disarrnament, 1305 (1945-1959) ; Legal Problems of
Space Exploration, supra note 10, Chapter 1, at 1000. Annex 7, infra, pp. 456-458.
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ally accepted, na1nely, that "the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations" as contained in the Statute of the International
Court of Justice and the U.N. Charter "~ere applicable to outer
space.217
The discussions supported the general proposition that outer space
should be used for peaceful purposes only. Ho\-vever, no definition
\vas established as to the meaning of "peaceful purposes," and the
Soviet delegate, Zorin, and the A1nerican delegate, Senator Lyndon
B. Johnson, while agreeing "to the need for the peaceful exploitation
of n1an's new capabilities in outer space for the benefit of all Inankind * * *" failed to take "a position on the potential legal status of
space and neither in fact stated a position w·hich "~ould estop future
claims from being 1nade." 218 The two constructive results of the discussions in the UN and the Resolution of December 13, 1958, were
the emphasis placed on the cooperative use of outer space for peaceful purposes and the decision to prepare through the Ad Hoc Committee a detailed report on the peaceful uses of outer space.
The twenty-seven page report, which was submitted to the General
Assembly on July 14, 1959, constituted a superb analysis of the myriad of political, legal, and scientific problems created by n1an's entry
into outer space. In addressing itself to the legal problems likely to
arise in the exploration of outer space the committee rightly concluded that an effort at the comprehensive codification of space law
would be premature, but, nonetheless, "recognized the need both to
take tilnely, constructive action and to 1nake the la\v of space responsive to the facts of space." 219
The report set forth some six legal problems which "~ere considered susceptible of priority treatment, and also mentioned five other
problems of lesser immediate legal significance. These problen1s are
presently at the very heart of the discussions on the emerging law of
outer space. The issues singled out for priority consideration were:
freedom of outer space for exploration and use, liability for injury
or damage caused by space vehicles, allocation of radio frequencies,
a voidance of interference bet"·een space vehicles and aircraft, identification and registration of space vehicles and co-ordination of
U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.987.
Taubenfeld, supra note 207, at 404. Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1958-15 June 1959, General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/4132.
21 9 U.N. Doc. A/4141, p. 1268; Legal Problems of Space Exploration, supra
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launchings, and re-entry and landing of space vehicles. The less
pressing problems included the question of determining where outer
space begins, protection of public health and safety, safeguards
against contamination of or from outer space, questions relating to
the exploration of celestial bodies, a voidance of interference among
space vehicles, and other technical matters such as the means of
achieving maxin1um effectiveness of meteorological activities in outer
space.·220
The report contained a reference to the role of customary law,
particularly as related to the yet unsolved problem of where outer
space begins, and it was suggested that additional experience might
enable states to view the subject of space not so much from the point
of view of sovereignty as from the viewpoint of uses. Thus, the
report suggested that "further experience might suggest a different
approach, namely, the desirability of basing the legal regime governing outer space activities primarily on the nature and type of particular space activities." 221 The acceptance in recent years of the rule
that outer space was to be employed for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive
and beneficial, purposes has largely proven the perceptiveness of this
portion of the committee report.
The United States in September, 1959, through Secretary of State
Herter, called to the attention of the General Assembly the hope that
outer space 'vould be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In demonstrating the relationship between space and disarmament he said
on September 17, 1959, that because "progress in disarmament might
be slow, * * * the United States has urged that peaceful uses of outer
space be considered as a separate step toward constructive change." 222
He added that there could be "no more dramatic illustration of a
spirit of cooperation in the world today as we stand at the threshold
of the space age than for this Assembly to act unanimously in this
field. This would be a major step forward in the process of peaceful
change." 223
During the following months the First Committee of the General
Assembly considered the Report and worked out a plan for the establishment of a new committee. On December 12, 1959, the General
Assembly unanimously adopted the Committee's action in the form
of a resolution entitled "International Co-operation in the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space," 1472 (XIV) .224
Ibid., 1268--1270; Annex 20, infra, pp. 472-480.
Ibid., 1270; Annex 20, infra, pp. 472-480
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The Resolution placed strong en1phasis upon the use of outer space
for peaceful purposes. It called for international cooperation, the
exchange of experiences, and the exploration and exploitation of
outer space for such purposes. The Resolution, therefore, continued
the precedent fixed in 1957 that outer space be reserved for peaceful
purposes. During a time plagued with the tensions incident to disarmament considerations, the Resolution took into account the benefits
derived and the usages which matured during the IGY. It authorized the ne'v committee to embark upon a study of the "nature of
legal proble1ns which 1nay arise from the exploration of outer
space." 225
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was dormant
-in part because of procedural disagreements-not meeting from its
creation until November 1961. During this period the United States,
through President Eisenho,v-er's address to the General Assembly on
September 22, 1960, disclosed concern that the problem was being
neglected. Thus, he stated at the U.N.:
Another problen1 confronting us involves outer space.
The emergence of this new 'vorld poses a vital issue: Will
outer space be preserved for peaceful use and developed for the
benefit of mankind~ Or 'viii it become another focus for the
arn1s race-and thus an area of dangerous and sterile competition.
The choice is urgent. And it is ours to make. * * * National
vested interests have not yet been developed in space or in celestial bodies. Barriers to agree1nent are now lower than they will
ever be again.***
I propose that:
1. vVe agree that celestial bodies are not subject to national
appropriation by any claims of sovereignty.
2. 'Ve agree that the nations of the 'vorld shall not engage in
warlike activities on these bodies.
3. lVe agree, subject to appropriate verification, that no nation will put into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass
destruction. All launchings of space craft should be verified in
advance by the United Nations.
4. 'Ve press forward with a program of international cooperation for constructive peaceful uses of outer space under the
United Nations. Better weather forecasting, improved worldwide
communications, and more effective exploration not only of
Z25
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outer space but of our own earth-these are but a few of the
benefits of such cooperation. 226
This forceful precedent was shared by President l{ennedy when he
spoke to the General Assembly on September 25, 1961. He stated:
As we extend the rule of law on earth, so must we also extend
it to man's new domain: outer space.
All of us salute the brave cosmonauts of the Soviet Union.
The new horizons of outer space must not be driven by the old
bitter concepts of imperialism and sovereign claims. The cold
reaches of the universe must not become the new arena of an
even colder war.
To this end, we shall urge proposals extending the United N at ions Charter to the lin1its of man's exploration in the Universe,
reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of
mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the
mysteries and benefits of space to every nation. \Ve shall further
propose cooperative efforts bet,veen all nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control. \Ve shall propose, finally, a global system of communications satellites linking the
whole world in telegraph and telephone and radio and television. The day need not be far away when such a system will
televise the proceedings of this body to every corner of the
world for the benefit of peace. 227
vVhen the First Committee began in October 1961 to discuss the
order to be assigned to the discussion of agenda items, it soon became
evident that a substantial number of countries wished to assign a
high priority to the subject of the peaceful uses of outer space. At
the 1170th meeting of the Committee on October 19, the United
Kingdom, Thailand, Guinea, Afghanistan, and Libya urged an early
discussion of the subject. The Soviet Union, and its satellites, however, sought to delay a consideration of the subject.228
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space having submitted a short report to the First Committee on November 27, 1961,229
and the governments of Australia, Canada, Italy, and the United
226
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States having prepared a four-nation draft resolution on December
2, 1961/30 the First Committee initiated debate on December 4. 231 In
addition to the foregoing documents they took into account a letter
dated November 14, 1961, addressed by the representative of the Soviet Union to the Secretary-General. 232 The operative language of the
four-nation draft resolution, so far as the proposal dealt with legal
principles, provided that the Gener2J Assembly:
1. Commends to States for their guidance in the exploration

and use of outer space the following principles:
(a) International law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies;
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law,
and are not subject to national appropriations by clai?n of sovereignty or otherwise. 233
A revision of this draft proposal was submitted to the First Committee on December 11, 1961, by all four of the original proponents,
plus twenty additional states, including the Soviet Union. 234 The only
change made with respect to legal principles, part "A" of the proposal, was to eliminate the letter "s" and the six words which are
underscored above. As revised the proposed General Assembly resolution was approved unanimously by the First Committee on December 11, 1961.235 It 'vas then adopted unanimously by the General
Assembly on December 20, 1961, as Resolution 1721 (XVI). 236
The debates in the First Committee disclose no stated reason for
eliminating the reference to "s by claim of sovereignty or otherwise."
The terms appear to be redundant when considered in relation to the
retained terminology. Perhaps they were dropped for reasons of
style. Their presence added nothing, nor did their absence affect
legal rights.
The importance of the two provisions adopted requires reference
to the meaning attributed to them during the discussions at the First
Committee. Speaking in support of the unamended four-nation proposal Ambassador Stevenson stated on December 4, 1961, that draft
resolution "A" contemplated a system of law and order in outer
U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L.301.
231 U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1210.
232 U.N. Doc. A/0.1/857.
233 U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L.301.
(Italics added.)
234 U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L.301/Rev. 1 and Rev. 1/Corr. 1.
235 U.N. Doc. A/C./SR.1214.
236 U.N. Doc. A/5100, 6-7; 9 U.N. Review 56-57 (January 1962); Annex 2,
infra pp. 443-446.
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space which would be beneficial to all states, the large and small
alike. He expressed the hope that space exploration would not become a contest between nations, that ideological quarrels would not
affect other planets, and that all nations would engage cooperatively
in the allocation of radio frequencies for space communications and
in global systems of weather prediction. In his view:
The first principle was that international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, applied to outer space and celestial bodies. In that connection, he pointed out that the Ad H oo
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space had observed in
its report of 14 July 1959 (A/4141) that, as a matter of principle, the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice were not lilnited in their operation to
the confines of the earth.
The second principle was that outer space and celestial bodies
were free for exploration and use by all States, and were not
subject to national appropriation. Freedom of space and of celestial bodies, like freedom of the seas, would serve the interests
of all nations; man should be free to venture into space \vithout
any restraints except those imposed by the laws of his own nation and by international law, including the United Nations
Charter. That principle also had been recognized in the report
of the Ad Hoo Committee and had since then been confirmed by
the practice of States. 237
He then added that the time had not arrived when the limits of
outer space could be fixed. The boundary "between air space and
outer space could be drawn only after further experience, and by
consensus of opinion among nations." 238
All of the other speakers approved the terms of the draft resolution "A," and there were no criticisms of this proposal. The proponents made it clear that part "A" of the resolution, as well as the
remaining elements consisting of "B" through "E," dealt exclusively
with the peaceful uses of outer space, and that the separate military
questions of space should be considered in the context of disarmament negotiations. Thus, a representative view was that of the Canadian delegate who stated "the Committee was not now dealing with
the military aspects of the question; its objective should be to ensure
the use of space for peaceful purposes only, by fostering international co-operation in all phases of space exploration." 239
U.N. Doc. A/C.l/SR.1210.
Ibid.
'239 U.N. Doc. A/C.l/SR.1210, 247.
237
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The delegates in discussing the draft proposal "A" found occasion
to consider the impact of a declaration of legal principles upon the
whole regi1ne of outer space. Sir Patrick Dean of the United Kingdom summed up this as follo,vs: "It was of great importance that a
satisfactory legal regime should be established for outer space and
the celestial bodies. Such a regime, however, must be established step
by step; a co1nprehensive code of I a w for outer space was not yet
practicable or desirable. However, certain broad legal principles
could be laid down and should be regarded as injunctions of great
weight and as useful steps towards such a legal regime." 240
Several delegates stated that the principles set forth in the second
paragraph of the proposed draft resolution "A" had already been
generally accepted by states. This was the view of the delegates of
Australia, Italy, Peru, Poland, s,veden, and Spain. They based this
conclusion on the fact that "no country had objected to tp.e orbiting
of space vehicles over its territory either during or since the International Geophysical Year." 241
The Spanish delegate, along with several others, however, considered that the first principle contained in draft resolution "A" was
creative rather than declaratory in nature. Thus, ~1r. De Lequerica
indicated that since it was too early to settle all legal problems
affecting outer space the sponsors of the draft resolution had acted
properly in confining themselves "to laying down the principle that
international law applied to outer space and celestial bodies * * *." 242
This, of course, runs counter to the general view that international
law applied in outer space absent the resolution.
The Japanese delegate, failing to weigh the post-1957 experience
in space, expressed the hope that "certain general principles should
be established as soon as possible * * *" and indicated that one "such
principle was that outer space 1nust be used for peaceful purposes
alone." 243 He stressed the need for the banning of outer space for
"military" purposes as soon as possible. The Greek delegate's remarks
indicate his belief that the adoption of the draft resolution "A"
'vould be creative rather than declaratory. 244
The only views which might be construed as critical of the substance of part "A" of the resolution were expressed by the Indian
Ibid., 249.
241 U.N. Doc. A/C.l/SR.1213, 264. The Iranian delegate after mentioning that
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no state objected to the free orbiting of satellites indicated that this seemed to
be a tacit acknowledgment that "territorial sovereignty did not extend beyond
air space." Ibid.
Ibid.
243 U.N. Doc. A/C.l/SR.1212, 258.
244 U.N. Doc. A/C.l/SR.1213, 265.
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delegate. He stated that his delegation had no objection to the
proposal and then said "He agreed with the principles proclaimed
in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A, but he felt that the
basic concepts of international law might perhaps be too limited
:for outer space2 where the concepts of nationality and sovereignty
would be out of place." 245
When the revised draft was presented to the First Committee
only eight delegates debated its adoption, and not all made reference to resolution "A." Mr. Yost, speaking for the United States,
stated that the "revised text gave formal recognition to two fundamental legal principles on which the Committee should base itself
in examining legal problems which might arise from the exploration
and use of outer space." 246 The British delegate stated that resolution "A" had "enunciated" legal principles relating to the peaceful
uses of outer space, and hoped that within the framework of the
disarmament program it would be possible to establish controls so
as to "limit the use of outer space to peMeful purposes o11ly." 247
The Soviet delegate indicated that the resolution "enunciated certain legal principles for the guidance of States in the exploration
and use of outer space * * *." 248 The French delegate stated that
while it was "certainly proper to declare that international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, applied to outer space
and celestial bodies * * *" he found merit in the cautious way in
which the second part of resolution "A" sought to avoid the making
of precise recommendations. 249 Thereupon, the chairman, finding
no objections within the committee stated that the resolution would
be considered as having been adopted unanimously. It was subsequently adopted unanimously and without amendment by the
General Assembly as Resolution 1721 (XVI) on December 20, 1961.250
Several important facts resulted from these discussions on the
law of outer space. The Resolution was adopted unanimously and
without reservations. Second, it stressed the existence of a legal
regime for space. Third, it emphasized the free use of space rather
than a restricted use of space. Fourth, it recognized the common
interest of mankind in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space,
and thereby raised important questions as to the differences, if any,
between peaceful and military uses. Although the entire resolution
Ibid.
246 U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1214, 267. (Italics added.)
247 Ibid., 268. (Italics added.)
24 8 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 U.N. Doc. A/5100, 6-7; 56 A.J.I.L. 946-949 (1962) ; Annex 2, infra, pp.
443-446.
245
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did not forbid the use of outer space for n1ilitary purposes, it is
correct to say that the participants, when en1ploying the ter1n "Inilitary,~' ''ere not suggesting or i1nplying that space could not be used
for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial 1nilitary purposes.
The participants in 1961 were using the term "military" as meaning
aggressive military purposes. Thus, one of the major contributions
of the discussions and of the resolution was to help clarify the ter1n
peaceful uses to include nonaggressi ve military purposes. The agreement that space might be used freely for exploration did not suggest
that in the course thereof states n1ight endanger the peace and security of other states. 251 The Co1nmittee did not endeavor to delineate
examples of aggressive and nonaggressive uses, although the Hungarian delegate on one occasion characterized niidas and Samos
satellites as engaged in 1nilitary espionage and declared the \\Test
Ford experin1ent to be a '~1nilita.ry project." 252
The efforts to arrive at suitable distinctions between aggressive
military and nonaggressive 1nilitary functions is a continuing one. 253
Probably of greatest ilnportance, however, was the de1nonstration,
following a long period of Soviet i11transigence, that the two resource
nations could con1e to some kind of explicit agreement relating to
the uses of outer space. This, in turn, led to the possibility that the
United Nations n1ight serve as a continuing foru1n for considering
the clainlS of all nations relating to outer space.
Resolution 1721 (X\TI) is important to the international law of
outer space for seYeral reasons. First, a unanimous resolution of the
General Assembly provides a conYenient means for the promulgation
of legal principles. Second, the principles so enunciated 1nay be
extended and refined through the subsequent acceptance of 1nore
detailed legal rules. Third, such resolutions may be easier of adoption than formal treaties, in that such resolutions may avoid the
psychological appearance of per1nanent commitments. Fourth, they
may not only be as practical as treaties, but they may also avoid
the constitutional proble1ns which may confront some nation-states.
Thus, the internationally sponsored resolution, like customary law,
may be distributive of international legal rights and duties resulting
from claims advanced in the international forum. The substance
of principles which ha\e been put forward as international resolutions have been referred to by Schachter as "soft" law as opposed
2 s 1 Goedhuis, "Some Trends in the Political and Legal Thinking on the Conquest of Space," 9 "Ketherlands bzter11ational Law Reviezo 128 (1962).
25 2 U.N. Doc. A./ C.l/ SR.1212, 260. See infra, pp. 302-304, 314, 404.
2 53 Infra, pp. 244-2-!6, 265-2"77, 292-293.
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to the "hard" law of treaties. The form in 'vhich the law is promulgated is less important than the fact that some resolutions of the
General Assembly, like explicit international agreements, do have
legal force and significance.
The content of international resolutions may be vague, but it
may also be specific. The United States delegate to the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on March 19, 1962, told that
body that the terms of Resolution 1721 (XVI) were both practical
and specific. He stated:
"\Ve should proceed in this area with the recognition that the
task of the organized international community is to develop
principles and standards which are sufficiently realistic and
specific to have an impact on international practice and which
are not so grandiose or elaborate as to be impractical and therefore ignored.
The practical and specific principles, which were unanimously
approved by the Assembly in Part A of General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), form the basic foundation of a legal regime
for outer space. They represent a forward-looking expression
by the Assembly that outer space is indeed the province of all
mankind. They are practical in the sense that the enlightened
self-interest of all States should lead to compliance with them. 254
He concluded that the United Nations was capable of playing an
important role by way of the resolution passing process in developing principles for the guidance of states in the peaceful uses of outer
space. On such foundations the United Nations has been the forum
for the consideration of more detailed legal rules.
The practical use of resolutions was noted by the representative of
the United l(ingdom at the meeting of the legal subcommittee of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on April 17, 1963.
~{iss Gutteridge of the British Foreign Office legal staff pointed out
that a unanimous resolution of the General Assembly "would be
254 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.2, 33-35. On April 22, 1963, the Italian delegate
told the legal sub-committee that binding legal principles might be expressed
in the form of a UN resolution. He said "In international law, rules were
binding primarily because States considered themselves bound by such rules,
whatever their origin. From that "Viewpoint recommendations of the General
Assembly undoubtedly had binding force." Compare Tammes, Decision~ of
International Organizations as a So-urce of International Law, 94 Recueil des
Cours 261 (1958) ; Virally, La Valeur Juridique des Recommendations dea
Organisations Internationales, 2 A.nnuaire Francai.s de Dro-it International 66
(1956).
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n1ost authoritative and would ha \·e son1e advantages over an agreenlent in vie'v of the possibility that all States 1night not accede to
an agree1nent or that delays in ratification or failure to ratify might
considerably reduce its scope.~' 255 It ''"as her vie'v that the adoption
of such a resolution on such a specific 1natter as space vehicle liability
or the right of a nation-state to the return of its astronauts from
foreign areas might usefully precede the conclusion of explicit international agreements.
Substantial authority exists in support of the view that the unanilllous resolution of an almost universal international organization,
such as the United Nations, is both authoritative and also, depending on the language used, 1nay be relied upon as the basis of legal
rights and duties. Such resolution, of course, can be creatiYe of new
rights and duties, and it 1nay also si1nply restate or proznulgate
existing rights and duties. As noted above, Resolution 1721 (XVI),
in the views of manyl merely summarized in written form preexisting customary la'v and therefore was promulgative rather
than creative. Just as there have been no official protests by states
respecting the practice of orbiting space vehicles in outer space,
there have been no official protests concerning the force and validity
of the resolution. This is true even though the resolution, like any
other written legal document, is potentially subject to differing
viewpoints and interpretations.
It is not possible to develop at length the fact that a unanimous
resolution of the United Nations possesses legal force. Starke has
analyzed the relationship bet,veen customary international law and
General Assembly resolutions. He has written that such resolutions
or comparable organizational decisions "may represent intermediate
or final steps in the evolution of customary law. " 256 He also holds
that a "Resolution or decision may suffice to create a precedent for
future actions." 257 This is true because the context in which a resolution has been prepared, as well as its specific language, 1nay affect
its legal status.
Two basic tests have been put forward by Sloan. He has observed
that:
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, 7.
Starke, An Introduction to Intcnwtional Law 35 (3d eel. 1954).
257 Ibid, at footnote 3. However, where a UN resolution does not have the
approval of a major member, such as the United States, it "does not necessarily bind the members. It is evidence of public opinion which may or may
not ripen into custom or be set forth in a treaty." II International Law, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-161-2 43, fn. 32 (1962).
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The first concerns the authority or competence of the General
Assembly in regard to the subject-matter, to the addressee, and
to the contemplated action or decision. The second concerns the
intention of the General Assembly in adopting a given resolution, :for even where a body may be competent to make a binding
decision it may voltmtarily limit its action to something less. 258
Resolution 1721 (XVI) refers to states as the subject of its terms,
and seeks to prescribe certain of their activities. It deals with nongovernmental as well as governmental bodies. It makes provision
for the submission of information respecting space launches, and
it calls for the submission of a variety of reports. Two members of
the United Nations, beginning with the report of March 5, 1962,
submitted by the United States, have registered launches of vehicles
going into orbit and beyond. Such registrations have been based on
the terms contained in the resolution. :J\1any nation-states, as well
as public and private international organizations2 have continually
made reports to the United Nations respecting their space activities.
Such reports have also been based on the terms contained in the
resolution. The whole history of the resolution coupled with unvarying national efforts to comply with its terms clearly suggests the
conclusion that it possesses legal as well as moral and political force.
States have been acting in conformity with it from a sense of obligation, ·which is one of the basic tests in ascertaining the legal
character of a resolution in internationallaw. 259 The United Nations,
of course, is free to ascribe whatever meaning it wishes to a resolution, and it is noteworthy that part "A" by its terms commends or
enunciates "principles" respecting the space activities of states. In
the entire context they can be regarded only as promulgated legal
principles, and, as such, can be meaningful only if they are regarded
as binding on states. Secretary of State Rusk has referred to the
principles contained in Part "A" as "presently the law; the unanimous action of the General Assembly in adopting the resolution, as
258 Sloan, "The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation' of the General Asse:r:nbly of the United Nations," 25 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 3 (1948). Some resolutions
of the General Assembly have been described as not "binding on member
States." 'Vhen resolutions have been cast in "the form of a declaration * * *
particular weight" is accorded a resolution. Schwebel, "The Story of the
U.N.'s Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty OYer Natural Resources," 49
A.B.A.J. 469 (1963).
259 Ibid., 2.
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action by the govern1nents of the world assembled, confirn1s this
view·." zGo
The unanimity of the Assembly action necessarily affects the distinction between the Inoral, political, or legal effect of a resolution.
Johnson has concluded a careful study of the force of such resolutions by stating "There is also nothing to prevent ~ie1nbers incurring
binding legal obligations by the act of voting for Resolutions of
the General Assmnbly, provided there is a clear intention to be so
bound * * * . Their value * * * depends upon the extent to which they
can be regarded as expressions of the 'juridical conscience' of humanity as a 'vhole rather than of an incongruous or ephemeral political
majority." 261 Further, it is well known that the general role of the
General Assembly has been considerably expanded over the years
since 1945. The applicability and force of its resolutions have grown
with its own added significance. Writers who deny that such resolutions are formally binding often admit that "they have great
persuasive value." 262 Where, however~ the General Assembly unanimously promulgates principles which reflect a consensus of practice
which has emerged as customary international law, there is no
difficulty in asserting that such a resolution and its contents constitute legal injunctions of great weight.
With the submission of specific and general proposals to the
United Nations relating to the peaceful uses of outer space, questions
have arisen as to the form which such proposals should take. In
addition to the resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly,
proposals have been put forward entitled recommendations, resolutions, declarations, codes, international agreements, and simply, draft
proposals. The documents bearing these titles have concentrated on
so-called "basic principles" and also upon detailed rules for a specific
type of situation.
The delegates to the United Nations have endeavored to reach
some kind of consensus as to the legal implications involved in the
selection of such terms. In doing so they have been governed by
their views as to the substantive law to be contained in such documents, as well as by general political considerations, including bargaining advantage. The choice of form has also been affected by the
260 Rusk, supra note 164, at 318. Compare Plimpton, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/
PV.2, 13-15, where he states that the General Assembly Resolution "rejected
the concept of national sovereignty in outer space." Also, Gore, U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1289, 21.
261 Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, 32 Brit. Yb lnt'l. L. 121-122 (1955-1956).
262 Abi-Saab, supra note 117, at 109.
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fact that not all delegates have a clear understanding of the legal
differences between principles and rules as noticed at the beginning
of this Chapter. The delegates have recognized that Resolution 1721
(XVI) sets forth general legal principles. They have also recognized the need to recite additional and clarifying principles and at
the same time to achieve agreement · on specific rules.
The 1962-1963 discussions relating to form have centered on the
differences, if any, between recommendations, resolutions, declarations, and explicit international agreements (treaties, codes, or conventions) proposed or sponsored at the U.N. There was not entire
agreement by the delegates that the form should be determined by
the subject matter, in view of the fact that there was not complete
agreement as to the legal differences between differing forms. The
central problem was put forth in the Soviet representative's remarks
before the First Committee in 1962. He said that "there is no need
to prove in detail that the draft declaration * * * would be a document obliging States to adhere strictly to its provisions. There is
no need to prove that the resolution of the General Assembly-any
resolution of the General Assembly according to the Charter-is
only a recommendation which has no legally compulsive character." 263 During 1963 the debates in the legal subcommittee reflected
several approaches as to form. Broadly speaking, the Soviet bloc,
because of its well known antipathy toward the role of general
customary international law, has sought a highly formal expression
of space law principles and rules. This has resulted in favor for
international treaties or conventions and for signed declarations. The
Soviet preoccupation with the view that only explicit written agreements can serve as a source of international law-despite their affirmative votes on Resolutions 1721 (XVI), 1802 (XVII), and 1962
(XVIII)-has been demonstrated in the debates of the legal subcommittee. In discussing outer space the Soviet delegate has argued
that a state might hinder the use of outer space by another state for
peaceful purposes because "the principle that there must be [explicit
written] agreement on activities affecting the interests of other
countries was widely recognized in international law, witness the
many bilateral and other agreements concerning the regime of
international waters," 264 Of course, the Convention on the High
Seas, taking into account customary international law, is "generally
declaratory of established principles of international law." 265 On
263
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U.N. Doc. A/C.l/PV.1289, 51.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 12-13.
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another occasion the Soviet delegate suggested there would have
been no need for the legal subcommittee if custom were regarded as
a reliable source of international la\Y. 266 Ho\\~ever, the Soviet bloc
has not denied the fact that customary international law does exist.
The United States in particular, with broad support, has favored
the use of unani1nous resolutions of the General Assembly as a
means to ratify or promulgate international legal principles. It has
displayed some concern lest basic principles set down in Resolution
1721 (XVI) might suffer from erosion or unintentional modification
in the course of adding to and extending such principles. 267
There has also been concern lest the establishment of rules intended
to render existing basic principles more specific should not, in fact,
depart from such principles. The Soviet delegate on ~fay 7, 1962,
told the Con1mittee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) constituted the
approval of "certain general principles which should guide the States
in their outer space operations* * *" 268 Although this resolution only
commended certain principles to men1ber states, such principles
according to the United States govern1nent "constitute the basis of a
universally accepted charter for outer space." 269
Soviet bloc states in seeking to argue the need of stating legal
principles in the form of a Declaration of the United Nations, preferably signed by governments, have endeavored to cast some doubt
on the fact that a unanimous resolution of the General Assembly
is generally considered to constitute-if so intended-operative international law. Thus, the Romanian delegate told the legal subcomInittee on April 18, 1963, that if principles, which he preferred to
rules, "were e1nbodied in a General Assembly resolution, there was
no certainty that they would be implemented. Numerous precedents
from United Nations experience confirmed such a view. The best
solution ''ould be to draw up a declaration which would be signed
by Governments and would have the legal force of an international
agreement." 270 The Polish delegate told the conunittee much the
same on April 23, 1963. It was his view that although Resolution
1721 (XVI) "laid do,vn the fundamental principles of international
law applicable to outer space * * * . Such resolutions, being merely
recommendations without binding force, could not be considered
266
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sources of law, although States were undoubtedly correct in attaching particular importance to some of them. It was now for the Subcommittee to translate existing resolutions on the legal aspects of
outer space into more binding legal language." 271
This argument fails to take into account the fact that Resolution
1721 (XVI) pro1nulgated existing general customary law and the
form employed has been frequently used to enunciate legal principles.
In his view, practice had demonstrated that resolutions had been
less effectively applied than legally binding rules. In supporting
the form of a signed declaration he 1ninimized the unwillingness of
some states to sign such a document, and urged the conclusion that
such declarations, as opposed to resolutions, should be accorded
"binding legal force." 272
The delegate from Lebanon told the subcommittee on April 25,
1963, that a solemn declaration like the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, would have greater authority than an ordinary
resolution of the General Assembly in establishing space law principles. In his vie,v, the acceptance of such a declaration would lead
the way to a convention or covenant containing such principles and
that this £orin of document might then be recommended by the General Assembly to its 1nembers for ratification. However, for more
mundane n1atters, such as liability or return of astronauts, an international agreement subject to ratification was more applicable. 273
The Indian delegate also expressed preference for an agreement
in the form of a declaration of general principles rather than a
resolution. It was his view that the declaration might be followed
by a "convention which would be ratified by States and thus become
legally binding." However, he soon amended this somewhat curious
statement by adding "A declaration had great moral force and, when
adopted unanimously, was generally accepted as part of international
law." 274 His objection to agreement in the form of a resolution was
not that it was lacking in legal validity, but that such a document
might be somewhat lengthy.
Mr. Meeker, the United States representative, endeavored to
clarify the difference between princi pies and rules in his remarks to
the subcommittee on April 24, 1963. He pointed out that while both
principles and rules may establish legally binding rights and duties,
2n U.N. Doo. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.19, 5.
212 Ibid., 6, citing Hall, A Treatise on lnternatio·nal Law, sec. 109 (8th ed.
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principles relate to broad concepts and rules relate to specific concepts, e.g., liability in the event of accidents and assistance and return
of astronauts. Only rules are able to deal with detailed provisions
relating to such matters as scope of liability, or the procedure for
presenting claims, or the forum to resolve the meaning of an agreement. Such matters, in his view, properly ought to be treated in
international agreements, treaties, or conventions.
On the other hand~ he urged that a resolution of the General
Assembly better served the needs of the international community as
a vehicle for the declaration of general principles. He pointed out
that it was easier and faster to adopt a resolution than to arrive
at a formal agree1nent. The latter process was always subject to
uncertainty as to the number of states which would ratify it. He
referred to the inconsistency of the Soviet position, in that rnembers
of the Soviet bloc had, in 1962, favored the adoption of a General
Assembly Resolution containing general principles of international
law relating to friendly relations and international cooperation
among states. 275
l\fr. Meeker concluded his analysis of the legal force of different
forms by calling attention to the many sources of international law.
He stated:
Some delegations had argued that only an international agreement signed by Governments would be legally binding. International agreements were not, however, the only sources of law.
As stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, judicial decisions, international custom and other
sources should also be taken into consideration. "\Vhen a General
Assembly resolution proclaimed principles of international law
-as resolution 1721 (XVI) had clone-and was adopted unanimously, it represented the law as generally accepted in the international community. 276
While it is clear that a unanimous resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly may promulgate legal principles having binding
force, it is also true that the same result would obtain if the document were entitled "declaration." This is true whether the declaration is signed or is not signed.
Comparisons between declarations and treaties have sought to
make the same distinction that has been attempted between resolu21s This is set forth in U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.505.
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tions and treaties. Thus, the Australian delegate told the First Committee on Dece1nber 11, 1962, that he thought there was:
* * * common ground that declarations by the General Assembly are not law-making in the sense that a treaty or a convention is, although a declaration universally adopted and adhered
to in practice may be valuable evidence of international custom,
and hence a most important source of law. The point I make
is that general acceptance, both by vote and in practice, is the
essential requisite, if a resolution or declaration by the General
Assembly is to be valuable in this way as a step in the making
of law." 277
Clearly, the juridical forn1 taken by a docun1ent may have some
legal significance, but it is sub1nitted that participating states may
through the appropriate consensus assign whatever legal import
they 1nay wish to any of the typical forms. In this connection it
must be remembered that general principles have more frequently
been found in resolutions and in declarations, or in declarations
embodied in resolutions, and that detailed rules have more often
been instituted through for1nal agree1nents and conventions.
Possibly the best rationale for the Soviet concern for the use of
declarations may be found in the statements of their delegate to the
First Co1nmittee on Decen1ber 3, 1962. In his view the role of international law is "to regulate the activities of the co-operating parties." 278 Thus, it is, in his view, the function of both principles
and rules to achieve this goal, and both may be used to impose
sufficiently precise regulations. He then added :
It is indubitable that it is very important to define, first
of all, the main principles of this co-operation and then the
concrete practical measures which would ensure success for such
co-operation and which would prevent the possibility of a misunderstanding, of frictions and of actions that would be prej udicial to the legal rights of any party. That is why the Soviet
delegation deems that it is important to adopt a declaration on
the main principles of activities of States in the study and use
of outer space. 279
Such regulation requires binding legal obligations, and so the Soviet
argument has asserted that "if Governments really intended to
U.N. Doo. A/C.1/PV.1298, 12-13.
U.N. Doo. A/0.1/PV.1289, 48-50.
279 Ibid.
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observe certain principles of conduct in outer space, they would
want to see those principles laid down in a declaration having the
full force of an international treaty." 280
The delegate fro1n the UAR and the Canadian representative,
among others, have also expressed themselves on the propriety of the
a vaila'ble for1ns. According to the former, a decision to em ploy a
declaration or a code depended upon the substance of the proposals. 281 The latter considered the formulation of principles for the
guidance of states to be a solemn task and that since a declaration
was a more formal document than a resolution that a declaration
was particularly suited to a statement of basic principles. However,
for rules, an even more formal procedure was required. In his view,
rules had to take the form of binding treaties or conventions. 282
On the basis of the foregoing review of positions advanced by
scholars and by representatives at the United Nations, it is clear
that international legal rights and duties may be set forth in varying
forms. Thus, the international law of outer space, in addition to
its customary foundation, may be found in international resolutions,
declarations, and formal agree1nents. The latter may be entitled
codes, conventions, treaties~ or other suitable expressions. 'Vhile all
may have equal weight as sources of international space law, if so
intended, there is a difference in the sense of their formality, with
the least formal-but not necessarily less effective-being the unanimous resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
~{ore formal is the unanimous declaration of the same body, particularly when subscribed to in writing by all of the 1nembers of the
United Nations, while most formal is the written agreement which
has been subjected to the appropriate constitutional tests within
the domestic areas of the numerous signatories. 'Vhile it is a matter
of choice as to which of the :foregoing ought to be employed with
respect to the principles and rules of international space law, it is
clear that states are divided in their preferences as to the means
2so 1\fr. Fedorenko to the legal subcommittee on April 19, 1963.
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to establish such general principles. The major choice is between
resolutions and doolarations. The Soviet bloc constitutes an exception and favors principles being set out in signed declarations and
even treaties. On the other hand, it is clear that all states prefer to
employ the formal agreement for the delineation of specific rules.
However this preference as to form has no inherent legal significance, and, although not at all practical, it would be entirely legal
to set out binding rules in the form of a resolution or declaration.
On February 21, 1962, Chairman l(hrushchev addressed a conciliatory letter to President Kennedy in order to extend his congratulations to Lieutenant Colonel John H. Glenn on the occasion
of his successful space flight. In the letter he offered some hope of
reestablishing the space discourse which he had neglected to pursue
with President Eisenhower during the Spring of 1958. President
l{ennedy, in his reply, indicated that the two countries should
"cooperate in the exploration of space" and that he would prepare
concrete proposals for common action in the hope that a meeting
might be arranged between appropriate officers motivated by "a
spirit of practical cooperation." ·283
On March 7, 1962, President Kennedy again wrote the Soviet
Premier listing five specific subjects which he considered within
the range of practical cooperation. This letter corresponded with
the March 1962 meeting of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, and on March 19, the American representative
distributed a copy of the letter to the entire committee. 284 This was
in keeping with the United States policy of presenting its space
claims to a forum broader than that of the two resource nations.
The major United States proposals were: first, the joint establishment of an early operational weather satellite system; second, the
establishment and operation of a radio tracking station in the Soviet
Union employing United States equipment and a similar arrangement in the United States employing Soviet equipment; third, cooperation in mapping the earth's magnetic field in space through
the use of two satellites in differing orbits; fourth, cooperation in
testing experimental communications by satellite; fifth, the pooling
of efforts and exchange of knowledge in the field of space medicine;
and, sixth, such other cooperative activities as might prove feasible
"President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev," 46 Department of StateBulletin 411 (1962).
2 84 "Letter dated lVIarch 7, 1962 from President Kennedy addressed to Chairman Khrushchev," 46 Department of State Bulletin 536 (1962) ; U.N. Doc..
A/AC.105/1; 9 United Nations Review 37-38 (April 1962).
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as the respective space progra1ns of the two nations developed. 285
~fr. ICennedy favored the free dissemination of information acquired
through such efforts. His proposal included the vie'v that such
tasks, costs, and risks might be both minimized and shared.
Premier IChrushchev replied on ~larch 20, 1962, and his response
was circulated to the General Assembly of the United Nations on
March 21. He conditioned his concrete proposals by stating that he
proceeded upon the premise that "all peoples, all mankind, are
-concerned with the task of exploring outer space and putting it
to peaceful uses * * *" 286 He then expressed agree1nent with the
ICennedy proposals in four instances, i.e., the latter~s first, third,
fourth and fifth proposals, and also put forward a series of separate
·proposals.
He favored cooperative activity regarding international long-distance communications systems. He· accepted the concept of co·operation in the field of worldwide weather observation services by
means of artificial satellites. He also agreed to cooperate in the
preparation of charts of the earth's magnetic field and in the general field of space biology. His proposals suggested that it would
be profitable to reach agreement "on the organization of a joint
program for making observations by radio and by optical means
·on objects launched toward the moon, ~1ars, Venus and other planets
in the solar system," and for cooperation in the study of "the physics
of interplanetary space and celestial bodies." 287 He proposed the
drafting and concluding of an international agreement providing for
"assistance in search for and recovering space-ships, satellites and
capsules which come down to earth by accident." 288
Mr. IChruschev referred to the common approach taken at the
United Nations when it adopted Resolution 1721 (XVI), and stated
that this constituted a sign of progress for the formulation of "the
initial principles of space law * * *" and proposed that there 'vas
an opportunity to go beyond these funda1nentals. He urged the
necessity of coming "to an agreement that, in carrying out experiments in outer space, no one should create obstacles to the study
and use of space for peaceful purposes by other states. It should,
perhaps, be specified that any experiments in outer space which
may hinder the exploration of space by other countries should be
the subject of preliminary discussion and of an agreement conIbid.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/2; 9 United Nations Review 38-39 (April 1962).
287 Ibid., 4.
288 Ibid.
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eluded on a proper international basis." 289 He also expressed the·
hope that through cooperative efforts and attitudes on the subject
of outer space it would be possible to derive gains in the field of
general and complete disarmament. These exchanges did bear fruit,
for they led to negotiation of the Dryden-Blagonravov understanding of June 8, 1962..290
"\Vhen the inaugural meeting of the expanded U.N. Committee·
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met in New York on March
19, 1962, the American representative made broad references to the
Kennedy letter to the Soviet government and expressed the hope
that the Committee would be able to assist in the planning of "peaceful uses of outer space. " 291 He specifically called for international
cooperation in the development of common legal doctrines and standards for outer space insofar as that area had become important "for
the future growth of international la'v ." 292 He commented on the·
meaning of Resolution 1721 (XVI) saying that the provisions of
part "A" had extended the rule of law to outer space, that under
the resolution "We have rejected the concept of national sovereignty
in outer space," and that since the principles were indeed sound
ones that he wished "to re-endorse them heartily on behalf of theUnited States Government." 293 In his judg1nent these principles
were practical and specific and constituted "the basic foundation of a
legal regime for outer space." 294 On this foundation the United States
then proposed that studies be undertaken on the subject of responsibility for space vehicle accidents and on the subject of "problems
arising from the landing, by reason of distress or mistake, of space
vehicles in the territory of other States." 295 This constituted the first
of numerous subsequent efforts to translate the fundament~al principles
into specific binding rules of international law. 296
The remarks of the United States delegate were also notable in
two other respects. He stated that practical international space
activities should not be carried on by the United Nations, but rather
that they should be the product of national programs-involving
289 Ibid., 5.
290 Infra, at pp. 230, 275-276. The agreement is set out in Annex 22, infra at pp.

482-488.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.2, 9-10; Plimpton, "New Vistas for International
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space," 46 Departrnent of State
Bulletin 809 (1962).
292Ibid., 12.
293Ibid., 13-15.
294 Ibid., 33-35.
295Ibid.
296 Infra, pp. 211-390.
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~ooperative

efforts with other nations-including private activities.
He then referred to the legislation pending before the United States
Congress calling for the establish1nent of a Commercial Satellite
Corporation which was "intended to be the United States participant
in a global system-a truly international arrangement 'vith broad
ownership and broad participation." 291 He pointed out that foreign
countries would be per1nitted to cooperate in and to participate in
the system which "'vithin this decade 'vill be for point-to-point
relay between central installations in different countries, not for
direct broadcast into people's homes." 298 The concept of a private
corporation engaging in international con1munications activities 'vas
later to be subject to criticism by the Soviet government.
On l\iarch 20, 1962, the Soviet delegate, l\fr. l\1orozov, prior to
his receipt of the l(hrushchev note of that date, addressed the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In acknowI edging the
existence of the principles contained in part "A" of Resolution 1721
(XVI) he stated that they signified "that the activities of the States
in outer space research should be conducted in keeping 'vith the
recognized principles of peaceful coexistence, sovereignty, equality,
non-aggression and non-interference in domestic affairs." 299 This
·Contention, which pursued the uniquely Soviet notion of the guidelines of international law-an emphasis 'vhich follo,vs 'veil-known
Soviet policy goals-constituted the first of many subsequent Soviet
efforts to provide an interpretation of the resolution. In extending
his ren1arks he pointed out that "all States have equal rights to
conduct independent research in space * * * [and that] no experiments are permissible in outer space, which might in any way
make it difficult for other States to conduct cosmic research and
exploration." 300 He referred to these contentions as "principles"
although certainly they do not fall within the scope of that 'vord
as defined at the beginning of this Chapter, 301 nor as attested to
by usage. It would be better to regard them as unilateral claims
to be accepted or rejected by the international community through
the customary or formal processes of the la 'v.
Mr. l\iorozov also put for,vard the "principle" or claim that no
State was entitled to extend its jurisdiction to any part of outer
.space. 302 l-Ie also spoke of the need for international agreements
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on several matters, presumably after the legal subcommittee of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space had been provided an opportunity to draft written agreements. In this category
he included first, "assistance in the searching and salvaging of any
space ships, sputniks and containers which might have to effect
forced landings," second, "provisions which would prohibit such
experiments as might obstruct or have a negative influence on
research conducted by other countries-research in the interests of
mankind-or which would create any kind of impediment or obstacle
to exploration or utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes
by other countries," third, that a "principle should be proclaimed
according to which the penetration, exploration and utilization of
outer space should be exercised by States whose Governments are
entirely responsible for any activities in outer space," and, fourth,
"juridical provisions to ensure the sovereign rights of States with
respect to the various objects they are launching." 303 As to the last
point he asserted that the launching state should be entitled to
receive back objects coming to rest in other states, provided suitable
information had been submitted to the United Nat ions by the
launching state.
He took some pains to point out why he had asserted the claim
that space devices should be the product of public rather than private
efforts. He considered that communications satellites might be
employed "in order to harm people, to foster the cold war, and to
aggravate international tensions * * * . It is necessary to work
out juridical provisions which would prohibit any activities in outer
space, such as the use of teleco1nmunications or television satellites,
which might be used for war propaganda or propaganda of racial
animosity and hatred, and among peoples and nations." 304
The tone of the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters caught the attention of the members of the committee and thereby improved considerably the hopes that written agreements and international cooperation for the peaceful uses of outer space might be achieved. The
committee's activities were adjourned on March 29th so that two
subcommittees, legal and scientific and technical, might meet in
Geneva on May 28, 1962.
It was at this time that the United States proposed to the 18nation Committee on Disarmament a Treaty on General and ComIbid.
Ibid., 27. See pp. 211-390 infra for a comparison of these principles with
those advanced by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab
Republic.
303

304

210
plete Disarmament in a Peaceful " 7 orld. 305 Thus, on April18, 1962,
a draft treaty affecting the uses of outer space was made public
which provided that states should agree "not to place in orbit weapons
capable of producing n1ass destruction." The draft also provided
for agreement "to support increased international cooperation in
peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other
appropriate arrangements." 806 It also provided for advance notification of launchings and for the prelaunch inspection of space
vehicles and 1nissiles by an International Disarmament Organization
and for the detection of unreported launchings. This proposal was
supplemented on August 27, 1962, by a draft treaty prepared by
the United States and the United Kingdon1 for signature by these
two and by the Soviet Union providing an obligation to discontinue
nuclear weapons tests in all environments. Article I b. provided
for the parties to undertake "to refrain from causing, encouraging,
or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear "\Yeapon
tests explosions anywhere." 307
The admittedly close interrelationship between scientific, technological, political, legal, and defense aspects of outer space very
importantly conditioned the ongoing efforts in the United Nations
to provide a substantial legal regime for that environment. These
considerations manifestly affected the initiation of studied and
cautious negotiations by the legal and by the scientific and technological subcommittees of the Con11nittee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space in Geneva, ~fay 28 to June 20, 1962. In their careful deliberations the member states sought to implement the legal
principles contained in Resolution 1721 (XVI). In the follo,ving
months negotiations were conducted in the First Committee of the
U.N., in the General Assembly, in such public international organizations as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the
World ~feteorological Organization (\VMO), UNESCO, the World
Health Organization (WHO), and in such private scientific agencies
as COSPAR. In addition, the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) of the United Nations demonstrated an interest in the
subject and cooperated with the other organs of the United Nations.
During that period several issues of central importance developed.
First, a general consensus developed that there were some practical
matters affecting the peaceful uses of outer space in which states
305 "United States Presents Outline of n Treaty on General and Complete
Disarmament," 46 Department of State Bulletin 747 (1962).
aos Ibid., 751.
807 "Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in All Environments," 47
Department of State Bulletin 411 (1962).
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were in general agreement. Second, the Soviet Union, with general support by members of its bloc, announced its support of
limitations upon the free and peaceful uses of outer space. Third,
the United States tentatively advanced certain views for the control
of some forms of space conduct, and at the same time rejected certain Soviet claims for a restriction upon the peaceful uses of outer
space. United States and Soviet differences were made known to
the entire community, and this led both to the firming of positions
and effort to arrive at a workable middle ground. During the same
time it became clear that the Legal Subcommittee would be seriously
affected in its deliberations by concern for political and defense considerations, while at the same time the members of the Scientific and
Technological Subcommittee would arrive at many practical solutions to practical problems, and further, \vould begin to implen1ent
such decisions.
The legal subcommittee during May and June, 1962, sought to
achieve a consensus on a number of the points raised in the l{ennedyKhrushchev correspondence of the preceding March. The debates
proceeded on the basis that the principles of part "A" of Resolution
1721 (XVI) were suitable foundations upon which there might be
developed legal rules relevant to outer space activity. The United
States submitted two proposals. The first was entitled "Assistance
to and Return of Space Vehicles and Personnel." 308 The second
was entitled "Liability for Space Vehicle Accidents." 309 The two
Soviet proposals were entitled "International Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts and Spaceships Making Emergency Landings," 310 and "Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the
Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space." 311 The government of India also submitted a proposal
which linked the subject of return of space vehicles and personnel
with the subject of liability. 312 The government of Canada filed
an assessment pointing to the fact that members of the Subcommittee
had endorsed the need for an agreement fixing liability for space
vehicle accidents. 313 No agreements were reached on any of the
proposals submitted to the Subcomn1ittee.
When the whole Com1nittee met from September 10 to 27, 1962,
a fifth proposal entitled "Draft Code for International Co-operation
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in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space" was submitted by the United
Arab Republic. 314 The whole Committee, also unable to come to
specific agreements, submitted the proposals and records of its second session 315 to the General Assembly on September 27, 1962.
During December, 1962, the First Co1nmittee received from the
United ICingdom a "Draft Declaration of Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space." 316 On December 8, 1962, the United States
also circulated to the First Committee a "Draft Declaration of
Principles Relating to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space." 317
The United States declaration of principles, after emphasizing
the fact that it was in the common interest of all mankind to
further the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, proposed
seven principles to states for their guidance in the exploration and
use of outer space. The first three of the principles were taken
directly from General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI). Thus,
they called first for free exploration and use by all states, on the
basis of equal rights, of outer space and celestial bodies in conformity
with international law. Secondly, the United States asserted as a
principle the fact that states are bound by the relevant rules of
international law and the relevant provisions of international treaties
and agreements, including the Charter of the United Nations, in
the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies. Third 1
it w·as the position of the United States that outer space and celestial
bodies are not subject to national appropriation. The remaining
four principles, which had been favorably received in the committees of the United Nations dealt 'vith assistance to space vehicle
personnel, return of cre'v and vehicle to launching state, international
responsibility and damage, and jurisdiction. Thus, the fourth United
States princi pie provided that states "shall render all possible
assistance to the personnel of space vehicles 'vho may be the subject
of accident or experience conditions of distress, or 'vho may land
by reason of accident, distress, or mistake. Space vehicle personnel
who make such a landing shall be safely and promptly returned to
the launching authority." 318
A/5181. Annex 14, i-nfra,, p. 463.
315
A/AC.105/PV. 10-16.
316
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explained in detail by Senator Gore to the First Committee on December 10,
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The fifth United States principle provided that "States shall
return to the launching authority any space vehicle or part that
has landed by reason of accident, distress, or mistake. Upon request,
the launching authority shall furnish identifying data prior to
return." 319 The sixth principle called for the establishment of
liability on the part of a state or international organization from
whose territory or with whose assistance or permission a space
vehicle is launched when harm was produced by the launch. Such
a state or international organization "bears international responsibility for the launching, and is internationally liable for personal
injury, loss of life, or property damage caused by such vehicle on
the earth or in air space." 320 Pursuant to the final principle, jurisdiction over a space vehicle "while it is in outer space shall be retained
by the State or international organization which had jurisdiction
at the time of launching. Ownership and property rights in a space
vehicle and its components remain unaffected in outer space or upon
return to the earth." 321
The First Committee o:f the General Assembly considered the
efforts of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space during
December, 1962. The First Committee concerned itself primarily
with a draft resolution dealing with international cooperation in
the peaceful uses of outer space which had been submitted by the
United States on November 29, 1962. 322 By December 11, 1962, the
United States draft had been co-sponsored by twenty-three other
states, including the Soviet Union, and was unanimously adopted
by the committee. 323 This document was then referred to the General Assembly and on December 19, 1962, was unanimously adopted
as Resolution 1802 (XVII), "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space." 324
Resolution 1802 broadly seeks to facilitate the implementation
of legal principles promulgated in Resolution 1721 (XVI). The
1962 resolution, after recalling Resolution 1721, set forth both the
grounds for and the areas in which further development of international space law might develop.
Ibid.
320 Ibid., 3.
321 .Tbid.
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The 1962 resolution recited the unanimous belief of the members
of the United Nations that the "activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in conformity
with international law including the Charter of the United Nations,
in the interest of friendly relations an1ong nations." In its operative
portions it expressed regret that reco1nmendations on legal questions
had not been received. It thereupon called upon 1nember states to
cooperate in the "further development of law for outer space." It
then requested the Co1nmittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
to continue on a basis of urgency to elaborate more specifically certain areas of law relating to outer space. These areas were four
in number, and are set forth in Resolution 1802 in the following
order, although the order of statement was not to be considered
as a delineation of priority by the United States delegate: "The
further elaboration of basic principles governing the activities of
States in the exploration and use of outer space, on liability for
space vehicle accidents and on assistance to, and return of, astronauts
and space vehicles, as well as other legal problems." 325 The General
Assembly instructed the Con11nittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space to take into account the various drafts referred to above as
'vell as all other proposals and documents presented to the General
Assembly during its debates on this subject, including the records
of those debates.
With this directive confronting it the Co1nmittee, through its
subcommittee on legal matters, reconvened early in 1963 to consider
suitable approaches to legal problems of outer space. The conditions were not particularly favorable for productive discussions.
Illustrative of this fact were sterile discussions lasting through l\{arch
as to where future meetings were to be held.
Soviet limitations to the legal principles contained in Resolution
1721 (XVI) were first presented to the legal subco1nmittee at its
Geneva meeting, 28 May-20 June 1962, in the form of a declaration
of basic principles governing the activities of states pertaining to
the exploration and use of outer space. 326 In an a1nended and
modified form the Soviet proposals were placed before the Legal
Subcom1nittee of the Com1nittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space on April 16, 1963. 327 The Soviet proposals 'vere intended
to serve as an alternate to those subn1itted to the subcon11nittee by
Ibid.
326 U.N. Doo. A/AC.105/C.2/L.1; U.N. Doo. A/AC.105/6, 3-4.
327 U.N. Doo. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6. Annex 16, intra, pp. 466-468. An explanation
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3 25

215
the United States on December 8, 1962. 328 The Soviet proposals of
April 16, 1963, embodied some of the proposals submitted by other
states, particularly some of those contained in the draft declaration
of basic principles prepared by the United I{ingdom and the draft
code prepared by the United Arab Republic. There was some
similarity of language in the last Soviet proposal and the United
States "Draft Declaration of Principles Relating to the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space" of Dece1nber 8, 1962.
Common subjects were mentioned, but the Soviet proposal was
longer and varied considerably from the principles put forward
by the United States. They were funda1nentally different in approach.
The United States had also previously submitted detailed dra:ft
proposals on assistance to and return of space vehicles and personnel
and liability for space vehicle accidents. More importantly, the
United States sought the approval of its principles in the form
of a resolution of the United Nations, whereas the Soviet Union
urged its proposals in the form of a declaration of the United
Nations, to be followed by signatures as in the case of a treaty or
international convention. Further, the Soviet set of principles proposed limitations upon the peaceful uses of outer space, which had
not been contemplated in the proposals of the United States. The
Soviet principles by reason of their detail introduced subjects into
the space debate which were not at all material to its broadest and
most beneficial uses.
Both proposals in their respective introductory language recognized "the common interest of all mankind" in furthering the "peaceful exploration and use of outer space'' according to the United
States proposal, 329 and "in the progress of the exploration and use
of outer space for peaceful purposes" pursuant to the Soviet draft. 330
The British Draft Declaration of Basic Principles, which had been
filed with the First Committee on December 4, 1962, did not contain
a preamble. 331
The United States and the Soviet drafts were identical in believing
"that the exploration and use of outer space should be for the
328
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betterment of mankind and to the benefit of States irrespective of
the stage of their economic or scientific development." Identical
language provided "that such co-operation will contribute to the
development of n1utual understanding and to the strengthening of
friendly relations among nations and peoples."
The preamble of the United Arab Republic draft code of September 1962, which had been deposited because of an acknowledged
need to promote "international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and uses of outer space," considered the United Nations to be
the focal point for such activity. 332 The UAR preamble asserted that
it 'vas "imperative in the interests of mankind that activities in
outer space should be exclusively devoted to the peaceful uses of
outer space," and the first operative paragraph asserted that "the
activities of Member States in outer space should be confined solely
to the peaceful uses."
All proposals made reference to Resolution 1721 (XVI), whereas
the Soviet draft, coming after the adoption of Resolution 1802
(XVII), noted the latter also and recited that both resolutions had
been adopted unanimously. The United States preamble made reference to "the great i1nportance of international cooperation in this
field of human activity," whereas the Soviet noted the desirability
of promoting "broad international cooperation in the exploration
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes." This theme was
enlarged on in paragraph 2 of the UAR proposal, which indicated
"That in their policies toward outer space Member States should
promote international and peaceful cooperation." The UAR draft
devoted much attention to this position. Thus, paragraphs 6, 7, '8,
and 9 suggested as guidance for com1nittee work:
6. That one of the main objectives in international peaceful
cooperation in outer space is to develop special programmes in
which the developing countries can participate with a vie'v to
promoting world-wide interest in outer space;
7. That Member States agree to make full use of the facilities
and experience of all international organizations, specialized
agencies and non-governmental organizations, 'vhich have activities in outer space ;
8. That l\fember States will exert every possible effort to provide the United Nations Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis,
with all information necessary for the promoting of in ternational cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space;
3 32

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.6; U.N. Doc. A/5181. This citation covers all of
the immediately following references to this document. Annex 14, infra, pp.
463-464.
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9. That l\1ember States undertake to give all possible assistance to the United Nations and its affiliated organizations, to
undertake joint programmes of training and research to pron1ote
science and technology in outer space.
Additionally, the Soviet draft preamble acknowledged "the great
prospects opening up before mankind as a result of penetration into
outer space," and borrowed from the preamble of the UAR draft
which had noted the interrelationship of the technical and legal
aspects of the activities of states in outer space. The UAR preamble
recited the need for a frame·work to guide the future space activities
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and urged
that its work might help to "save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war."
The difference in the United States and Soviet approaches was
set forth in the following opposing drafts. The United States preamble commended "to States for their guidance in the exploration
and use of outer space the following declaration of principles * * *",
whereas the Soviet preamble called for a signed declaration whereby
states "solemnly declare that in the exploration and use of outer
space they will be guided by the following principles * * *."
The substantive principles illustrate si1nilarities and dissimilarities. Paragraph 1 of the United States draft provided that "outer
space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all
States, on the basis of equal rights, in conformity with international
law." The first sentence of paragraph 1 of the British draft is
identical, except no reference was made to "on the basis of equal
rights."
Paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft provided (after having indicated
in paragraph 1 that "The exploration and use of outer space shall
be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of mankind.")
that "Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and
use by all States * * *" The Soviets then added in paragraph 2
that "sovereignty over outer space or celestial bodies cannot be
acquired by use or occupation or in any other wa,y." The addition
took into account the British basic principles, which had sought to
distinguish clearly between freedom to do certain things in space
or freedom from controls, from types of activity where control
might be expected. In the present context the British draft provided in paragraph 2 that "Outer space and celestial bodies are not
capable of appropriation or exclusive use by any State" and then
added "Accordingly, no State may claim sovereignty over outer
space or over any celestial body, nor can such sovereignty be acquired
by means of use or occupation or in any other way." This view
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conforn1s to the principle contained in paragraph 3 of the United
States draft of principles "~hich provided that "Outer space and
celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation."
The United States, the Soviet, and the United l{ingdom drafts
recognized the application of the UN Charter and international la \V
to specified activities in outer space. Thus, paragraph 2 of the
United States draft recited that "In the exploration and use of
outer space and celestial bodies, States are bound by the relevant
rules of international la \V and the relevant provisions of international treaties and agreements including the Charter of the United
Nations." The British draft confirmed this vie\v in paragraph 3,
by providing that "In the exploration and use of outer space and
celestial bodies States are bound by international law and by the
provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international
agreements \Vhich may be applicable."
The Soviet proposal, paragraph 4, stated that "The activities of
States pertaining to the conquest of outer space shall be carried out
in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and
with other generally recognized principles of international law in
the interests of developing friendly relations among nations and of
maintaining international peace and security." In this proposal the
Soviets, by the use of the word "conquest," substituted a new
expression for the previously accepted language of "exploration and
use" used in the various UN debates. Paragraph 4 of the Soviet
proposal also endeavored to emphasize the role of "security" and,
at least on the surface, appeared, through reference to general principles of international law, to make concessions to the concept of
general customary international law-although it is probable that
stronger evidence than is contained in the foregoing paragraph will
be required to support the view that the Soviets have given up
their traditional distrust of the role of customary law.
The Soviets, as is \Vell kno"\"\Tn, have stressed the view that international law must take into account, not only national security, but
also the sovereign equality of states. Having worked the notion of
sovereignty into paragraph 2 of their proposal, they thereupon made
reference to equality in paragraph 3: "All States have equal rights
to explore and use outer space." The British proposal, paragraph
4, extended the Soviet view, in that it opened the possibility that
individuals as well as states could possess rights to explore and use
space. The British paragraph provided "All States, shall, for theinselves and for their nationals, have equal rights in the exploration and
use of outer space. These rights shall be exercised in accordance
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with international law and with the principles affirmed in this
Declaration."
All o:f the drafts, except the British, made reference to such practical matters as liability, assistance, and return. Thus, the UAR
draft, paragraphs 3 through 5, made provision that:
Member States bear special responsibility emanating :from
their obligations to secure the safety o:f space :for astronauts in
outer space.
Member States agree to provide every possible assistance to
personnel o:f space vehicles who may be the subject o:f accident
or experience conditions o:f distress or who may land by reason
o:f accident, distress or mistake. 333
Member States undertake to return to the State or international organization responsible :for launching space vehicles these
space vehicles and its personnel.
Paragraph 4 o:f the United States draft deals with assistance to
be rendered to personnel who return to earth in space vehicles.
Paragraph 6 o:f the Soviet draft, while making reference to "assistance" does not recite the rights o:f returning personnel, 334 and, in
:fact, puts :forward a very broad limitation upon national exploration
and use o:f outer space. The Soviet proposal provided:
Co-operation and mutual assistance in the conquest o:f outer
space shall be a duty incumbent upon all States; any measures
that might in any way hinder the exploration or use o:f outer
space :for peaceful purposes by other countries may be implemented only after prior discussion o:f and agreement upon measures between the countries concerned. 335
333 For an analysis of legal aspects of aerial distress, see Lissitzyn, "The
Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law," 47
A.J.I.L. 564 (1953).
33 4 The United States had previously submitted a draft proposal on this
subject, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.4, infra, pp. 211-212, as had the Soviet government, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.3, infra, pp. 211, 279n, 287.
33 5 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/0.2/L.6.
United States policy on this subject had
been stated by Senator Gore to the First Committee on December 3, 1962: "The
United States believes that nations which conduct activities in outer space
should take all reasonable steps to avoid experiments or other activities which
seriously threaten to deny or to limit the use of outer space to other nations.
This is consistent with well established principles of international law. We
encourage prior international discussion concerning experimental activities in
space which may have undesirable effects, and my Government is prepared in
the future, as in the past, to consult with scientists of other countries as well
as United States scientists wherever practicable and consistent with our
national security." U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1289, 17.
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The enormity of this proposal 1nay be noted from both the legal
:and the political point of view. After 1957, usage had crystallized
around the legal concept that outer space might be used for peaceful
purposes without hindrance. This vie'v ·was based on the general
legal proposition that such conduct was engaged in as a right on
the proposition that all peaceful conduct was permitted until specifically prohibited. Prior to this Soviet proposal this principle had
not been challenged. The Soviet proposal, however, would reverse
the traditional presumption and 'vould suggest that peaceful, i.e.,
nonaggressive and beneficial, uses n1ight not be engaged in until
after the consent of "the countries concerned," itself a vague concept. From the political point of view the Soviet proposal would
enable a state to veto the conduct of another state on undefined, and
probably undefinable, grounds.
.
The United States made provision in paragraph 5 for the return
to a launching authority of space vehicles or parts which had landed
by reason of accident, distress, or mistake. The term "launching
authority" was selected to serve as generic enough to take into
account such legal entities as states and international organizations.
The duty to return, however, was that of states.
The Soviet Union proposed a similar legal rule. Prefixing their
proposal, paragraph 10, with the view that states "shall regard
cosmonauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render
all possible assistance to spaceships and their crews which 1nay 1nake
nn emergency landing on the territory of a foreign State or on the
high seas * * * ," the Soviets went on to provide that "spaceships,
satellites or capsules found beyond the limits of the launching State
shall be returned to that State."
The United States made provision in paragraph 6 for liability
on the part of states or international organizations from whose
territory or with 'vhose assistance or per1nission a space vehicle was
launched. The Soviets proposed in paragraph 11 that only a state
should undertake space activities and noted that a "State undertaking activities in outer space bears international responsibility for
damage done in a foreign State or to its physical or juridical persons
as a result of such activities." The proposal of the United States
encompasses liability for "personal injury, loss of life, or property
damage caused by such vehicles on the earth or in air space," but
made no reference to liability in outer space.
There is so1ne semblance of agreement between the United States
and Soviet proposals in the areas of jurisdiction and ownership of
vehicles. The United States draft, paragraph 7, called for jurisdic-
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tion over a space vehicle while it is in outer space on the part of
the state or international organization which possessed jurisdiction
at the time of launch. The Soviet proposal, paragraph 8, rejecting
the view that a launch might be accomplished by an international
organization, provided that national states shall retain their "sovereign rights over objects they launch into outer space." Paragraph 7
of the United States draft and paragraph 8 of the Soviet draft are
almost identical in their provision for ownership. According to the
United States, "Ownership and property rights in a space vehicle
and its components remain unaffected in outer space or upon return
to the earth." The Soviets accepted this view by making provision
that "Rights of ownership in respect of objects launched into outer
space and their components remain unaffected while they are in
outer space and upon their return to earth."
A number of unresolved problems may arise on the basis of these
foregoing provisions, but the difficulties would not appear to be
insuperable, assuming tolerance and good will on the part of the
differing states or international organizations. However, the Soviet
proposal contained three paragraphs, ( 5, 7, and 9), which injected
critically different social, economic, and political considerations into
efforts to both facilitate and control the peaceful uses of outer space.
These paragraphs follow :
5. The use of outer space for propagating war, national or
racial hatred or enmity between nations is inad1nissible.
7. All activities of any kind pertaining to the exploration and
use of outer space shall be carried out solely by States. If States
undertake activities in outer space collectively, either through
international organizations or otherwise, each State participating in such activities has a responsibility to comply with
the princi pies set forth in this Declaration.
9. The use of artificial satellites for the collection of intelligence information in the territory of a foreign State is incompatible with the objectives of mankind in its conquest of outer
space.
In referring generally to the ideas contained in paragraph 5 and
'9, the Italian delegate pointed out to the legal subcommittee on
April 24, 1963, that they constituted points of disagreement and that
such proposals "did not really hinge on problems directly related to
the use and exploration of outer space." 336 The same comment
applies with equal validity to paragraph 7 of the Soviet proposals.
336

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, 3.
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The Soviet position has been built consistently around five concepts
which are central to their policies and their understanding and use
of international la''· nir. 1\forozov, as previously noted, in speaking
to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, on l\farch
20, 1962, sought to construe General Assembly Resolution 1721
(XVI) in the light of these Soviet views. He urged that "the
principles which have already been approved by the General Assembly signify in our view, that the activities of the States in outer
space research should be conductea in keeping 'vith the recognized
principles of peaceful coexistence, sovereignty, equality, nonaggression and noninterference in domestic affairs." 337 And he added,
"These important principles and provisions should be studied and
should become a basis for the work of the juridical subcommittee." 338 It was at this time that he urged the acceptance of the
propositions which are not contained in paragraphs 5, 7, and 9 of
the Soviet draft of April16, 1963.
1\ir. Kiselev, representing the Byelorussian SSR, speaking before
the First Committee on December 10, 1962, again called attention
to the belief that "international co-operation in the conquest of outer
space * * *" would have to be solved "by respecting such generally
recognized principles as the principle of peaceful coexistence, respect
for the sovereignty of States, nonaggression, noninterference in the
internal affairs of countries, and equal rights." 339
The Soviet Union by joining in the sponsorship of Resolution
1721 (XVI), and assuring its unani1nous adoption not only through
its own vote but also those of the Soviet bloc, gave its approval to
a set of principles applicable particularly to peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, uses of outer space. Since December 1961,
the proper role of states engaged in negotiations in the United
Nations forum on the legal status of outer space has been to reduce
the previously acknowledged principles into a set of working rules.
In a substantive sense, this has become the problem of controlling
or qualifying the pro1nulgated freedom of use and exploration within
a framework of general principles.
Such control, by its very nature, must encourage certain types of
space activity, and must also discourage or inhibit other kinds of
space ~tivity. In arriving at a decision as to permitted and non33i

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.3, 23-25.
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Ibid.

339 U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1297, 13. These views have long _l)een current in the
Communist world. Compare the terms of the treaty of April 29, 1954, between
Red China and the Republic of India. See also, Lissitzyn, "The Soviet View
of International Law," 14 Naval War College Review 1 (1961).
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permitted conduct, nation-states will, of necessity, be required to
take into account such beneficial factors as freedom of exploration
and use, but must also take into account the needs of international
peace and security and national defense. The latter, of course, must
be measured on the basis of the fact that the physical location of an
orbiting space vehicle has no direct bearing on the amount of good
or the amount of harm that it may produce. Thus, a space vehicle
need not be superjacent to a given state in order to observe what is
going on below, just as it would not be necessary for a space platform to be superjacent to a state prior to its use in connection with
nonpeaceful, i.e., aggressive and nonbeneficial purposes. In view of
these facts, Johnson has stated "What is required is some form of
international control directed to,vard specific space activities, regardless of the location of their occurrence." 340 This viewpoint, which
reflects United States policy, is based on the need to establish practical answers for real problems. The draft proposals urged by the
United States provide evidence of this approach. However, the
United States, along with other states, has avoided the formulation
of a detailed code at this time. Moreover, the United States, along
with other states, as previously pointed out, has been willing to
propose and to discuss comparable proposals made by other states
looking to an acceptance of principles extended beyond the terms of
Resolution 1721 (XVI).
The position of the United States has been to accept the concept
of control, within the reasonable context of national interest, and
subject to the concepts of freedom contained in Resolution 1721
(XVI). It has sought to achieve an orderly, and hopefully, peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, legal structure for outer space.
As Senator Gore pointed out to the First Committee on December
3, 1962, the "United States policy_ and United States programmes
for outer space are peaceful in intent, co-operative in practice and
beneficial in operation." 341 This has resulted in a willingness to
achieve controls respecting the use of radio frequencies, the establishment of rules of liability, the achievement of agreement on the
return of personnel and equipment, and, additionally, such principles as would contribute to the advancement of the peaceful, i.e.,
nonaggressive and beneficial, uses of outer space. Such control may
be secured through the UN forum insofar as its program takes the
Charter and international law for the standard for space activities.
340
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...t\.s a result of this, "mankind ''ould * * * be free to use space on
the same basis as it uses the high seas-free of any restraints except
those on exclusive use and illegal activity such as aggression." 342
...-\.t the time of this 'vriting, the ...t\.pril-niay 1963, discussions of
th legal subcom1nittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space have been concluded. As a result of the political-legal
clai1ns advanced in this foru1n, and the generally ardent support
for the principles previously pron1ulgated through the United
Nat ions, ceria in conclusions 1nay be stated.
1. The broad principles contained in Resolutions 1348 (XIII),
1721 (XVI), and 1802 (XVII) of the General Assembly continue
to have the general approval of UN men1bers, particularly the
strong affirmative support of the \'Testern states.
2. It was universally recognized that it was highly desirable to
extend such principles and to develop suitable rules respecting outer
space activities.
3. There was very broad agreement as to the specific rules which
were needed.
4. There was substantial agreement as to detail regarding the
substance of additional principles, although there was substantial
disagreement respecting proposals advanced by the Soviet bloc concerning the instrumentalities by which space activity could be conducted, as well as substantial disagreement respecting the Soviet
proposal dealing with observational activities.
5. "While there was a profound recognition of the fact that a law
of outer space was emerging and although there was a somewhat
diminishing difference as to whether it should be put forward in
the form of resolutions, declarations, or treaties, there was still a
strong difference as to whether the substance should find expression
as principles or as rules, and whether priority should be assigned
to the principles or the rules.
6. It was well understood that political considerations had been
introduced into the legal discussions and it was clear that states
would have to measure their expectations in terms of their political
goals and willingness to engage in political "give and take."
7. Despite differences, the content of space law continued to
harden, and, additionally, scientific and technological working agreements were reached bet,veen the t'vo major space powers.
The most important result of UN deliberations has been the
revitalization of the principle first promulgated on December 13,
342

Gardner, "Cooperation in Outer Space," 41 Foreign Affairs 345 (1963).

225
19~58,

in the form of General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII).
That resolution stated in the first paragraph of its preamble that
the General Assembly recognized "the common interest of mankind
in outer space and that it is the common aim that it should be used
for peaceful purposes only * * *" 343 Not until the United Arab
Republic submitted in 1962, its Draft Code for International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was serious attention
given, by countries other than the United States, to the principle
that such uses should be solely or exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Paragraph 1 of this draft called for states to be guided by the
principle that "the activities of Member States in outer space should
be confined solely to the peaceful uses. * * *" Lest there be any
mistake, the preamble also referred to the fact that "activities in
outer space should be exclusively devoted to the peaceful uses of
outer space." 344 Speaking on May 3, 1963, the Indian delegate told
the legal subcommittee that several delegations had expressed support for that principle and that "It was regrettable that no agree ..
ment had been reached on the one principle which his delegation
had hoped would be universally accepted-the principle that outer
space should be used solely for peaceful purposes." 345 A few minutes:
later, Mr. Meeker, speaking on behalf of the United States, 'vhich
had voted in favor of Resolution 1348 (XIII), stated that the United
States had always supported the principle that outer space should
be used solely or exclusively for peaceful purposes. His exact words
'\vere that "his delegation wished to place on record the fact that the
basic ideas in the draft code submitted by the United Arab Republic
(A/AC.105/L.6) represented propositions to which the United States
Government had been committed from the beginning of the space
age." 346 Mr. Timerbaev of the Soviet Union, speaking next, stated,
343

II Docu1nents on Disanna1nent 1305 (1945-1959) ; Annex 7, infra, pp.
456-458.
344 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/L.6; U.J.l. Doc. A/5181, Annex 3, 7.
345 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 6.
34
6 Ibid., p. 9.
It should be recalled that President Eisenhower \vrote to
Premier Bulganin on January 12, 1958, "I propose that we agree that outer
space should be used only for peaceful purposes," 38 Department of State
Bulletin 126 (1958) ; that on January 16, 1958, Secretary of State Dulles,
stated that the President had "advanced the most significant proposal that
could be made at this time to assure human survival, namely, that outer space
should be used only for peaceful purposes." "The Role of Negotiation," 38
Department of State Bulletin 162 (1958) ; and that on September 18, 1948,
he told the General Assembly that ""\Ve must make every effort to dedicate
outer space exclusively to constructive pursuits." "Problems of Peace and
Progress," 39 Department of State Bulletin 528 (1958). These statements
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"The Soviet Union had ahvays n1aintained that outer space should
be used solely for peaceful purposes." 347 In view of the fact that the
Soviet Union had led the Soviet bloc in opposition to, and had voted
against, Resolution 1348 (XIII), this statement was iinportant.
Even so, by announcing that it would be guided by this principle, it
failed to assume a position as firm as that of the United Statesthat of being committed to the principle. Following the Soviet
change of position, the representative of the UAR observed that
the acceptance of this principle '\vas "necessary for progress towards
the adoption of other principles." 348
Several delegates, in undertaking to assess the achievements of
the subco1nmittee's activities, pointed to the need for states to consider the political aspects involved in endeavoring to ·satisfy the
claims of states for the legal order of space activities. Thus, ~fr.
1feeker noted that the co1nmittee members "should be prepared to
engage in the give and take of international discourse and to make
adjushnents in their positions in order to achieve a consensus." 349
The .A_ ustrian delegate suggested that "\V11at was lacking was not
agreement but the will to record it." 350
A number of delegates, even before the Soviet delegate had
ackno,Yledged that outer space ought to be used solely for peaceful
purposes, had summarized the extent to which states were in agreelnent respecting both the substance of the law and the need to
for1nulate specific agreements. On April 25, 1963, for example, the
Australian member of the subcommittee had noted that there ·was
should be compared with the position announced by l\Ir. Loftus Becker, legal
advisor to the Department of State, who on June 9, 1958, made the following
statement to the Special Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics: "The
most immediate problem in the field of space foreign policy is how to insure
that outer space is used for peaceful purposes only." He continued by stating
that the lJnited States \Vas engaged in taking steps "to assure that missiles
and other outer-space vehicles, already in the development stage, will be
utilized solely for peaceful purposes." Becker, "l\Iajor Aspects of the Problem
of Outer Space," Departrnent of State Bulletin 962-963 (1958) ; Space Law, A
Syrnposiunz, supra note 10, Chapter I, at 367-368. From the foregoing, it is
abundantly clear that the United States has always supported the position that
outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only. In doing so it has
shaped the substance of the law of outer space.
3 1 7 Ibid., p. 13.
348 Ibid., p. 14.
34 9 Ibid., p. 9.
350 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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a substantial area of agreement on each of the subjects mentioned
in Resolution 1802 (XVII). He then stated:
There was complete agreemen~ in broad principle that a
State launching a space vehicle should be internationally liable,
without fault, for injury, loss or da1nage caused by the vehicle
on the earth or in the air space, and that States should be under
a duty to render all possible assistance to the personnel of a
space vehicle landing by accident, distress or 1nistake and to
return to the launching State both personnel and vehicle. It was
also apparent that an important measure of agreement existed
concerning the further elaboration of basic legal principles
governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of
outer space. 351
The Austrian delegate opined that there had been a unanimous
consensus that a draft declaration of basic principles should contain
four principles, namely:
Outer space and celestial bodies 'vere free for exploration and
use by all States; sovereignty could not be acquired over outer
space or celestial bodies; States were liable for damage caused
by space vehicles; and assistance should be accorded to space
vehicles in distress. 352
He also noted that there was considerable agreement on the subject
of prior consultations between states concerning experiments affecting outer space.
The representative of the United States concurred that there was
general agreement respecting rules and principles, both existing and
proposed. As to the subject matter of formal agreement respecting
rules, he stated that a treaty on assistance and return was recognized
as appropriate. Further, it was his view that there had been agreement on the desirability, and to a large measure on the contents,.
of a declaration of basic principles to guide states in their explora-tion and use of outer space. l-Ie added :
Specifically, there was a consensus on the freedom of outer
space for exploration and use by all States, on a basis of equality
and in accordance with international law; on the immunity of
celestial bodies from national appropriation; on the applicability of international law, including the United Nations Charter,
to relations among States in outer space; on retention by the
351
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launching authority of jurisdiction over and ownership of
space vehicles; on assistance to astronauts in distress and return
of space vehicles and their personnel, and on liability for injury
or damage caused by space vehicle accidents. 353
He also pointed to the fact that the United States, as well as other
states, had been willing-following the general lines of the Soviet
draft proposal contained in their paragraph 6-to engage in appropriate international "consultation on problems of interference and
conta1nina tion in outer space and of providing for discussion of
particular proposed projects." 354 He rejected the proposal c,ontained
in paragraph 7 of the Soviet proposal, 'vhich would have required
that space activities be restricted to state vehicles, but ackno,vledged
that the debate had "disclosed a widely shared recognition of the
fact that Governments bore responsibi~ity and were accountable for
national space activities." 355
The Soviet delegate called attention to the fact that the United
States had declined to discuss paragraphs 5 and 9 of the Soviet draft.
He stated that "The United States delegation had not even mentioned many important issues which had been raised in the Subcommittee, such as the question of the prohibition of the use of artificial
satellites for the collection of intelligence information and the inadmj ssibility of the use o£ outer space for propagating war, national
or racial hatred or enmity between nations." 356 Many of the delegates had pointed to the controversial nature of these Soviet proposals, with many expressing the view that the use of observation
satellites was within the range of peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and
beneficial, purposes and not interdicted by international la 'v. 357
Other delegates thought that the subject n1ight better be discussed
in the context of disarmament. J\1any states held that the Soviet
proposal dealing with the use of satellites for purposes of "\var
propaganda had failed to take into account the definite provisions
of the unanimous General Assembly Resolution 110 (II), which
3 53 Ibid., p. 9. The assertion by the Czechoslovakian delegate that "There
had been no general agreement on such fundamental principles as the freedom
and equal right of all States to explore and use outer space" seems to be
entirely erroneous. Ibid., p. 7.
3 54
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The Soviet bloc, speaking through Hungary, has urged that the use of
reconnaissance satellites constituted a delict under international law. See
infra, pp. 271-295 for a detailed discussion of this problem.
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had stated that communications facilities should not be employed
for war propaganda purposes. 358
In resume, it may be said that several clearly distinguishable
legal principles respecting outer space have been almost universally
recognized. Of first importance has been the decision of nations,
particularly the two major resource states, that in principle outer
space must be used exclusively or solely for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes. Secondly, there has been almost
universal acceptance of the principle that outer space is open to
the free use and exploration of all nations. Third, there is almost
universal agreement that neither outer space nor celestial bodies fall
within the sovereignty of any state, and that they may not be made
the subject of national appropriation. Fourth, there is almost universal agreement that outer space falls within a regime of structure
of law, and that man's activities in his environment are governed
by the principles and rules of international law and by the Charter
of the United Nations. Finally, there is remarkable consensus that
there is the need to enter into treaties covering a number of detailed
rules relating to the safety, return, and liability of space vehicle
personnel and the vehicles themselves. Opinion has so hardened as
to the reasonableness of claims respecting the subjects of the
prospective treaties that in their absence it appears reasonably clear
that states will conform to the rights and duties set forth in the
common provisions of the various draft proposals. 359
vVhile the legal subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space must be credited with contributing to the promulgation of customary rules of international law, as in Resolutions
1721 (XVI) 1802 (XVII), 1962 and 1963 (XVIII), and also with
assisting in the unfolding of additional principles and new rulesthrough whatever form-it has fallen to the scientific and technological subcommittee to provide the rudimentary conventional
international law for outer space. The two resource states, mindful
of the terms of the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters of March 1962,
have entered into technical agreements to exploit three particular
phases of outer space activity. During the 1962 Geneva meeting
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of the technical subco1nmittee of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, Dr. Hugh Dryden, representing the United
States, and Academician A. A. Blagonravov, representing the Soviet
Union, discussed in detail the possibilities of cooperation in meteorology, a world magnetic survey, and satellite telecommunications.
On June 8, they issued a joint communique in which it was announced that recommendations on these points had been forwarded
to their governments. 360 The bilateral agreement, consisting of a
su1nmary of understandings, was transmitted to the United Nations
on December 5, 1962, in a letter signed jointly by the respective
permanent representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The letter stated that the documents related "to an agree1nent
reached on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space * * *" 361
This bilateral agreement, although not the first entered into between
the United States and another state, was the first significant space
agreement between the resource nations.
The agreement was to be implemented by scientists of the two
states and provided for meteorological contributions by the United
States and the Soviet Union, within their capabilities, toward the
creation of a global weather satellite system for the benefit of all
nations. Both states agreed to cooperate through the use of their
own satellites in the preparation of a map of the earth's magnetic
field. Finally, they agreed to cooperate in using Echo A -12, a
NASA satellite, for a passive communications experiment. 362 These
various activities are to be extended over a period of years, with
close coordination with the World ~1eteorological Organization,
International Telecommunications Union, COSPAR., and other international, as well as national, bodies. ~{any commentators have called
attention to the comparative ease with which this agree1nent was
achieved in comparison with the difficulties engendered in the
political-legal forum. 363
3. Role of Other International Organizations

Outer space has also attracted the attention of the United Nations'
Economic and Social Council as a result of its responsibility in the
fields of science and technology. Paragraphs C and D of General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), Parts III and IV of
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/5, Annex III 1.
U.N. Doc. A/C.l/880; NASA News Release No. 62-251, Dec. 5, 1962;
Annex 22, infra, pp. 482-488.
362 Ibid., 3-6.
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Resolution 1802 (XVII), and Parts III and IV of Resolution 1963
(XVIII) impress responsibilities on the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), which have important interests in the peaceful uses of outer
space. Both organizations have made substantial inquiries into
space problems, have regulatory activities which are intended to
maximize the use of space capabilities, and have cooperated with the
UN through the submission of reports to the General Assembly.
Representatives of \VMO, ITU, and UNESCO have appeared before
UN committees and have reported both orally and in writing on
their activities in their areas of special interest. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the vVorld Health Organization (vVHO) have also cooperated with the UN committees dealing
with outer space.
Upon the invitation of the UN, the private International Council
of Scientific Unions, through its Committee on Space Research
( COSPAR), has participated in the work of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as an observer. All such agencies,
public and private, have engaged in developing and planning educational and training programs on meteorological and telecommunications techniques and have also advised various UN bodies of their
findings and have made appropriate recommendations.
4. Bilateral Treaties and Other Agreements Dealing W:ith the
Use and Exploration of Outer Space

The United States, in order to in1plement its space programs and
policies, has entered into a host of international agreements with
many states. The agreements have been mainly on a bilateral basis,
dealing generally with technical as opposed to political subjects.
Although the agreements have not explicitly acknowledged such
fundamental principles as those providing that outer space may be
used only for peaceful purposes, or that it may be used and explored
by all states without right of appropriation, or that it is governed
by international law and the terms of the UN Charter, these agreements do, nonetheless, constitute support of these principles by clear
implication.
The extent to which the United States is engaged with other
states in the many fields of space research and scientific development is vast. Much of this international cooperation is the product
of explicit international consent, which is marked by varying degrees
of formality. The extent of such cooperative effort was described by
791-405-6,6-16
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Senator Gore to the United Nations on December 3, 1962, when he
described the range of such activities as follows:
Today, happily, more than fifty nations are associated with
the United States on one or another aspect of this important
work. There are over two dozen space tracking and data acquisition stations in nineteen separate political areas in support of
United States scientific programmes, the majority operated
wholly or in part by technicians of the host countries. Scientists of forty-four nations are working with our space agency
NASA in ground-based research projects in meteorology, communications, and other space sciences, directly utilizing United.
States satellites. Thirteen nations are engaged with us in actual
flight projects in which experiments, jointly determined by the
scientists of both countries, are sent into space either on vertical
sounding rockets, or in earth satellites. * * * These have all been
truly cooperative experiments, the results of which are open to
all, to every nation, to every citizen of the world. 364
The first United States bilateral agreement dealing with spaceage problems was with the United l{ingdom. On July 21, 1950, the
two states entered into "The Bahamas Long Range Proving
Ground" agreement providing for a flight testing area for vehicles
launched from Cape Canaveral to a point north of the Caicos
Islands. 365 With the advent of the International Geophysical Year
(IG Y), numerous agreements were entered into dealing with technical cooperation, including the installation of tracking and telemetering facilities in a substantial number of countries. These were
formal agreements between states and were in addition to the many
informal arrangements between scientists and technologists of different countries.
The formal agreements, at first negotiated by personnel of the
Department of State, seldom achieved formal treaty status. It was
more common to effect exchanges of notes, memoranda, and letters
between representatives of United States diplomatic missions and
foreign offices. However, with the establishment of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration in the United States on July
29, 1958, NASA has become the agency through which technical
space agreements with foreign states have been processed. Illustrative of NASA negotiated agreements, often described as a "MemoU.N. Doc. AjC.l/PV.1289, 21.
aas MacCbesney, U.S. Naval War College International Law Situation and
Documents, 1956, 611 (1957). TIAS 20!)9; 1 UST 545; 97 UNTS 261; Cmd.
364
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randum of Understanding," and not referred to the United States
Senate, as would be the case of a formal treaty, have been those
with the British Post Office, the Brazilian Post Office, the Brazilian
National Committee for Space Activities, the Italian Space Commission (in this instance the memorandum was made public through
the exchange of notes signed by the Vice-President of the United
States and the Italian Foreign Minister), the French National Center for Space Studies, the Indian Department of Atomic Energy,
and the Japanese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. 366
The most common subject of these agreements relates to the
tracking of space vehicles and orbiting earth satellites. At the time
of this writing such agreements had been entered into with the
following sixteen states: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Ecuador, United l(ingdom, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, and Spain.367 The agreements at first
dealt with rocket probes. Later, as the art increased, provisions were
made for missiles and orbiting space vehicles. The number of such
agreements with a given state varies considerably: from one with
Mexico to more than fifteen with the United Kingdom.
Some of the agreements deal only with the right to establish and
use tracking stations in other countries, while others make detailed
provision for a substantial number of rights. In the latter category,
for example, the agreement of February 10, 1961, between the United
States and the Federation of the West Indies (titled "United States
Defense Areas in the Federation of the West Indies") provided for
the "right to maintain and operate within the defense areas an
electronics research and test station, including its associated instrumentation, detection and communications systems. The United States
government shall also have the right to launch, fly and land test
vehicles." 368 The agreement, with respect to these rights, also provided that "it is understood that the electronics test and research
station which the United States Government will operate pursuant
to this provision will be used in connection with United States test
and research programmes in the fields of electronic surveillance and
communications. Research and test operations at the station will
include detection, tracking, telemetry, data read-out, reception, transmission and communications related to both missile and space programmes." 369
366
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In addition to the sixteen states with which the United States
has entered into tracking agreements, space agreements have also
been reached ·with eight others: Paraguay, Chile, Federation of the
"\Vest Indies, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, S"reden,
and the Soviet Union. These agreements have been bilateral in form
except for the NASA agreement relating to the launching of the
relay experimental communications satellite between the United
States and six other states, namely, the United J{ingdom, France,
Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, and Japan.370
Illustrative of the wide-ranging developments in the area of space
science and technology have been international agreements on n1any
subjects, which-so far as the United States has been concernedhave developed in the following chronological sequence: proving
ground for guided missiles, tracking of. guided missiles, meteorological test systems, tracking stations for space vehicles, damages to
fisheries in missile test programs, radio communications, experimental communications satellites, sampling radioactivity, cooperation in space research, special agreements for l\fidas, Relay, and
Rebound, radio regulations, joint equatorial launch, equatorial
som1ding rocket facility, and the United States-Soviet agreement.
dealing with a world geomagnetic survey as well as with meteorology
and passive communications. These developments cover the period
from 1950 through 1963.
~Iany other states have entered into international agreements
dealing with the peaceful use and exploration of outer space. Perhaps the most notable has been the multilateral agreement between
Australia, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Gern1any, Italy,
Holland, and the United J{ingdom encompassing a European Organization for the Development and Construction of Space Vehicle
Launchers. 371 Another example has been the agreement establishing
the European Space Research Organization consisting of Belgium,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Holland, the United
J{ingdom, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 372
All of the explicit space agreen1ents have been based on the fundamental assumption that launches from the surface of the earth,
transit through airspace, transit through outer space, and return
to earth-when such launches have been for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes-have been and are legally permissible. None of these agreements specifically refer either to the
S70
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missible. None of these agree1nents specifically refer either to the
creation of a new, or the promulgation of a pre-existing, rule or
principle of law. In the context of the practices and usages current
at the time these explicit agreements were executed, including the
development of a customary international law of outer space during
and after the IGY, it is clear that states have asserted the legal
right to engage in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space.
In doing so, states have supported their conduct on the legal basis
that the forms of conduct actually engaged in were legally permissible in view of the fact that there were no valid legal inhibitions
then existing which could rightfully-and thereby legally-have
denied to them the right to engage in such conduct. In short, in
the absence of effective principles and rules prohibiting the use and
exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes, the type of launches
actually engaged in-being peaceful in their nature-were at the
time of these express agreements considered to be lawful. The subsequent space practices, the continued force of these agreements, and
the consensus arrived at in the United Nations continue to support
the view that outer space may be used solely or exclusively for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes.
This conclusion may also be supported by general principles of
law and by reference to suitable legal analogies. The impact of
general legal principles upon the development of a law of outer
space will be discussed in the following section.
5. General Principles of Law
With the promulgation by the United Nations of basic principles
of law regulating activities in outer space, it has become one of the
functions of general principles of law to provide support for such
space law principles. General principles must also assist in the
extension and implementation of those principles upon which general agreement has already been reached. Among the general principles of law which can assist in the development of an adequate
legal structure for space activities are estoppel, respect for acquired
rights, good faith and nonabuse of rights, and the general principles
of equity.
a. Estoppel
The principle of estoppel, widely accepted in the jurisprudence
of municipal law, has received much attention in international law
in recent years. This principle, by its inherent merit and by general
acceptance, has become a general principle of international law
recognized by civilized nations. 373 It depends upon the acceptance
MacGibbon, "Estoppel in International Law," 7 Int'l
(1958).
37 8

&

Oomp. L.Q. 468

236
of good faith as a guide to interpersonal and international relations,
and depends upon the concept of consistency as contributing to
stability and predictability in international conduct.
Several forms of estoppel have been identified. It may be established through formal and explicit written processes, such as treaties,.
exchanges of notes, resolutions, declarations, or any other written
agreement. 374 The force of the principle has been noted on several
occasions where the international agreement has taken explicit form~
and the orld Court has emphasized the validity of the doctrine. 37 5Estoppel is also the product of usage or conduct, and, as such, has
close affinity with the doctrines involved in the development of
custo1nary international law. Estoppel in this context is related to
the need for consistency and inhibits states from changing courses
or patterns of conduct whenever by so doing there would be unreasonable harm or detriment to other states which had so arranged
their conduct as to benefit from practices supported by implicit
behavior. The principle of estoppel is broad enough to require
states to assert affirmatively their rights and freedom of action. 376
A state may not only be estopped by its affirmative conduct, but
may also be estopped by reason of its failure to act after having
been put on due notice of the development of a pattern of conduct.
For the principle of estoppel to be operative at least three essential
conditions must exist. First, the meaning of a state's conducteither in the form of a writing or practice-must be clear and
unambiguous. Second, if the conduct is in express form, it must
be voluntary, unconditional, and authorized. And third, there must
be good faith reliance to the benefit or detriment of the various
participants. 377
The principle of estoppel supports the legal right and duty relationship that states enjoy in regard to the use and exploration of
outer space for peaceful purposes. The total past conduct of states
has been that of the peaceful uses of space. This, in turn, has provided then1 with the right to rely upon such total conduct to the
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end that they may lawfully rely on the use of space for nonaggressive and beneficial purposes. By their past conduct, states have
become estopped to deny to each other the right to engage in peaceful
uses. Further, since there has developed a legal consensus that outer
space must be used solely or exclusively for peaceful purposes, and
conduct has followed this pattern, it may be urged that states have
estopped themselves from using space for nonpeaceful purposes.
Under such circumstances, states would be estopped from claiming
legal support for the use of outer space for nonpeaceful purposes.
It is thus submitted that the broad claim, now alive in the international forum, that outer space be used only for given purposes and
upon certain conditions, has been buttressed by the principle of
estoppel.
b. Respect for Acq·uired Rights
The general principle that law will respect acquired rights is
based on the same considerations which underlie the doctrine of
estoppel, namely, that rights acquired over a suitable period of time
must be respected since this conduces to an orderly community.
It enhances peaceful change, provides for conditions of mutuality
in which the concept of good faith can be 1naximized, and acknowledges the expediency of conforming to ongoing expectations. On
the basis of this principle, states are permitted to make plans for
future activities in space with some assurance that they will be able
to implement them.
This principle works in two ways respecting space activities.
First, it bolsters the principle that outer space may be used for
peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, activities. This necessarily takes into account the launching, orbiting, and return to earth
of space vehicles. Secondly, insofar as the principle has been established that neither space nor celestial bodies may be made the subject of appropriation or sovereign control, the principle serves as a
limitation upon the acquisition of such interests. As in the case
of estoppel, so also as concerns the doctrine of respect for acquired
rights, judicial opinions uphold such principles. 378
c. Good Faith andNonabuse of Rights
The commonality of the concept of good faith in 1nan's relationships extends throughout his total experience. It is more than a
378
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general principle o£ international law, and in the view of many is
regarded as a foundation of all la"" as well as the ultimate guide to
all social relationships. Innumerable court decisions attest to the
vie'v that the princi pie of good faith is the standard underlying all
international ht,v. 3 9 As such, it requires states to confonn 'vith
reasonable expectations induced either through general customary
international law or through express international agreements.
The right and duty relationship is central to the concept of good
faith, for 'vithout the existence of such a relationship, the principle
of good faith would be lacking in an environn1ent in which it could
serve the interests of order and stability, as well as other significant
hu1nan values. The relationship bet,veen good faith and legal rights
has been noted by the "\Vorld Court, which has stated that "it is
possible to see an indirect approach. to the principle prohibiting
abuse of rights in the frequent affir1nation of the duty of States to
act in good faith in the exercise of their rights." 380 Rights, once
established, are suited to judicial proof, as are abuses of rights. The
World Court has ruled that the party asserting that an existing
right has been abused has the duty of proving it and that the
existence of an abuse "cannot be presumed by the Court." 381
d. Equitable Principles
Discussions in the United Nations have n1ade it clear that outer
space must be used for the benefit of all mankind, and that such
benefits must be made available to resource and nonresource nations
alike. There is also general consensus that space benefits must be as
broadly and equitably distributed as is possible. The principles of
equity may be called upon to support the claims of many nations
that activities in space be as extensive and as permissive as possible
and that exclusive uses be held to a fundamental minimum. These
foregoing general principles-and others might be mentioned, such
as Pacta Sunt Servanda, the right to international peace and security, the right of self-preservation, and sovereignty under the laware all related to each other. Their importance lies in the fact that
they have, in the past, contributed to the necessary ordering of international relations. They have served as guides to states in making
and compron1ising claims in the international forum. Additionally,
they have been recognized and used by international tribunals.
j
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The application of these principles to the emerging law of outer
space may be considered a foregone conclusion. Through their force
they will strengthen the more fundamental principles applicable to
the use and exploration of outer space. Through their presence
and influence, existing and future space law principles-as well as
more detailed rules-will take on greater specificity and meaning.
Through their persuasive influence they will have a major role in
bringing the new space principles and rules into the seamless web
of all the law. 382

e. Private Efforts to Supply Space Law Principles
Individual lawyers and associations of lawyers, throughout the
world, have made many important contributions to the development
of principles applicable to outer space. The impact of their views
upon the emerging law of outer space has been so important, and
will continue to be so impressive, that reference must be made to
their suggestions and recommendations. Their various drafts often
rather closely approximate the views expressed in the United Nations, and in some instances are intentionally quite tentative.
In 1960 the Committee on Aeronautics of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York promulgated "Some Tentative Provisions for International Agreements on Space Activities." 383
Taking the form of a suggested space law agreement, the proponents
set forth a very broad program for the establishment of a legal
regin1e for outer space. The draft emphasized the legal right to the
free use of space. It further provided that space activities, as
defined, might be carried on in airspace, without regard to national
sovereignty in the airspace, but that such space activities could not
"unduly interfere with national uses of air space for security and
navigation." 384 Although the proponents of the agreement reached
no decision as to the most acceptable line dividing airspace from
space, they did acknowledge the need for reaching such a decision.
There was agreement that states would not be able to exercise national
jurisdiction above a certain point, measurable in miles. Further, for
those who favored the establishment of an appropriate boundary
in the near future, there was a good consensus that the boundary
382
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should be at a fairly low altitude, in the range of from 25 to 50
miles.
The Committee's provisions, as with other private proposals,
advanced claims for national rights, while taking into account
limitations upon such rights because of broad community interests.
This was reflected in the Committee's suggestions regarding the
central problem of the peaceful use of outer space. Their draft
provided, under the heading Peaceful Uses of Space:
The High Contracting Parties declare their adherence to the
principle that the conduct of space activities should be open
and orderly. They denounce the use of space for purposes of
aggreS;3ion. They reserve all rights of security and self-defense
conferred by or recognized under the Charter of the United
Nations or otherwise under international law. 385
The draft then made provision for the prohibition of the use of
space for mass weapons, including an inhibition against the placing
into orbit or the stationing in space of such weapons.
l\{any references were made concerning the need for cooperative
~ctivity by nations in outer space within the draft. Among the
subjects treated under this heading were dissemination of space data,
notice of launchings, orbital or flight tracks, reentry, distribution
of information on identification and registration, cooperation in the
repossession of spacecraft and the repatriation of personnel, notice
as to location of launching sites with a description of those used
as orbital sites and those used for ballistic launches. In this last
subject area, a provision for the inspection of orbital sites and for
the detection at or near ballistic sites of activities other than "space
activities" was also made. In order to provide for the 1nanage1nent
of such inspections, and for other activities, the draft provided for
an International Space Agency, whose duty included cooperation
with existing international organizations having to do with space
activities. The Agency was accorded operational functions, including the establishment of world data centers, the management of
satellite tracking stations, and the organization and direction of joint
space programs undertaken by two or more of the signatories. Pursuant to the draft all participating nations would undertake rights
and duties concerning radio spectrum management (within the
larger reference of the International Telecommunications Union),
concerning disposal of spent spacecraft, respecting liability for
damages, and the minimization of adverse effects of space contamination.
as5 Ibid., p. 4, (Article C) .
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Under the heading "Territorial Claims to Celestial Bodies," the
group proposed that celestial bodies should not be subject to "ex·Clusive appropriation by any person, organization, or State on earth,"
but that objects launched from earth should remain the property
·o f the launcher. 386 The proposal also stated "Any exploration, occupation, development, use, and exploitation of the resources of such
-celestial bodies shall be conducted so as not to endanger such acti vities conducted by others." 387 The draft also provided for a modification of or extension of this principle by a vote of two-thirds of the
me1nbers of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Additionally, it made provision for the submission of disputes, not
resolved by other means, relating to the interpretation or application of the proposed convention, to the International Court of
.Justice. Finally, the draft imposed upon the proposed agency the
·duty of reviewing continuously the terms of the agreement with
the view to making recommendations for changes to the signatories.
This proposal, while in agreement with the basic principles set
forth in UN Resolution 1721 (XVI) of December 20, 1961, went
-considerably further. Like other nonpublic proposals, this one
·e mphasized the urgent need for the development of a structured
.and precise law for outer space. Additionally, private proposals
have stressed the need for the management of space problems
through either existing or new agencies. This particular proposal
-called for the construction of a new agency, while others have urged
that such functions be performed within the existing framework
-of the United Nations.
The International Law Association at its 49th Conference, August
1960, adopted a resolution which had been proposed by its subcommittee on air sovereignty and the legal status of outer space. This
proposal, like the one previously described, antedated Resolution
1721 (XVI), but did take into account the decisions previously
Teached at the United Nations. The Association sought to provide
principles of law which would serve as the basis for an express
international agreement, and it should be noted that the Association's
Tesolution was adopted before it became generally recognized that
its principles were, even at that time, being formulated through the
processes of general customary international law. The Association
.assigned priority to the formulation of the following principles:
(a) Outer space and celestial bodies should be utilized only
for peaceful purposes to the greatest common profit of all
386
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mankind in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
(b) Outer space may not be subject to the sovereignty or
other exclusive rights o:f any State. 388
The Association recommended that states should enter into explicit
agreements affirming the above principles. In its view, such agreements should include provisions whereby states would not make
claims of sovereignty or other exclusive rights over celestial bodies.
Finally, the Association expressed an interest in securing a definition
of the lower limits of outer space and in obtaining an international
mechanism for ensuring observance o:f the foregoing principles.
The Inter-American Bar Association has also adopted a resolution,
titled in part "~Iagna Carta of Space," which has had an influence
on the development of space law principles. ~feeting early in 1961,
the Association agreed on a resolution which called for an express
international agreen1ent along the lines proposed very widely then
and now. The resolution pointed to the urgency of creating "an
international code of law for the benefit of the nations of the w·orld
with the avowed purpose o:f avoiding war and preserving peace." 389
The detailed contents o:f the space ~fagna Carta were based upon
the view that all states, pursuant to Article 2 ( 1) of the UN Charter,
were equally sovereign and had an equal interest that "Outer Space
be used for peaceful purposes only." 390 Thus, part (f) of this resolution stated that "Outer Space shall be used solely for peaceful
purposes with freedom of exploration and exploitation thereof given
to all peoples for the benefit of mankind." 391 The final paragraph,
(r), resolved that "\~Var, in, by, through space is hereby barred
forever." 392
The resolution called for space to be free for peaceful uses, and
employed the distinction frequently used by writers on the subject
relating to res nullius and res co1nmuni8. Free or 1·es con1/Jnunis
space would deny rights of appropriation and exclusive control by
one nation, whereas, according to the resolution, the res nullius principle would authorize rights of appropriation through the establishment o:f principles of discovery, habitation and settlement. It there388
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fore suggested a zonal approach to outer space with the view that
airspace 'vould be subject to sovereign control, that outer space
would be a res communis, and that between the two there would
be a zone called "Neutralia." In the latter area the right of innocent
passage was to be recognized without offense to sovereignty. No
specific reference was made, however, to the probable need for passage by spacecraft through the airspace of another state.
Reference 'vas made to such typical subjects as the need to identify,
register, and establish the intent of space launches, reentry and landing rights, allocation and control of radio frequencies, routings to
a void hazards between spacecraft and aircraft and between different
spacecraft, and liability for damages. Unique provisions related to
the establishment of an international insurance fund under the control of an international organization for the payment of damages to
those harmed by the operation of space vehicles, for the policing of
outer space in order to prevent violations of individual and national
rights, for the settlement of disputes through an arbitral procedure
designated by the UN, and, finally, it was resolved that "The people
of the earth do hereby declare that they recognize the rights of sovereignty, ownership and control of any other planet by the inhabitants thereof." 393
The American Bar Association, at the instance of its Section of
International and Comparative Law, adopted a resolution in August
1962, relating to international space law principles. The House of
Delegates acknowledged and approved the adoption of the principles contained in Resolution 1721 A (XVI) of the UN General
Assembly. It also urged as United States policy that through the
United Nations there be:
(1) the continued clarification by the United Nations of
appropriate legal principles with respect to the uses of outer
space; and
(2) the drafting o:f international agreements covering specific
problems relative to space activities, commencing with subjects
of immediate practical importance for which agreed solutions
are most probable;
( 3) the developing of cooperative programs among the nations
of the world in their mutual interest in such fields as weather
forecasting and communications. 394
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One of the most comprehensive private efforts to forn1ulate a basic
understanding of space law problems has been the work of a British
Study Group on the Law of Outer Space. Their results, entitled
"Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space,"
was published in 1962 by the David Davies Memorial Institute of
International Studies. 395 The effort is worthy of notice because it
assumes that an international code is timely, and because, like the
present study, undertakes to relate the physical capabilities of spacecraft to the principles put forward. The first principle of the group·
takes into account the need to effect a practical division between
outer space and airspace. It is their conclusion that the relatively
low altitude of 50 miles might serve as "the limit of sovereignty and
the beginning of outer space." 396 This recent interest in a relatively
low boundary between the area of res commun-ls omnium, defined as;
outer space and the celestial bodies therein when free for exploration and use by all, and the even lower res nullius area is itself
noteworthy. As the practical capabilities of launched spacecraft and
the X-15 and comparable hybrid type craft become more fully understood-with their capacity to orbit at least once at close proximity
to the earth-earlier proposals sponsoring relatively high boundaries.
are being abandoned. Concurrently with this development is an
increasing demand for national control over areas immediately
superjacent to areas where conventional aircraft regularly operate ..
'!'his demand has also been accompanied by demands that launched
and hybrid craft be given the right of innocent passage while engaged in landing procedures, or that it be treated as aircraft in all
respects.
The proposed code by the British Study Group has adopted the·
two principles contained in the General .A. sse1nbly Resolution 1721
A (X\TI). Further, it has assumed that in the course of international cooperation on space activities, numerous international agree-Inents will beco1ne binding. The draft code has also proposed that
states and their nationals will have equal rights in the exploration
and use of outer space, that states and international bodies are not
"precluded from employing military personnel or equipment for·
scientific and peaceful purposes," 397 and that no "state or international body shall put the airspace, outer space or the celestial bodies,.
to uses which cause, or are likely to cause, modifications of the environment of mankind unless the prior agreement of the appropriate·
"Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space," The:
David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies 1-17 (1962).
396 Ibid., 7.
39 7 Ibid., 9.
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international body has been obtained that such modifications are
acceptable." 398
~1any of the proposed principles are directly related to a broad
concern respecting the presence of weapons in space. Thus, the draft
provides that "No spacecraft carrying any type of warhead or otherwise designed as a weapon for use against targets on the earth or in
the airspace, shall be placed in orbit around the earth, or celestial
body, or be carried in or launched from any space station or celestial
body." 399 Presumably omission of outer space targets was intentional, and this is curious in view of the proposal that "The establishment of military stations upon any celestial body and the use of
such stations or of a celestial body for the purposes of war is
prohibited." 400 and that "The testing of any nuclear device or the
disposal of radioactive waste upon any celestial body is prohibited." 401 The draft also prohibits contamination of both the earth
and celestial bodies, requires control of radio transmissions, permits
the establishment of celestial stations to facilitate exploration and
use, calls for the placing of such stations under the supervision of
the United Nations subject to the right of the establishing state to
exercise jurisdiction over its personnel in the station, and authorizes
an international body to establish such a station and, by international
agreement, to exercise jurisdiction over its personnel in the station.
The inhibition against the launch or orbiting of weapons for use
against targets on the earth or in airspace covered conventional as
well as nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological devices. However, in
view of the general acceptance of the principle that outer space must
be used for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive or beneficial, purposes, the
draft does not disapprove of the right of a state to employ surveillance or reconnaissance satellites, which, as the draft acknowledges
"may primarily serve military purposes, yet have the ad vantage
that they contribute to an 'open world' and so increase rather than
diminish security.'' 402
The draft code takes into account, in a very practical sense, the
fact that space vehicles in returning to earth may occupy flat trajectories, closely proximate to the surface, for extended areas. This
means that such craft may transit through areas commonly occupied
by hybrid craft as well as conventional aircraft, thus posing the
problem of the height of the sovereignty and control of the subIbid., 11.
Ibid., 12.
40 0 Ibid.
401 Ibid.
402 Ibid.
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jacent state. It also raises questions of traffic control for descending
spacecraft. The British proposal sought to apply existing air law
rules to the landing procedures of spacecraft, and urged that
No spacecraft launched from the territory of any State 1nay
at any stage of its flight enter the airspace of another State
without the consent of that State: provided that
a. such consent shall not be withheld if prior notice has been
given to that State of the intended flight, and it has been sho,vn
to its satisfaction that the flight is solely for scientific and peaceful purposes and shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to
aircraft;
b. any craft capable of operating both as a spacecraft and as
an aircraft shall for the purposes of its use of the airspace be
deemed to be an aircraft;
c. a manned spacecraft may enter the airspace without prior
consent for the purpose of making an emergency landing, but
shall be subject to the provisions of Section b. 403
The proposal then suggests that it would be appropriate for any
state to divert or destroy any spacecraft which might enter its airspace without having previously received permission to do so. It further suggests the possibility of liability or damages as the result of
unlawful diversion or destruction. Provjsions for the registration
of spacecraft by national and international authorities, the assignment of registration marks, registration as evidence of nationality,
and registration as proof of ownership are also incorporated. The
operation of spacecraft by private persons or corporations is acknowledged and provjsions for the licensing of such craft only to
nationals are n1ade. The purpose of this proposal is to insure a
continuing state of responsibility for private operators. However,
other portions of the draft proposal make it clear that the public
entities, states or international organizations, responsible for the
launching of spacecraft should be liable for injury, damage, or
loss caused by the craft or any of its parts. Liability is limited to
fifty million United States dollars. Finally, this British draft calls
for the assistance and return of personnel and the spacecraft to the
launching authority. In the event of dispute, not otherwise resolved,
the code provides for the jurisdiction of the International Court of
J ustice. 404
The importance of establishing and recognizing suitable principles
for an effective law of outer space has been noted by many private
403
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co1nmentators. Authoritative expressions have been presented in
many forums, particularly at the meetings of the International
Astronautical Congresses, the proceedings of 'vhich have been published each year since 1959 in the 'vell-kno,vn colloquia on the law
of outer space. 405 Responsible views have also been presented during
the annual meetings of the American Society of International Law,
particularly. in 1.956, 19·58, 1961, and 1963. 406
The views expressed by legal authorities on these occasions have
reflected the attitudes and policies put for,vard herein under the
heading of "General Principles of La,v," and the positions taken at
the United Nations, by the Space Foru1n of the Association of the
Bar, by the International Law Association, by the Inter-American
Bar Association, by the American Bar Association, and by the
Davies Study Group. The co1nmonality of vie,vpoint, and the fairly
general recognition of urgency, suggest that Inany principles have
been recognized and clarified. It also suggests that serious efforts
'vill continue to be made to refine principles into rules, so that there
'vill soon be a rather substantial an1ount of treaty la 'v providing a
certain legal structure for n1any outer space activities. It may be
hoped, as many have suggested, that progress should go for,vard
around such fundamental principles as freedo1n of use, 'vith resulting diversity of use, peaceful cooperation with the 'videst possible
distribution of benefits to all mankind, and, to the extent that disputes may arise, upon the basis of third party adjudication. Rejection of this last mentioned principle 1nay be said to constitute a
basic repudiation of la'v per se. 401
6. The Problem of Analogies

In the development of the law of outer space n1any references
have been made to the use of analogies. The constantly recurring
theme of analogy has, in effect, been rivaled only by the variety
suggested. These have included the high seas, territorial waters,
contiguous zones, continental shelf, artificial islands, airspace, land,
the Antarctica, and international rivers and river basins. A very
broad area of man's past experience is suggested by this variety and
how it has been brought to bear-in large or small amounts, depending on . the analogy-on Inan's diverse interests and activities in
space. However, it must be re1nembered that the device of analogy
is but a means of making a co1nparison, ~ild that, as analogy~ it
4 05
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offers no precedent. 'Vhen analogizing, one must be alert to the fact
that in the co1npared situations there 1nay exist major differences as
well as the possibility of so1ne striking si~nilarities. Appropriate
e1nphasis n1ust be placed upon each during the process of applying
the principles and rules conditioned by historic forces derived fro1n
one set of situations to thjs ne,Yly exploitable environn1ent.
a. High Seas, Territorial lVaters, Contiguous Zones, Continental Shelf, and L-lrtificial Islands
In order to understand that sea analogies are meaningful for
outer space, it is "Tell to recall that the la'v of the sea contains
principles and rules 'Yhich have effectively served the interests of
peoples, states, and the "rorlcl con1n1unity, and have offered to nations
a 1naxilnu1n of security in accord 'vith their need for ongoing selfprotection. 1"'he sa1ne principles and rules have provided for a 'vide
sharing of a res conununis o1nniu1n 'vith substantial benefits to Ulankind. 408 'Vhen an experience has been so generally beneficial and
satisfactory, it is but natural to turn to it and endeavor to repeat
it in another environ1nent.
''Tith the develop1nent of 1nan's space capabilities, first taking the
for1n of rockets and ballistic n1issiles, it became obvious that early
devices possessed enor1nous military significance. In this context, the
la'v of the sea 'vas soon called upon to provide support for the
broad idea that there should be a national right to protect a state
against threats to national security from outer 'space: and, in particular, that a state's sovereignty should be extended to great distances
out into space. Thus, the zonal concepts of sea law· ''ere adduced in
support of private vie,vs that there should be national sovereignty
above the earth~s surface to distances varying from I-Ialey's aerodynan1ical boundary 409-about 52 1niles above the surface-to
Cooper's proposals, often n1odified, ranging bet,veen 52 to 300 to
600 to an indefinite nu1nber of 1niles, n1odified by 1nore recent prol\IcDougal and Burke, The Public Order of tlte Oceans 1-88 (1962) ;
Schachter has noted the relevance of the international law of the sea to the
emerging international law of outer space. Further, "the analogy of the high
seas can only be useful if full regard is had for the differences in conditions,
techniques and objectives between maritime and . 'spatial' activity. 'Vith this
reservation, analogy (or the extension of traditio1:1al concepts) may serve the
useful function of facilitating the acceptance of legal rules in novel situations."
Schachter, "A Preview of Space Law Problems," 1DG8 New York County Lawyers Association Bar Bulletin 34 (June 1D58) ; Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Syntposium. Supra, note 10, Chapter I, at 346.
~o9 Haley, "SurYey of Legal Opinion on Extraterrestrial Jurisdiction," Third
Colloquiu1n, Appendix 5, p. 54; Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Symposium, supra, note 10, Chapter I, at 733.
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posals suggesting only 80 to 100 miles. 410 The literature contains
1nany varying distances as related to sovereignty. The early pro·
posals \vere based largely on speculation concerning the capabilities
of space devices; all being heavily influenced by concerns for national
security. However, the legal-political process could not, in the early
stages, receive immediate guidance from science and technology
relative to ultimate space capabilities, nor as to measurements of
the presence of precise atmospheric amounts at great distances.
Thus, for a while, lasting down to about 1960, emphasis turned
a\vay fron1 the effort to fix precise li1nits within which airspace type
sovereignty n1ight be exercised over space devices. During this time
it was recognized that national protective Ineasures 'vere not restricted to areas over which sovereignty was exercised, 411 because of
the realization that so far as space devices were concerned their
potential danger was not at all related to mere "overness." This
conclusion \vas in part based on the fact that where distances are
great, substantial difficulties exist in the preparation of orbiting
space devices for potentially aggressive 1nilitary purposes. Additionally, it became apparent that space devices could orbit for extended periods 'vith perigees as low as 100 statute miles, and, that
perigee heights 1night be further considerably reduced, at least for
relatively small satellites and for at least a relatively sn1all number
of orbits.
These factors have produced several results. For example, they
have soine,vhat strengthened the den1and for fixing a relatively low
line to \vhich airspace sovereignty 1nay extend, and thereby an
equally lo'v line for the legal regin1e of outer space. Additionally,
they have supported the 'visdo1n of the broadest of the sea law
Cooper's views may be consulted in "High A.ltitude Flight and ~ational
Sovereignty," 4 International Law Quarterly 418 (1951) ; "Legal Problems of
Upper Space," 1956 Proceedings of the American Society of International La1v
92 (1956) ; The Tinws (London), September 2, 1957, p. 9; "::\lissiles and Satellites: The Law and Our National Policy," 44 American Bar Association Journal
321 (1958) ; "International Control of Outer Space-Some Preliminary Problems," Third Colloquium 22 (1960). The legal adviser to the State Departmentp
Loftus Becker, posed the figure of 10,000 miles in 1958, Becker, "~lajor Aspects
of the Problem of Outer Space," 380 Department of State Bulletin 966 (1958).
For views on the law of the air, see Goedhuis, "Questions of Public International Air Law," 81 Recueil des Cours 205 (1952), and compare Kucherov,.
"Soviet Attitude toward International Law and Outer Space," Soviet Space
Pt·ograms, supra, note 10, Chapter I, at 194-203.
411 Chief Justice l\Iarshall stated in 1804 that the state's "power to secure
itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.'p
Clt urch v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187.
410

250
analogies, natnely, that there should be sovereign control over the
.airspace si1nilar to the right of a state to exercise sovereign control
QVer territorial 'vaters and that just as the high seas are free of
-exclusive sovereign control, so also the area to be known as outer
space should be free of exclusive sovereign control. The force of this
analysis led, 'vithout dissent, to the adoption of the General Assembly's Resolution 1721 A l.(b) (XVI), which promulgated the
previously established custo1nary la 'v that "Outer space and celestial
bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity
'vith international la'v and are not subject to national appropriation." 4 : 2 Thus, it 1nay be positively stated that outer space and
celestial bodies: like the high seas, 1nay not be 1nade the subject of
any state's exclusive sovereignty. This, of course, does not lin1it the
right of a state to enjoy internatioi1al peace and security, nor does
it inhibit a state's legitimate right of self-defense. Neither does it
resolve the proble1n of deter1nining 'vhere airspace ends and outer
space begins, nor establish precise activities in which a state 1nay
engage 'vhile pursuing the peaceful purposes impressed upon it by
the current la,v. Ho,vever, it is absolutely clear that a state, and
others, may engage in the same kind of peaceful activities in outer
space as a state, and others, may pursue on the high seas, and for
the same purposes. Legitimate defensive activities may be carried on
in both environments, since both are man-oriented and 1nust serve
his national and cotnmunity values.
Resolution 1721 (XVI) 1nade no effort to define the reahn of
outer space and did not carry into this environment the fixedalbeit uncertain-zonal concepts of territorial 'vaters and high seas.
The legal situation 'vas accurately depicted by Ambassador Stevenson prior to the adoption of the resolution. He stated in 1961 to the
First Comn1ittee ho'v fortunate it "-ras that "the value of the principles of freedotn of space and celestial bodies does not depend on
the dra 'ving of a boundary line. If I 1nay cite the analogy of the
high seas, "·e have been able to confir1n the principle of freedom
of the seas even in the absence of con1plete agreement as to where
the seas begin." 413
The i1nportance of establishing a fixed distance above the subjacent state as the up"'ard boundary of exclusive po,ver cannot be
overlooked. This point can best be esta~pshed by means of express
agreement in vie'v of the needs of certainty and specificity. It
springs directly fro1n the vast peace, security, and defensive-as
412
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affected by all of the other considerations of the social complexrequirenlents of the present ''orld. In the event that express agreement cannot be realized, the forces of custo1n and usage 'vill undoubtedly provide the ultimate bounds of national sovereignty..At
the present time, however, custom and usage are unable to provide
suitable guidance for precise li1nits of such a boundary because of
the constant change in science and technology. At the ti1ne of this
writing, the typical miniinu1n perigee of 1nanned spacecraft is 100
miles. The future may ''ell bring a reduction of this altitude, but in
any event, in the course ·of a launch and return to earth-particularly "~hen advanced hybrid craft are employed-it 1nay be aiiticipated that relatively flat trajectories, at heights of 25 to 60 Iniles,
'vill extend in lateral distance as far as 7,000 to 10,000 n1iles.
Under these probable circun1stances, the maritime analogy of
territorial waters for spacecraft when in airspace ('vi thin 'vhich the
subjacent state exercises full sovereignty) 1nay be en1ployed. The
concept of innocent passage through airspace for the forthcoming
landing of a spacecraft has been frequently suggested. 414 Ho,vever,
inasmuch as a state n1ay undertake security measures in areas over
which it does not exercise sovereignty, for1nalization and highly specific clarification of space activities may be required. Thus, the
concept of contiguous zones 1nay be developed for areas situated
above the upward or lateral reach of the exclusive sovereignty of
the underlying state and the legal rationale underlying air defense
identification zones ''ould appear applicable to these outer reaching
areas beyond sovereign control. 415
It does not appear that a subjacent state will be able to exploit
outer space in the same 1nanner that a littoral state is able to use
the resources of the continental shelf. It is, in fact, difficult to
imagine any exploitative parallel bet,-veen areas in space and those
underlying the high seas closely proxi1nate to a surface continental
land n1ass. The Truman Proclan1ation ter1ned such a shelf to be "an
extension of the land-1nass of the coastal nation and thus naturally
appurtenant to it * * *" 416 Although the United States proclan1ation
414 Horsford, "Principles of International Law in Spaceflight," 5 St. Louis
University Law Journal 73 (1958). Compare articles in the Space Law· Colloquia.
415 ~IacChesney, U.S. Naval War College Internat-ional Law Situatio-n a1ul
Documents, 1956, 579-600 (1957) ; )!artial, "State Control of the Air Space
over the rerritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," 30 Canadian Bar Review
245 ()larch 1952).
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tnade reference to self-protection, it also declared that "The character as high seas of the 'vaters above the continental shelf and
the right to their free and uni1npeded navigation are in no way
thus affected." 417 1"'his has since been recognized in ...t\.rticle 3 of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. 418 Thus, if any
co1nparison affecting outer space is to be made, it must be that the
principles of Resolution 1721 A (XVI), requiring that outer space
be available for free use and exploration, correspond with the rights
possessed on the high seas rather than the primary rights of exploitat ion of natural resources. .A. ny self-defensive :fnctors in1plied in the
continental shelf doctrine are safeguarded, in outer space, via the
concept of sovereignty in airspace and by the doctrine of reasonable
self-defense to ensure the basic right of continued national existence.
\rery little attention has been called to the possible analogy bet,veen an artificial island positioned in the high seas and the perinanent or seiniperinanent space station established in outer space.
rrexas to,vers have been placed in high seas areas on the continental
shelf in order to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources and
for security purposes. Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf specifically takes this into account and authorizes their use for exploitatiYe purposes. The essential natural res ources of outer space are obser,Table scientific data. Thus, there
"~ould appear to be no objection to the establisl11nent of a per1nanent
or se1niper1nanent space station for the gathering of scientific data.
'l"'his would fall 've11 w·ithin the principle that outer space is to be
used for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes.
Franklin, in discussing the use of the continental shelf for purposes other than the exploitation of natural resources, has suggested
that such areas may be justifiably used :for reasonable defensive
purposes. According to him, Article 5 ( 1) of the Convention suggests the test of reasonableness for the exercise of inherent defensive
rights, 41 9 na1nely, that such installations "1nust not result in any
unjustifiable interference 'vith navigation, fishing, or the conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference
'vith funda1nental oceanographic or other scientific research carried
out 'vith the intention of open publication." 420 There is ilo doubt
that "Tho1never installs an artificial island or Texas-type to,ver on
Ibid.
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the high seas retains legal title to it, nor that such an installation
must not unreasonably interfere "\"vith existing sea lanes. l\fany proposals have been made that title to space devices remains in the
launching or operating party, and that the latter should have the
right to repossession of the craft, its parts, and the return of personnel. In this context it may be suggested that a mobile space
platform may be compared to an artificial island. This conclusion
is buttressed by the basic principle that outer space 1nay be freely
used and exploited, subject to the right of each satellite to use the
orbit into which it has been placed. Such craft, so long as it is
used for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes, 1nay
claim exclusive use of its orbital pattern with the corollary right
that there should be no unreasonable interference with the first
occupier's use. To provide for maximum benefits there is an urgent
need for a system of prelaunch registration and inspection procedures and regulated landing processes. The absence of such procedures, ho,vever, need not detract from the validity of this analogy,
nor does the analogy detract fron1 application to outer space of the
basic high seas analogy. In the words of Mr. Justice Story:
Upon the ocean, then, in. time .of peace, all possess an entire
equality. It is the comn1on high,vay of all, appropriated to the
use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior prerogative there. Every ship sails there with the unquestionable
right of pursuing her own lawful busine~s 'vithout interruption;
but whate"{ler may be that business, she is bound to pursue it in
such a manner as Hot to violate the rights of others. 4 2 1
The acceptance of this funda1nental principle, although it provides
n~ detailed help as to the boundary bet,veen sovereign airspace and
the free outer space of Resolution 1721 (XVI), can contribute n1aterially to the evolution of the la'v of outer space.
It 1nay be concluded that outer space has dra,vn heavily on the
legal concept of freedom of the seas and 'vill continue to do so. At
the present ti1ne the concept of territorial 'vaters has only a mini1nal
relation to sovereignty in airspace, and aside fron1 the need of the
c.o rollary of freedom of innocent passage for spacecraft in airspace, it is very speculative as to 'vhether this doctrine can be
accommodated to the needs of outer space. Asstuning that there 'vill
be a precise agreement establishing the upper limits of sovereignty
in airspace, it is entirely foreseeable that outer space 'viii receive
'vith favor the analogy of contiguous zones extending space,vard to
421
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appropriate distances fro1n the joint airspace-outer space bounda.ry.422 .A.dditionally, since both the continental shelf and artifi~ial
islands concepts are based on the right to engage in the reasonable
use of kno"~n resources, they have assisted in establishing the principle that outer space 1nay be reasonably used or exploited, including
the right to obtain from it scientific and technical data beneficial to
1nankind.
b. Airspace
...<\.s "~ith the high seas and related maritime areas, there has been
n1uch serious analysis to deter1nine whether the legal principles and
rules applicable to airspace have any reasonable bearing on outer
space. Although, as previously noted, the doctrine of sovereign
control over airspace has not been accepted for outer space, 423 it is
universally accepted that each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory and territorial waters. 424
The la'v of territorial waters, and, to a much lesser extent, the
la'v of airspace, place emphasis upon practical needs for innocent
passage. Innocent passage requires conduct which is not prejudicial
to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal or subjacent state.
Thus, while a state 1nay arbitrarily exclude anyone fron1 its airspace, it must accept lin1itations upon full sovereignty over territorial 'vaters. Passage in territorial waters is subject to national
laws and regulations, but the latter in turn are subject to appropriate
international agreen1ents and other rules of international law. The
same 1nay become true respecting the use of a state's airspace.
In vie'v of the fact, heretofore stressed, that future landing procedures for spacecraft w·ill involve long flights at relatively lo'v
altitudes above the subjacent territorial areas-perhaps, even including extended passage through national airspace-it no'v appears
likely that the law of outer space 'vill necessarily be required to take
account of, and probably adopt a substantial portion of, the analogy
of innocent passage through territorial 'vaters. It follo,vs then, that
if the function of the spacecraft is such that it may claim the right
of innocent passage through sovereign airspace in the course of
making a landing, it would appear that its function 'vhile in outer
space 1nust not be dissin1ilar, and vice versa. Ho,vever, for this
claim to have validity, it 1nay 'veil be that a requirement as to con422 Seara-Vazquez, "The Functional Regulation of the Extra-Atmospheric
Space," Second Colloquitun 143-144 (1960).
423 Supra, pp. 242-248.
424 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago,
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sistency of conduct, e.g., a guarantee of peaceful use, on the part of
the spacecraft, or similar consistent conduct by its owner, will be
Tequired as a condition precedent to. the enjoyment of the privilege
~of innocent passage in airspace. This, of course, creates no problem
'vhen accepting the basic principle that spacecraft must be used for
peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive or beneficial, purposes. The acceptance
·of this innocent passage analogy, in the context of peaceful purposes,
serves to place great emphasis on the need to achieve specificity as
to the content of the spectrun1 of peaceful purposes.
Although the analogy of sovereign control over airspace has been
rejected for the regime of outer space, the broad sea and the li1nited
:airspace analogy of innocent passage has a direct bearing on space
conduct and space law and has already found its way into the law
in the for1n of United Nation Resolution 1721 (XVI) .425 There is,
ho"Tever, an urgent need to specify, through an express international
agreement, the rights and duties of spacecraft during the course
-of such innocent passage "\vhile engaged in landing procedures.
·Certainly suitable registrations, inspections, and notifications of
proposed launches, prior to launching, may assist in determining
'vhether a spacecraft returning from outer space and passing through
:airspace ''ill be entitled to clai1n a right of innocent passage.
c. Land
Since, as has been asserted, outer space and celestial bodies are
·o riented to serve man's needs, it is not surprising that proprietary
rights relating to the o'vnership and possession of land have a
direct bearing on man's ne'v space dimension. Resolution 1721
Al. (b) (X\TI) promulgated the principle that '~Outer space and
·celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in
conformity with international la'v and are not subject to national
appropriation." The intent behind this principle was to avoid national clain1s of sovereignty, including exclusive use over clain1ed
.areas, for all or parts of outer space and for celestial bodies. Ho,v€ver, as previously suggested, 426 this does not appear to prohibit the
creation of a valid claim for possessory rights respecting the oceupancy of a given orbital pattern, although the extent of such
rights ''ill necessarily become the subject of a convention providing
for n1onetary damages for destruction or interference. Furthermore,
the right, if any, to reoccupy such an orbital pattern following
removal or destruction of the space vehicle through 'vhose activity
·o r presence the initial claim was ·made must also be determined .
425
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l\IcDougal has exa1nined the possibility that exclusive clai1ns n1ay
be n1ade relating to minerals located on celestial bodies, while at
the sa1ne tin1e supposing that spatial-extension resources such as
the void of space, the surfaces of celestial bodies and contiguous
space surrounding celestial bodies ""~in be 1naintained as sharable
resources, open to free access by all." 427 He has seen the value of
the doctrine of occupation respecting the possible future developInent of a rule of la'v applicable to celestial bodies pertaining to
the possibile exclusive acquisition by individuals and others of fixed,
and limited, surface areas. 1\fcDougal iinplies that the use of a land
analogy depends upon the follo,ving contingency: ''In the eventuality, ho,vever, that the general co1nmunity should con1e to tolerate
the exclusi-ve acquisition of the sur~aces of the celestial bodies, it
would still appear in the comn1on interest that the community should
impose the most stringent require1nents of effective occupation for
the establishment of such exclusive acquisition." 428 If this eventuality were to con1e to pass, certain analogies relating to the manner
of staking out clain1s, registration, and the provision of notice
n1ight be borro,ved fron1 earthly practices.
,.Vhile previewing 'vithout forecasting, the possibility of establishing claims to resources-but not to celestial bodies, per se-~fcDougal
has e1nphasized the co1nn1on interests to be served by holding the
great bulk of space resources "open for inclusive enjoy1nent by all,
and not made subject to exclusive acquisition." 429
It is generally agreed today, and certainly this is the position of
the major resource states, that sovereignty is not applicable to outer
space and celestial bodies. This has been explicitly stated by the
Soviet Pre1nier, 1\Ir. 1\:hrushchev, in assertin-g that the depositing
of Soviet pennants on the n1oon has given rise to no special claims
on that planet. 'Vith the clear prospect of manned lunar flights and
the probable 1nanned exploration of the surfaces of celestial bodies,
it 1nay well be that in the future there 'vill arise legal claims-not
for celestial bodies in their entirety-for specific surface seg1nents
or areas 'vhich have been brought under the type of do1nination and
control envisioned by ~fcDougal. Should this co1ne about, it would
appear that there ''ould not be any serious objection to the estab427 ~IcDougal, Lasswell, Vlasic and Smith, ''The Enjoyment and Acquisition
of Resources in Outer Space," 111 Unircrsity of Pennsylvania Laze Review 634
(1963).
4 28 Ibid., 63;:). Comvare, R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisit-ion of Te·rritory in International Law 36-52 (1963).
42 9 Ibid., 636.
See pp. 551-552 for a distinction between three types of resources: Spatial Extension, Flow, and Stock.
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lislunent of proprietary rights over seg1nents or parcels follo,ving
the property la 'v analogies of the earth. It should be noted, ho,vever,
that such activity as n1an 1nay be able to devise and iinplement on
celestial surfaces must conforn1 to the overriding principles heretofore acknowledged, na1nely, use and exploration for peaceful purposes. The establishment of earth rules for property, tort, criminal
law, and other similar types of situations 'vould best be evidenced
by express international agree1nents.
d. Antarctica
'fhe successful negotiation, signature, and ratification o£ the Antarctic Treaty of December 1, 1959, providing continually for its
use for exclusively peaceful purposes has given encouragement to
those \vho seek to 1nini1nize international tension and discord and
to n1axin1ize legal processes. Thus, . A.rticle I of the Treaty provided :
1. Antarctica shall be used for JJeaceful p~trposes only. There
shall be prohibited, inter alia, any n1easure of a military nature,
such as the establislunent of 1nilitary bases and fortifications,
the carrying out of 1nilitary Inaneuvers, as \vell as the testing of
any type of "~eapons.
2. The present treaty shall not prevent the use of military
personnel or equipn1ent for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purposes.430
A strong parallelisn1 as to substance, if not as to forn1, exists respecting permitted uses of Antarctica and outer space.
Prior to the suspension of the need to make national claims and
self-serving staten1ents reserving the right to 1nake clai1ns of sovereignty by reason of the provisions contained in . A.rticle IV of
the .A. ntarctic Treaty, the Legal Adviser of the Departn1ent of State
had pointed to the existence of an analogy between the Antarctic
and outer space. It 'vas his vie,v, in 1958, that at no ti1ne had the
United States "conceded that we have no rights in the higher regions
of space." 431 It was also his vie'v that there ·was no need to make a
clain1 respecting outer space until after 1nan had clen1onstrated a
capability to exist outside the atinosphere, and that even after this
had been ascertained there would be no cause to n1ake an early clain1
to protect national rights. He stated:
A very apt analogy is afforded by the Antarctic. There, for
n1any, many years, the United States has been engaged in activ43041 Departnwnt of State Bulletin 912 (1959); 54 A.J.I.L. 47G (19GO).
(Italics added.)
431 "~fajor Aspects of the Problem of Outer Space," 38 Department of State
Bulletin 966 (1958).
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ities \Yhich under established principles of international law,
'vithout any question 'vhatsoever, created rights upon which the
United States \vould be justified in asserting territorial claims,
that is to say, claims of sovereignty over one or more areas of
the Antarctic. Notwithstanding this fact the United States has
not asserted any clai1n of sovereignty over this portion of Antarctica, although the United States has, at the same time, 1nade
it plain that it did not recognize any such clai1ns made by other
states. 432
It \Vas his vie'v that the United States had expressly reserved rights
and that its noncla.in1 status had not derogated from the rights
flo,ving from its numerous activities in the area.
The validity of the Becker analogy between . A. ntarctica and outer
space has been analyzed by Lissitzyn 'vho has referred to it-in the
context or sovereignty only-as "not altogether convincing." 433 The
Lissitzyn assessment \\Tas published prior to the 1959 T'velve Po,ver
agree1nent on .A.ntarctica, and it \vas his conclusion that both for
practical and legal reasons it \Vas "unlikely that the legal status of
outer space \Yill in the future resemble that of Antarctica." 434
After these views \Yere expressed, the asserted analogy bet,veen
outer space and the Antarctic respecting sovereignty has been entirely dissipated. The Dece1nber 20, 1961, General Asse1nbly Resolution 1721 ( X\TI) specifically negated the concept of so,Tereignty
in outer space. In co1nmenting on the 1neaning of this resolution to
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the American
representative, 1-\.1nbassador Plin1pton, stated on ~iay 4, 1962, "'Ve
have rejected the concept of national sovereignty in outer space.
No 1noon, no planet, shall ever fly a single nation's flag. These
principles are sound principles, and I take this opportunity to
re-endorse then1 heartily on behalf of the United States GovernInent." 435
Ibid. His reference to the effective role of national "activities" in Antarctica varallels the position taken herein that the active use of outer space
for peaceful pnr1wses has helped to establish a pattern of customary international law.
433 Lissitzyn, "The American Position on Outer Space and Antarctica," 53
A.J.l.L. 131 (1959).
434
Ibid. Compare, KucheroY, "Legal Problems of Outer Space," Second Colloquiun~ 69 (1960).
435
U.N. Doc. A/AC.103/PY.2, 13-1G. Compare, Feldman. "The Report of the
IJnited Nations Legal Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: A
Provisional Appraisal," Second Colloquiurn 21 ( 1960).
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In another context, that of 1nanaging international relations in
areas ''"'here sovereignty either does not exist· (outer space) and in
areas 'vhere if it does exist is no'v held in suspension (Antarctica),
certain analogies or paral1elisn1s exist. The problen1 of control is
generic to both areas, and it is entirely possible that processes and
principles acceptable in one area 'vould be beneficial to mankind in
the other area. 436 As has already been pointed out, the t\ro major
resource nations have discussed in the context of disarmament in outer
space the provision, found in Article I of the Antarct~c Treaty,
prescribing the testing of any type of 'veapons. 437
Several writers have noted the analogous relationship bet,veen
outer space and Antarctic proble1ns. The most detailed approach. to
comn1on proble1ns has been 1nade by Faria 'vho has developed a
draft covenant for outer space following much of the language contained in the Antarctic Treaty. Thus, paragraphs 1 and 2 of his
first article accept the concepts of Article I of the Antarctica Treaty,
and provide:
1. The outer space, the 1\ioon, and all uninhabited space
bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be
prohibited, inter alia, any 1neasures of a 1nilitary nature, such
as the establishment of 1nilitary bases and fortifications, the
carrying out of military Inaneuvers, as well as the testing o.f
any type of weapons.
2. The present treaty shall not prevent the use of military
personnel or equip1nent for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purpose. 438
His proposals achnit the need of a space regulatory agency, ackno,vledge the need for space rules, and make provision for penalties .in
the event of infraction. Like the drafts presented at the United
Nat ions and those of private groups, the Faria proposals seek a
structured regi1ne of la,v, including controls, for outer space.
e. International Rivers and River Basins
The discussions concerning the legal rights over international
rivers a~1d river basins have, in a very real sense, de1nonstrated
opposing vie,vpoints 'vhich exist 'vith respect to rights in space.
436
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~7 Supra, pp. 257-258.

Faria, "Draft to an International Covenant for Outer Space-The Treaty
of Antarctica as a Prototype," Third Oolloquiunt 125 (1961).
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In 1958 the Departn1ent of State 1nade public a ~Ien1orandtun
entitled The Use of Systern~ of International 1Vaters. 439 This docuInent placed emphasis upon the fact that general custo1nary interllational la \Y contains principles, rules, concepts, and standards equal
to the task of effecting an equitable distribution of the resources of
J.nternational riYers and riYer basins. 440
.1\.nother point of vie"· on international river and river basin
rights has been put for\vard by Berber, \vho has urged that the only
\vay to establish a regi1ne of la '' for such areas is through the
express process of treaty n1aking. 441 It is true so far as the law of
outer space is concerned that a few nations have asserted it can be
the product only of express agree1nent. This view, however, has
been almost universally rejected by nations not making the assertion,
and as has been heretofore expressed, existing principles of space
la'' haYe been the product of practice and usage. These have no\v
ripened into a custo1nary international la '' of space. l-Ienee, it is
not possible to assert that there exists-eYen assun1ing, but certainly
not admitting the validity of the Berber pren1ise-a valid analogy
between the processes of the law of outer space and the asstuned
exclusively formal processes of riYers and river basins.
There is abundant reason to believe that custo1nary international
la'v ·establishing rights a11d duties respecting international rivers
.and river basin resources no\v exists. If this be true, then the question arises as to the content of such law which may have so1ne application, by \vay of analogy, to the peaceful use and exploration of
outer space.
General principles of la\Y apply to the use of waters of international drainage basins. Thus, Lauterpacht has stated:
The responsibility of a State 1nay be{!oine involYed as the
result of an abuse of a right enjoyed by virtue of International
Law. This occurs ''hen a State aYails itself of its right in an
arbitrary manner in such a \vay as to inflict upon another
State an injury ·which cannot be justified by a legitilnate consideration of its own advantage. * * * The duty of the State
439 Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters with Reference to Columbia-Kootenay River System under Custonwry International Lazv
ana the Treaty of 1909 (1958). Compare, Griffin, "The Use of 'Vaters of In·
ternational Drainage Basins under Customary International Law," 53 .A.J.I.L.
50 (1959). Griffin is the author of the departmental memorandum.
Ho Goldie, ';Special Hegimes and Pre-empth·e ActiYities in International
Law," 11 Int'l &; Comp. L.Q. G83 (1962).
44 1 Berber, Ri1:ers in International Law 156-159, 259-2(36 (1959).
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not to interfere with the flow of a river to the detriment of
other riparian States has its source ·in the same principle. 442
Griffin has noted that the domestic law of a number of important
states, including the United States, contains principles prohibiting
the diversion of a stream in a manner strongly prejudicing those
'vho might otherwise benefit from such a stream. He has also noted
the existence of international judicial decisions denying to states
the use of territorial sovereignty in such a manner as to cause injury
to another state, and he has concluded that these principles are
applicable to the use of water resources in such streams. 443
These are general principles and have no unique applicability to
water resources. Their application to the peaceful uses of outer
space follows as a matter of course. Further, the acceptability of
general customary international law in the field of water uses and
resources gives additional support to its meritorious application to
the use and exploration of outer space.
f. Analogies in Summation
In summary, it may be said that the application of the analogy
of freedo1n of the high seas has been useful and valuable although
neither the la 'v of the sea nor the la 'v of outer space, by 'vay of
analogy or otherwise, have been able to offer final assurance as to
'vhere their boundaries begin. In view of the expected low trajectories to be employed by space vehicles while returning to earth, a
critical legal problem of "Innocent passage" for space vehicles
remains to be resolved. It is to be hoped that the pertinent analogies
to be dra 'vn fro1n both sea la 'v and air la ".,., as 'veil as general
principles of law no matter where found, will provide practical
answers to this situation. General principles, no less than analogies,
will have to serve the ongoing needs of the space age, for as l\fr.
Justice Frankfurter has pointed out with regard to the employment
of analogies in the develop1nent of air law as it may pertain to the
established laws of land or sea, "One of the most treacherous tendencies in legal reasoning is the transfer of generalizations developed
for one set of situations to seemingly analogous, yet essentially very
different, situations." 444
Despite this caution it should also be remembered that 'vith the
advent of the space age, new and important problems are demanding prompt answers. The instances of the behavior of states and
their nationals is increasing in volume and variety. This conduct has
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taken place to a very important degree in the world forun1. The
reasonable control over the uses of outer space, which is afforded by
international law, should not be unduly arrested by a false inability
to ascertain the existence of analogous conditions. ~fore affirmatively the development of an adequate space law·, through the;
I;ational processes of analogy, serves 1nany national and co1nmunity
values.

